Unintended reward costs: the effectiveness of customer referral reward programs for innovative products and services
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 5 of the 48 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
To encourage customers’ referral behavior and expand their customer base, providers of innovative products and services often use customer referral reward programs (CRPs), though not all CRPs deliver on their initial promise. With one field experiment and four online experiments, this research investigates the effectiveness of rewarded referrals for recruiting new customers for more innovative (versus less innovative) offerings and outlines the conditions in which public referral rewards have unintended ramifications and decrease customers’ referral likelihood. In addition to establishing these effects for more innovative offerings, this research identifies some moderating consequences, such that the detrimental effect of referral rewards on referral behavior can be attenuated by not disclosing referral rewards (for recommenders) to referral recipients, increasing the referral reward size, and rewarding both recommenders and referral recipients. These findings have theoretical and managerial implications.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Public referral rewards can backfire for innovative offerings: they reduce referral likelihood by undermining expected self-enhancement, whereas they increase referrals for less innovative offerings. The negative effect is attenuated by private rewards, larger rewards, or rewarding both parties.
Key findings
- Across one field experiment and four online experiments, public referral rewards decreased referral likelihood for more innovative products/services but increased it for less innovative ones. In Study 2, more innovative service: no reward M = 80.04 vs. public reward M = 62.20; less innovative service: no reward M = 58.86 vs. public reward M = 74.37.
- Expected self-enhancement mediated the positive effect of innovativeness on referral likelihood when no reward was offered, but public rewards suppressed this path. In Study 1, the innovativeness × public reward interaction on referral likelihood was b = −8.73, SE = 1.27, p < .001; the indirect effect via expected self-enhancement was b = 2.55 in the no-reward condition and b = .28 in the public-reward condition.
- Private, non-disclosed rewards attenuated the negative effect. In Study 3, for more innovative products, public reward M = 58.70 vs. no reward M = 81.17, while private reward M = 73.41 was not lower than no reward.
- Larger rewards and reward-both schemes attenuated the negative effect. In Study 4, small €5 reward M = 51.23 vs. no reward M = 81.64, while large €50 reward M = 73.20; in Study 5, reward-both M = 87.17 vs. no reward M = 78.60, while reward-me M = 47.73.
Methods
- One field experiment with an established German online shop: 3,363 customers invited from 33,630 recent purchasers, 607 responded, final n = 480; participants reported their last purchased product, perceived innovativeness, expected self-enhancement, and referral likelihood, and were randomly assigned to a public €5 referral reward or no-reward condition.
- Four online experiments (n = 230, 323, 305, 334) using product/service scenarios (gym, suitcase) with between-subjects manipulations of innovativeness and reward visibility, reward size, or reward scheme.
- Main analysis used moderated mediation (Hayes Model 8, bootstrapped with 5,000 draws), with expected self-enhancement as mediator and referral likelihood as outcome; referral likelihood was measured on a 100-point scale.
Limitations
- The paper states that it focuses solely on recommenders and their referral likelihood, not referral recipients’ perceptions or receptivity; that fictitious brands prevented studying brand strength; and that only financial rewards were examined, leaving non-monetary rewards uninvestigated.
- Evident from the text: the studies rely on self-reported referral likelihood rather than observed referral behavior, including in the field experiment; samples are German consumers recruited via an online shop, a market research panel, or street intercepts, which may limit generalizability.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
5 Valid · 2 Not valid · 38 Not checked · 185 Own results and interpretations
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Thus, rewards can be counterproductive if they conflict with individuals ' motivations or goals (Ariely et al. 2009; Deci et al. 1999).”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Ariely et al. 2009 source
- Supportedcites Deci et al. 1999 source
On p. 628, the paper explains that rewards experienced as controlling can thwart autonomy and undermine intrinsic motivation. Its concluding discussion (pp. 658–659) reports that tangible rewards tend to reduce intrinsic motivation and forestall self-regulation, supporting the claim that rewards can be counterproductive when they work against a person's motivation. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Such varying effects are due to individuals ' perceptions of the rewards relative to their initial needs (Deci et al. 1999).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Deci et al. 1999 source
On p. 628, the paper explains that rewards can be perceived as controlling or as indicators of competence, with different effects on intrinsic motivation depending on whether they thwart or satisfy needs for autonomy and competence. This supports the citing sentence’s paraphrase about varying effects, perceptions, and needs. (LLM, conf=0.92)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, self-enhancement does not mediate the effect of innovativeness on referral likelihood with a public reward ( b = .28, SE = .45, 95% CI = [ -.57, 1.20]).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Consistent with H2b, public referral rewards suppress the positive effect of innovativeness on expected self-enhancement ( b = .04, SE = .06, p > .05, 95% CI = [ -.07, .16]).”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In support of H2a, there is a negative direct effect of innovativeness on referral likelihood in the public reward condition ( b = -9.59, SE = 4.10, p < .05, 95% CI = [ -17.68, -1.52]).”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
141 more claims
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 33
- The quote only partly states this claim. 9
Statistics that don’t add up
Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“t (81.82) = 2.76, p < .001”
Reported p < .001 · recomputed p = .007
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Doesn’t add upt(81.82) = 2.76reported p < .001 · recomputed p = .007
“t (81.82) = 2.76, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(5, 474) = 40.75reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F (5, 474)= 40.75, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(6, 473) = 39.7reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F (6, 473)= 39.70, p < .001”
- Consistentt(49) = -5.69reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t (49) = -5.69, p < .001”
- Consistentt(49) = -5.74reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“t (49) = -5.74, p < .001”
26 more recomputed tests
Create a free account to see every test the Stats check recomputed.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Discussion · p. 15
“with a large referral reward, referral likelihood increases again (vs. noreward condition).”
§ Results · p. 15
“referral likelihood in the large public reward condition still is lower than in the no-reward condition ( M noreward = 81.64; M largereward = 73.20; t (81.82) = 2.76, p < .001).”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Results · p. 15
“( M noreward = 61.18; M smallreward = 69.68; t (63) = -1.88, p = .06; Figure W4)”
§ Results · p. 15
“( M noreward = 61.68; M largereward = 81.79; t (43.05) = -5.41, p < .05)”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Results · p. 13
“| Product innovativeness (PI) | 1.60 | .25 | < .001 | [.69, 1.78]”
§ Results · p. 13
“| No reward | 1.60 | .25 | < .001 | [1.10, 2.10]”
Citations
Cites
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“Thus, with a public reward-me scheme, recommenders may perceive themselves as self-interested and driven by economic benefits, reducing internal satisfaction and positive selfesteem (Andreoni 1990), conflicting with motivations to self-enhance with the referral.”
BackgroundA New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables
Bass, F. M. (1976) · Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-51565-1_107 · Cited by 3,948
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- Rosen, E. (2009). The anatomy of buzz revisited: Real-life lessons in word-of-mouth marketing. New York: Doubleday.
Cited by
Babić Rosario, A., de Valck, K., & Sotgiu, F. (2020) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1007/s11747-019-00706-1 · Cited by 462
De Keyser, A., Verleye, K., Lemon, K. N., Keiningham, T. L., & Klaus, P. (2020) · Journal of Service Research · doi:10.1177/1094670520928390 · Cited by 457
Schaarschmidt, M., Walsh, G., & Ivens, S. (2021) · Journal of Vocational Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.jvb.2021.103644 · Cited by 58
Self-citationA Conceptual Approach to Understanding the Customer Experience in E-Commerce: An Empirical Study
Pires, P. B., Prisco, M., Delgado, C., & Santos, J. D. (2024) · Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research · doi:10.3390/jtaer19030096 · Cited by 88
The effect of tokenized rewards on customer loyalty programs
Boukis, A. (2024) · Annals of Tourism Research · doi:10.1016/j.annals.2024.103851 · Cited by 23
Metadata
- Authors
- Dose, D. B., Walsh, G., Beatty, S. E., & Elsner, R.
- Affiliations
- Aston University (GB)
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena (DE)
- University of Alabama (US)
- Steinbeis University Berlin (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Dose, David B.
- Venue
- Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science
- Published
- 2019-02-09
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 438-459
- ISSN
- 0092-0703 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7824
- OpenAlex
- W2914890086
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 73
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 9.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Aston Publications Explorer (Aston University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Open Research Exeter (University of Exeter) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Aston University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Digital Marketing and Social Media
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Customer Service Quality and Loyalty
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Keywords
- referral behavior, innovative products and services, unintended consequences, customer acquisition, word of mouth, customer growth
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