The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Open accessAbstract
We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect.Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives.We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire.Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior.Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
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Cites
Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-2271-7 · Cited by 26,772
The Theory of the Leisure Class
Veblen, T. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/owc/9780199552580.001.0001 · Cited by 5,279
Bem, D. J. (1972) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60024-6 · Cited by 5,241
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Self-citationThe Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence
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The Theory of Moral Sentiments
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Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00150 · Cited by 3,011
Cognitive consequences of forced compliance.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0041593 · Cited by 2,945
Cited by
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Self-citationExploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z · Cited by 1,445
Delmas, M. A., Fischlein, M., & Asensio, O. I. (2013) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.109 · Cited by 672
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2011) · doi:10.3386/w17579 · Cited by 227
Dose, D. B., Walsh, G., Beatty, S. E., & Elsner, R. (2019) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1007/s11747-019-00635-z · Cited by 60
Metadata
- Authors
- Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2005-08
- OpenAlex
- W2891249453
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 53
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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