The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 14 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms
Open accessAbstract
Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Kastrup argues that idealism—the ontology in which all physical structures are circumscribed by a unitary universal phenomenal consciousness—is plausible and that common objections to it rest on misconceptions. He rebuts objections concerning concreteness, private minds, a stand-alone world, natural laws, brain function, unconscious mentation, solipsism, and cosmic history.
Key findings
- Idealism is defined by two propositions: phenomenal consciousness is irreducible, and everything else—the whole of nature—is reducible to a unitary and universal phenomenal consciousness.
- Appeals to the felt concreteness of the world are still appeals to phenomenality; the notion of a world outside consciousness is an explanatory model, not an empirical fact.
- Private minds and a shared, stand-alone world can be explained via dissociation: individual psyches are “alters” of universal consciousness, and mental impingement across dissociative boundaries accounts for sense perception and the world’s independence from personal volition.
- Brain activity and apparent unconscious mentation do not contradict idealism: brain activity is the extrinsic appearance of inner life across a dissociative boundary, and unreportable or unremembered phenomenality can explain Libet-type findings and episodes of seeming unconsciousness.
Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical essay; no original empirical study or sample. It defines competing ontologies and rebuts a series of objections to idealism.
- Analysis is argumentative, drawing on cited psychiatry and neuroscience literature (e.g., dissociation, Libet experiments, sleep/dream research) to show consistency with idealism.
- Main move: reinterpret empirical findings as phenomenality within universal consciousness rather than as evidence for a physical world outside consciousness.
Limitations
- Stated: the paper says interpretations of cosmopsychism not consistent with idealism “shall not be further addressed”; it has no formal limitations section.
- Evident from the text: no original data, experiments, or quantitative results; the case rests on conceptual coherence and secondary empirical citations.
- Evident from the text: it addresses “the most common objections” rather than an exhaustive survey, and it does not resolve the hard problem of consciousness.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 0 Not valid · 11 Not checked · 82 Own results and interpretations
In the paper
“it is now well established in psychiatry that mental contents can undergo 'a disruption of and/or discontinuity in [their] normal integration' (Black and Grant 2014: 191).”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Black and Grant 2014: 191
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“No phenomenal quality can be construed as direct evidence for something outside phenomenality.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A stone allegedly outside consciousness, in and by itself, is entirely abstract and has no qualities.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The notion that there is a world outside and independent of the phenomenal is an explanatory model , not an empirical fact.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“all we can assert with confidence upon coming round from episodes of seeming unconsciousness is that we cannot remember phenomenality occurring during those episodes.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
59 more claims
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 16
- It may state two separate claims as one. 15
Citations
Cites
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Libet, B. (1985) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00044903 · Cited by 2,623
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 1×
“For instance, Tononi (2004) has shown that reportable experiences correlate only with complex networks of information integration in the brain.”
The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious
Jung, C. G. (2014) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315725642 · Cited by 1,767
Monism: The Priority of the Whole
Schaffer, J. (2010) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-025 · Cited by 925
The quest for consciousness: a neurobiological approach
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1543 · Cited by 812
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Tsuchiya, N., Wilke, M., Frässle, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002 · Cited by 551 · cited 1×
“The argument above is not idiosyncratic, for the existence of unreportable phenomenality is well established in neuroscience to-day (Tsuchiya et al. 2015, Vandenbroucke et al. 2014).”
Re-representing consciousness: dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness
Schooler, J. W. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01949-6 · Cited by 485 · cited 2×
“Indeed, as elaborated upon by Schooler (2002), reportability is an extra function at a metacognitive level, on top of phenomenality proper.”
Incognito: the secret lives of the brain
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-2368 · Cited by 308
Skrbina, D. (2017) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11084.001.0001 · Cited by 279
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Kihlstrom, John and Cork, Randall. 2007. Anesthesia. In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ed. by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cited by
Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie?
Spiegel, T. J. (2020) · Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie · doi:10.1515/dzph-2020-0003 · Cited by 26
A beautiful loop: An active inference theory of consciousness.
Laukkonen, R., Friston, K., & Chandaria, S. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106296 · Cited by 45
“Even the metaphysical assumptions underlying the science of consciousness still result in fierce debates (Kuhn, 2024; Fleming et al., 2023; Kastrup, 2008).”
The View from Everywhere: Realist Idealism without God
Yetter‐Chappell, H. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780197795057.001.0001 · Cited by 15
Forms of Life and Subjectivity: Rethinking Sartre’s Philosophy
Garrido, D. R. (2021) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0259 · Cited by 7
Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy
Kastrup, B. (2018) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 7
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Kastrup, B.
- Corresponding author
- Kastrup, Bernardo
- ORCID
- Kastrup, Bernardo
- Venue
- Disputatio
- Publisher
- Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- Published
- 2017-05-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 44
- Pages
- 13-34
- ISSN
- 0873-626X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2736026129
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 11 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 1.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Disputatio (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- idealism, phenomenal consciousness, ontology, physicalism, panpsychism, phenomenal experience, brain function, objective world, metaphysics of mind
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