Post-Populism: Transitions from Populist to Personalist Authoritarian Rule
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 92 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Populism is a political strategy in which political leaders directly mobilize support through mass communication, typically posing as the opponents of an entrenched political elite. Although a growing body of research shows that populists draw on their mass support to weaken executive constraints, less attention has been given to what follows this populist turn. Specifically, under what circumstances are populists capable of leveraging their erstwhile mass support into authoritarian rule over the long-term? In contrast to other studies that put the durability of formal and informal democratic institutions to the fore, and unlike most current research on populism, drawing on detailed studies of Vladimir Putin in Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, we explain the personalization of power under populist leadership by examining how such leaders manage other elites; that is, we place the degree, timing, and nature of elite cohort replacement at the center of our argument.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that populists transition to personalist authoritarian rule not mainly because of ideology or formal institutions, but through elite cohort replacement: using appointment powers to replace initial elite collaborators with loyalists. It illustrates this with Putin in Russia and Erdoğan in Turkey, showing variation in how thoroughly and quickly leaders accomplish that transformation.
Key findings
- Populists begin with narrow, contingent elite backing; only those who remove elite constraints can erode broader institutional constraints after mass support declines. In Russia, Putin’s May 2000 cabinet had only 3 of 29 ministers with prior ties to him; by mid-2000 he controlled at best about 15% of roughly 150 key political/civil-service officials, and the “old” elite dominated by about two to one until late 2003. By 2007–2010, almost 30% of the most important officials came from Putin’s pre-presidential associates; after 2012 he began a second replacement round, and among 33 cabinet ministers in 2020 arguably only Dmitry Patrushev retained personal affiliation with Putin.
- In Turkey, the AKP was founded in 2001 and remained in power through consecutive victories for more than 20 years; Erdoğan first won the Istanbul mayoralty in 1994 with a 25% plurality. Almost 50% of AKP-era cabinet ministers had a Master’s or PhD, and cabinet members with military backgrounds declined after 2002 and were absent before the 2016 coup attempt. After the failed 2016 coup, 125,678 public officials were removed via decree laws; 20,077 Turkish Armed Forces members were discharged, 1,243 stripped of rank, and 4,360 judges/prosecutors removed; the Interior Ministry saw 38,578 dismissals and 5,679 suspensions, including 31,000 police officers.
- State-business relations were central to Turkey’s post-populist elite replacement: the AKP made over 150 legal changes to public procurement, and between 2002 and 2015 AKP-connected firms secured around 38% of contract value, TÜSİAD and affiliates 13%, foreign firms about 4%, while “local others” won 45% of 49,355 auctions but only one fourth of total contract value.
- The US under Trump is presented as a counterexample: despite efforts to undermine democratic institutions, Trump lacked loyalist networks throughout government, was viewed with suspicion by the military, and had no effect on the economic elite’s composition, so democracy held.
Methods
- Comparative case studies of Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey, developing a theoretical framework of “post-populism” centered on elite management and elite cohort replacement.
- For Russia, the paper draws on monthly expert surveys of the top 100 most influential political actors from 1999 to 2016, covering 537 individuals and coding shared personal, educational, or professional ties; it also uses Levada approval data and the V-Dem presidentialism index.
- For Turkey, the analysis relies on secondary literature and descriptive data on cabinet composition, military-civilian relations, judicial purges, state-business procurement, and post-2016 coup dismissals; no equivalent monthly elite panel is described.
Limitations
- The paper states no limitations. (stated)
- Evident: the design selects two cases that both made the transition to personalist authoritarian rule, so it cannot systematically test why other populists fail; the US counterexample is illustrative rather than a matched comparison.
- Evident: the evidence is asymmetric—Russia has original monthly expert-survey data on elite ties, while Turkey relies on secondary sources and descriptive statistics, limiting direct comparability; Russian elite ties are reconstructed from expert assessments and media reports.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
1 Valid · 7 Not valid · 71 Not checked · 119 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“there is little proof of one between authoritarianism and populist support per se”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Bartels, 2023 matched to “Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe” (2023) source
- Partly supportedcites Schäfer, 2022 matched to “Cultural Backlash? How (Not) to Explain the Rise of Authoritarian Populism” (2022) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Authoritarian-Populist Parties,” the paper reports no statistically significant effect of authoritarian values on voting for authoritarian-populist parties once other factors are taken into account. But “Populist Attitudes” reports a significant negative association between its authoritarian-values scale and populist attitudes, so the broader claim of little evidence of any association is not fully supported. (LLM, conf=0.83)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Again, Trump had no effect whatsoever on the composition of the country's economic elite (Pierson, 2017), hardly a surprise given the size and diversity of the American economy compared with somewhere like resource-dependent Russia.”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites Pierson, 2017 matched to “American hybrid: Donald Trump and the strange merger of populism and plutocracy” (2017) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “More plutocrat than populist: Trump in office,” Pierson describes wealthy appointees and continuity in the Republican economic agenda. The abstract says plutocrats’ interests typically prevailed in government. Neither passage addresses whether Trump changed the composition of the country’s economic elite; searches for that claim and for changes in elite membership found no such finding. (LLM, conf=0.73)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Then, the concentration of power increased quite dramatically, particularly in 2012 and 2013.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As also shown in Figure 3, Putin's concentration of power, as measured from the presidentialism index, jumped most notably in the period 2011 to 2014, precisely when he faced protests and declining popularity in the polls.”
plainstates an associationSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As seen from the data on the elite composition of Russia's ruling coalition displayed in Figure 1, from 2012, when Putin returned to his second 'first' term, he began a second round of elite replacement.”
plainstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
114 more claims
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 68
- Probably not a substantial claim. 18
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ Elite Turnover in Russia · p. 13
“Only in late 2003 does Putin's 'new' elite break through and clearly come to dominate the ruling coalition.”
§ Elite Turnover in Russia · p. 13
“While both 'old' and 'new' elites have remained in parity from late 2003 to late 2004, from December 2004 Putin's group has become clearly dominant.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Post-Populism: A Theoretical Framework · p. 7
“Hitler had such limited control over the military in his first year in office that the possibility that President Paul von Hindenburg and Defence Minister General Werner von Blomberg would use the military to declare an end to the 'Hitler experiment' was very real until at least the purging of the SA in the night of the Long Knives (June 30, 1944)”
§ Post-Populism: A Theoretical Framework · p. 6
“Adolf Hitler, as is well-known, was appointed German Chancellor in 1933”
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Cited by
From Democracy to Personalist Electoral Autocracy: The Case of Hungary
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Metadata
- Authors
- Balta, E., Baturo, A., & Kenny, P.
- Affiliations
- Özyeğin University (TR)
- Dublin City University (IE)
- Australian Catholic University (AU)
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2023-08-23
- OpenAlex
- W4386086173
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2023: 1
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Populism, Right-Wing Movements
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Keywords
- populism, authoritarianism, personalization of power, populist leaders, Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, political elites, democratic backsliding
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