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Unintended reward costs: the effectiveness of customer referral reward programs for innovative products and services

Open access
Dose, David B., Walsh, Gianfranco, Beatty, Sharon E., Elsner, Ralf · 2019 · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 5 of the 48 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

To encourage customers’ referral behavior and expand their customer base, providers of innovative products and services often use customer referral reward programs (CRPs), though not all CRPs deliver on their initial promise. With one field experiment and four online experiments, this research investigates the effectiveness of rewarded referrals for recruiting new customers for more innovative (versus less innovative) offerings and outlines the conditions in which public referral rewards have unintended ramifications and decrease customers’ referral likelihood. In addition to establishing these effects for more innovative offerings, this research identifies some moderating consequences, such that the detrimental effect of referral rewards on referral behavior can be attenuated by not disclosing referral rewards (for recommenders) to referral recipients, increasing the referral reward size, and rewarding both recommenders and referral recipients. These findings have theoretical and managerial implications.

Overview

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TL;DR

Public referral rewards can backfire for innovative offerings: they reduce referral likelihood by undermining expected self-enhancement, whereas they increase referrals for less innovative offerings. The negative effect is attenuated by private rewards, larger rewards, or rewarding both parties.

Key findings

  • Across one field experiment and four online experiments, public referral rewards decreased referral likelihood for more innovative products/services but increased it for less innovative ones. In Study 2, more innovative service: no reward M = 80.04 vs. public reward M = 62.20; less innovative service: no reward M = 58.86 vs. public reward M = 74.37.
  • Expected self-enhancement mediated the positive effect of innovativeness on referral likelihood when no reward was offered, but public rewards suppressed this path. In Study 1, the innovativeness × public reward interaction on referral likelihood was b = −8.73, SE = 1.27, p < .001; the indirect effect via expected self-enhancement was b = 2.55 in the no-reward condition and b = .28 in the public-reward condition.
  • Private, non-disclosed rewards attenuated the negative effect. In Study 3, for more innovative products, public reward M = 58.70 vs. no reward M = 81.17, while private reward M = 73.41 was not lower than no reward.
  • Larger rewards and reward-both schemes attenuated the negative effect. In Study 4, small €5 reward M = 51.23 vs. no reward M = 81.64, while large €50 reward M = 73.20; in Study 5, reward-both M = 87.17 vs. no reward M = 78.60, while reward-me M = 47.73.

Methods

  • One field experiment with an established German online shop: 3,363 customers invited from 33,630 recent purchasers, 607 responded, final n = 480; participants reported their last purchased product, perceived innovativeness, expected self-enhancement, and referral likelihood, and were randomly assigned to a public €5 referral reward or no-reward condition.
  • Four online experiments (n = 230, 323, 305, 334) using product/service scenarios (gym, suitcase) with between-subjects manipulations of innovativeness and reward visibility, reward size, or reward scheme.
  • Main analysis used moderated mediation (Hayes Model 8, bootstrapped with 5,000 draws), with expected self-enhancement as mediator and referral likelihood as outcome; referral likelihood was measured on a 100-point scale.

Limitations

  • The paper states that it focuses solely on recommenders and their referral likelihood, not referral recipients’ perceptions or receptivity; that fictitious brands prevented studying brand strength; and that only financial rewards were examined, leaving non-monetary rewards uninvestigated.
  • Evident from the text: the studies rely on self-reported referral likelihood rather than observed referral behavior, including in the field experiment; samples are German consumers recruited via an online shop, a market research panel, or street intercepts, which may limit generalizability.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11747-019-00635-z

Cites

76 of 76 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

31 tests recomputed · 0 with the reported and recomputed p on opposite sides of .05

Figures

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

5 Valid · 2 Not valid · 38 Not checked · 185 Own results and interpretations

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Statistics that don’t add up

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Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Doesn’t add upt(81.82) = 2.76reported p < .001 · recomputed p = .007

    “t (81.82) = 2.76, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(5, 474) = 40.75reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (5, 474)= 40.75, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(6, 473) = 39.7reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (6, 473)= 39.70, p < .001”

  • Consistentt(49) = -5.69reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “t (49) = -5.69, p < .001”

  • Consistentt(49) = -5.74reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “t (49) = -5.74, p < .001”

5 of 31 · the rest aren’t loaded

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Rosen, E. (2009). The anatomy of buzz revisited: Real-life lessons in word-of-mouth marketing. New York: Doubleday.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Dose, D. B., Walsh, G., Beatty, S. E., & Elsner, R.
Affiliations
  • Aston University (GB)
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena (DE)
  • University of Alabama (US)
  • Steinbeis University Berlin (DE)
Corresponding author
Dose, David B.
Venue
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science
Published
2019-02-09
Volume
47
Issue
3
Pages
438-459
ISSN
  • 0092-0703 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-7824
OpenAlex
W2914890086
Cited by
60
References
73
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 2
FWCI
9.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
  • cc-by
  • creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Aston Publications Explorer (Aston University) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Open Research Exeter (University of Exeter) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Aston University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Digital Marketing and Social Media
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Customer Service Quality and Loyalty
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
Keywords
referral behavior, innovative products and services, unintended consequences, customer acquisition, word of mouth, customer growth

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Unintended reward costs: the effectiveness of customer referral reward programs for innovative products and services. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11747-019-00635-z
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Dose, D. B., Walsh, G., Beatty, S. E., & Elsner, R. (2019). Unintended reward costs: the effectiveness of customer referral reward programs for innovative products and services. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-019-00635-z

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