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Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts
Open accessAbstract
Blockchain technology provides decentralized consensus and potentially enlarges the contracting space using smart contracts with tamper-proofness and algorithmic executions.Meanwhile, generating decentralized consensus entails distributing information which necessarily alters the informational environment.We analyze how decentralization affects consensus effectiveness, and how the quintessential features of blockchain reshape industrial organization and the landscape of competition.Smart contracts can mitigate informational asymmetry and improve welfare and consumer surplus through enhanced entry and competition, yet the irreducible distribution of information during consensus generation may encourage greater collusion.In general, blockchains can sustain market equilibria with a wider range of economic outcomes.We further discuss anti-trust policy implications targeted to blockchain applications, such as separating consensus record-keepers from users.
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Thakor, A. V. (2020) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2019.100833 · Cited by 1,378
Blockchain without waste: Proof-of-stake
Saleh, F. (2021) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaa075 · Cited by 825
Goldstein, I., Jiang, W., & Karolyi, G. A. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhz025 · Cited by 686
Chang, V., Baudier, P., Zhang, H., Xu, Q., Zhang, J., & Arami, M. (2020) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120166 · Cited by 613
Biais, B., Bisière, C., Bouvard, M., & Casamatta, C. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy095 · Cited by 565
Metadata
- Authors
- Cong, L. W., & He, Z.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2018-03
- OpenAlex
- W3021222613
- Cited by
- 310
- References
- 40
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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