The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Open accessAbstract
We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect.Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives.We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire.Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior.Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-2271-7 · Cited by 26,772
The Theory of the Leisure Class
Veblen, T. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/owc/9780199552580.001.0001 · Cited by 5,279
Bem, D. J. (1972) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60024-6 · Cited by 5,241
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Self-citationThe Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence
Andreoni, J. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261662 · Cited by 3,162
The Theory of Moral Sentiments
Smith, A. (2010) · The Two Narratives of Political Economy · doi:10.1002/9781118011690.ch10 · Cited by 3,127
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00150 · Cited by 3,011
Cognitive consequences of forced compliance.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0041593 · Cited by 2,945
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Performance Pay and Productivity
Lazear, E. P. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.5.1346 · Cited by 2,487
Posner, R. A. (1974) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1227682 · Cited by 2,239
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175
Not just for the money: an economic theory of personal motivation
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-1009 · Cited by 1,955
Valuing public goods: The purchase of moral satisfaction
Kahneman, D., & Knetsch, J. L. (1992) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/0095-0696(92)90019-s · Cited by 1,941
Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193913 · Cited by 1,539
Self-citationExploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z · Cited by 1,445
Bernheim, B. D. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261957 · Cited by 1,304
The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance
Akerlof, G. A., & Dickens, W. T. (2005) · Explorations in Pragmatic Economics · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199253906.003.0009 · Cited by 1,133
Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
Bagwell, L. S., & Bernheim, B. D. (1996) · American Economic Review · Cited by 966
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Self-citationCostly Signaling and Cooperation
GINTIS, H., SMITH, E. A., & BOWLES, S. (2001) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 · Cited by 862
A Signaling Explanation for Charity
Glazer, A., & Konrad, K. A. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_43 · Cited by 688
Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203330 · Cited by 643
Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor
Freeman, R. B. (1997) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209859 · Cited by 630
An economic model of moral motivation
Brekke, K. A., Kverndokk, S., & Nyborg, K. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00222-5 · Cited by 615
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421167 · Cited by 610
Self-citationSect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews*
Berman, E. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554944 · Cited by 541
Harbaugh, W. T. (1998) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(97)00062-5 · Cited by 529
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
Reiss, S. (2012) · Teaching of Psychology · doi:10.1177/0098628312437704 · Cited by 439
Models and helping: Naturalistic studies in aiding behavior.
Bryan, J. H., & Test, M. A. (1967) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0024826 · Cited by 403
Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
Carrillo, J. D., & Mariotti, T. (2000) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00142 · Cited by 395
An Economic Analysis of "Acting White"
Austen-Smith, D., & Fryer, R. G. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/120.2.551 · Cited by 394
Design Innovation and Fashion CyclesPreprint
Pesendorfer, W. (1993) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 324
Self-Signaling and Diagnostic Utility in Everyday Decision Making
Bodner, R., & Prelec, D. (2003) · The Psychology of Economic Decisions · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199251063.003.0006 · Cited by 258
Honestly, why are you driving a BMW?
Johansson-Stenman, O., & Martinsson, P. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.08.006 · Cited by 226
Incentives and Careers in Organizations
Gibbons, R. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5705 · Cited by 195
Altruism and Prosocial Behavior
Lay, J. C., & Hoppmann, C. A. (2015) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-287-080-3_69-1 · Cited by 174
Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
Kőszegi, B. (2010) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-009-0465-x · Cited by 170
Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?Preprint
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.313028 · Cited by 140
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual IncompletenessPreprint
Fehr, E., Klein, A., & Schmidt, K. M. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.262015 · Cited by 136
The price of a price: on the crowding out and in of social norms
Janssen, M. C. W., & Mendys-Kamphorst, E. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2002.11.004 · Cited by 117
Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments
Murnighan, J. K., Oesch, J. M., & Pillutla, M. M. (2001) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0847 · Cited by 113
The non-monetary nature of gifts
Prendergast, C. J., & Stole, L. (2001) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00102-1 · Cited by 110
Do incentive contracts undermine voluntary cooperation?
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-004373338 · Cited by 107
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary CooperationPreprint
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 98
An Economic Model of Moral MotivationPreprint
Nyborg, K., Brekke, K. A., & Kverndokk, S. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.260583 · Cited by 96
Distrust - the Hidden Cost of ControlPreprint
Falk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.560624 · Cited by 71
Exploiting Moral Wriggle Room: Behavior Inconsistent with a Preference for Fair OutcomesPreprint
Dana, J. D., Kuang, X., & Weber, R. A. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.400900 · Cited by 67
The theory of the open shop trade union reconsidered
Corneo, G. G. (1997) · Labour Economics · doi:10.1016/s0927-5371(96)00023-1 · Cited by 41
Potters, J., Sefton, M., & Lise Vesterlund, C. (2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 30
Seabright, P. (2004) · Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications (Université Toulouse I Capitole) · Cited by 13
Essays on the economic effects of vanity and career concerns
Denrell, J. C. (1998) · Cited by 4
Cited by
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Self-citationExploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z · Cited by 1,445
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13484 · Cited by 809
Delmas, M. A., Fischlein, M., & Asensio, O. I. (2013) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.109 · Cited by 672
Handbook of Heroism and Heroic Leadership
(2016) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315690100 · Cited by 418
Metadata
- Authors
- Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2005-08
- OpenAlex
- W2891249453
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 54
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.