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Post-Populism: Transitions from Populist to Personalist Authoritarian Rule

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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 92 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Populism is a political strategy in which political leaders directly mobilize support through mass communication, typically posing as the opponents of an entrenched political elite. Although a growing body of research shows that populists draw on their mass support to weaken executive constraints, less attention has been given to what follows this populist turn. Specifically, under what circumstances are populists capable of leveraging their erstwhile mass support into authoritarian rule over the long-term? In contrast to other studies that put the durability of formal and informal democratic institutions to the fore, and unlike most current research on populism, drawing on detailed studies of Vladimir Putin in Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, we explain the personalization of power under populist leadership by examining how such leaders manage other elites; that is, we place the degree, timing, and nature of elite cohort replacement at the center of our argument.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that populists transition to personalist authoritarian rule not mainly because of ideology or formal institutions, but through elite cohort replacement: using appointment powers to replace initial elite collaborators with loyalists. It illustrates this with Putin in Russia and Erdoğan in Turkey, showing variation in how thoroughly and quickly leaders accomplish that transformation.

Key findings

  • Populists begin with narrow, contingent elite backing; only those who remove elite constraints can erode broader institutional constraints after mass support declines. In Russia, Putin’s May 2000 cabinet had only 3 of 29 ministers with prior ties to him; by mid-2000 he controlled at best about 15% of roughly 150 key political/civil-service officials, and the “old” elite dominated by about two to one until late 2003. By 2007–2010, almost 30% of the most important officials came from Putin’s pre-presidential associates; after 2012 he began a second replacement round, and among 33 cabinet ministers in 2020 arguably only Dmitry Patrushev retained personal affiliation with Putin.
  • In Turkey, the AKP was founded in 2001 and remained in power through consecutive victories for more than 20 years; Erdoğan first won the Istanbul mayoralty in 1994 with a 25% plurality. Almost 50% of AKP-era cabinet ministers had a Master’s or PhD, and cabinet members with military backgrounds declined after 2002 and were absent before the 2016 coup attempt. After the failed 2016 coup, 125,678 public officials were removed via decree laws; 20,077 Turkish Armed Forces members were discharged, 1,243 stripped of rank, and 4,360 judges/prosecutors removed; the Interior Ministry saw 38,578 dismissals and 5,679 suspensions, including 31,000 police officers.
  • State-business relations were central to Turkey’s post-populist elite replacement: the AKP made over 150 legal changes to public procurement, and between 2002 and 2015 AKP-connected firms secured around 38% of contract value, TÜSİAD and affiliates 13%, foreign firms about 4%, while “local others” won 45% of 49,355 auctions but only one fourth of total contract value.
  • The US under Trump is presented as a counterexample: despite efforts to undermine democratic institutions, Trump lacked loyalist networks throughout government, was viewed with suspicion by the military, and had no effect on the economic elite’s composition, so democracy held.

Methods

  • Comparative case studies of Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey, developing a theoretical framework of “post-populism” centered on elite management and elite cohort replacement.
  • For Russia, the paper draws on monthly expert surveys of the top 100 most influential political actors from 1999 to 2016, covering 537 individuals and coding shared personal, educational, or professional ties; it also uses Levada approval data and the V-Dem presidentialism index.
  • For Turkey, the analysis relies on secondary literature and descriptive data on cabinet composition, military-civilian relations, judicial purges, state-business procurement, and post-2016 coup dismissals; no equivalent monthly elite panel is described.

Limitations

  • The paper states no limitations. (stated)
  • Evident: the design selects two cases that both made the transition to personalist authoritarian rule, so it cannot systematically test why other populists fail; the US counterexample is illustrative rather than a matched comparison.
  • Evident: the evidence is asymmetric—Russia has original monthly expert-survey data on elite ties, while Turkey relies on secondary sources and descriptive statistics, limiting direct comparability; Russian elite ties are reconstructed from expert assessments and media reports.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.33774/apsa-2023-zpppw

Cites

72 of 72 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Fig 1 Elite Composition of Russia's Ruling Coalition Note: Per cent of individuals in the ruling coalition with shared personal or professional affiliation with Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Based on monthly expert surveys of the Top 100 most influential politicians in Russia (in presidential administration, cabinet, top state companies and institutions, security agencies, most important private company CEOs or owners, etc) (Baturo and Jelkink 2021, 205-14).
Fig 1 Elite Composition of Russia's Ruling Coalition Note: Per cent of individuals in the ruling coalition with shared personal or professional affiliation with Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Based on monthly expert surveys of the Top 100 most influential politicians in Russia (in presidential administration, cabinet, top state companies and institutions, security agencies, most important private company CEOs or owners, etc) (Baturo and Jelkink 2021, 205-14).From the PDF
Fig 2 Elite Composition in Political and Economic Segments Note: Per cent of individuals in the ruling coalition with shared personal or professional affiliation with Vladimir Putin, with either cabinet/presidential administration, or in private business or major state companies. The data are explained in Figure 1.
Fig 2 Elite Composition in Political and Economic Segments Note: Per cent of individuals in the ruling coalition with shared personal or professional affiliation with Vladimir Putin, with either cabinet/presidential administration, or in private business or major state companies. The data are explained in Figure 1.From the PDF
Fig 3 Approval and the Concentration of Power. Note: The left vertical axis reports the percentage of respondents who approve of the activity of Vladimir Putin: "In general do you approve or disapprove of the activity of Vladimir Putin as president (prime minister) of Russia?" Based on monthly data from http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/. The right axis reports annual
Fig 3 Approval and the Concentration of Power. Note: The left vertical axis reports the percentage of respondents who approve of the activity of Vladimir Putin: "In general do you approve or disapprove of the activity of Vladimir Putin as president (prime minister) of Russia?" Based on monthly data from http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/. The right axis reports annualFrom the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

1 Valid · 7 Not valid · 71 Not checked · 119 Own results and interpretations

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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 72 references

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Applebaum, A. (2020). Twilight of democracy : the seductive lure of authoritarianism (First edition. ed.). New York: Doubleday.
  2. Baker, P., & Glasser, S. (2022). The divider : Trump in the White House, 2017-2021 (First edition. ed.). New York: Doubleday.
  3. Canovan, M. (1981). Populism (1st ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
  4. Kenny, P. D. (2017). Populism and patronage : why populists win elections in India, Asia, and beyond (First edition. ed.). Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  5. Ledeneva, A. (2006). How Russia Really Works. Informal Practices in Politics and Business : Cornell University Press New York, NY.
  6. Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die (First edition. ed.). New York: Crown.
  7. McGlynn, J. (2023). Russia's war . Medford: Polity Press.
  8. Moffitt, B. (2020). Populism . Cambridge, U.K. ; Medford, Massachusetts: Polity Press.
  9. Müller, J.-W. (2016). What is populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
  10. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2018). Cultural backlash : Trump, Brexit, and the rise of authoritarian-populism . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
  11. Short, P. (2022). Putin (First US edition. ed.). New York: Henry Holt and Company.
  12. Weyland, K. (2017). A political-strategic approach. The Oxford handbook of populism , 4873.

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Metadata

Authors
Balta, E., Baturo, A., & Kenny, P.
Affiliations
  • Özyeğin University (TR)
  • Dublin City University (IE)
  • Australian Catholic University (AU)
Published
2023-08-23
OpenAlex
W4386086173
Cited by
2
References
62
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2023: 1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Populism, Right-Wing Movements
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
populism, authoritarianism, personalization of power, populist leaders, Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, political elites, democratic backsliding

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Post-Populism: Transitions from Populist to Personalist Authoritarian Rule. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.33774/apsa-2023-zpppw
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Balta, E., Baturo, A., & Kenny, P. (2023). Post-Populism: Transitions from Populist to Personalist Authoritarian Rule. https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2023-zpppw

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