De-Globalisation? Global Value Chains in the Post-COVID-19 Age
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet; 19 of the 77 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
This paper evaluates the extent to which the world economy has entered a phase of de-globalisation, and it offers some speculative thoughts on the future of global value chains in the post-COVID-19 age. Although the growth of international trade flows relative to that of GDP has slowed down since the Great Recession, this paper finds little systematic evidence indicating that the world economy has already entered an era of de-globalisation. Instead, the observed slowdown in globalisation is a natural sequel to the unsustainable increase in globalisation experienced in the late 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. I offer a description of the mechanisms leading to that earlier expansionary phase, together with a discussion of why these forces might have run out of steam, and of the extent to which they may be reversible. I conclude that the main challenge for the future of globalisation is institutional and political in nature rather than technological, although new technologies might aggravate the trends in inequality that have created the current political backlash against globalisation. Zooming in on the COVID-19 global pandemic, I similarly conclude that the current health crisis may further darken the future of globalisation if it aggravates policy tensions across countries.
Verified 2026-11-22 · 1 reference not checked yet
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper evaluates whether the world economy has entered de-globalisation and offers speculative thoughts on global value chains in the post-COVID-19 age. It finds little systematic evidence of de-globalisation, arguing that the post-Great Recession slowdown is “slowbalisation” after an unsustainable 1986–2008 hyperglobalisation, with the main future challenge being institutional and political rather than technological.
Key findings
- World trade-to-GDP more than doubled from 13.7% in 1970 to 29.7% in 2018, with close to 80% of that increase occurring in 1986–2008; after the Great Recession it recovered to essentially its 2008 peak by 2018.
- Hyperglobalisation was driven by the ICT revolution, trade liberalisation, and the spread of capitalism: the weighted average tariff on traded manufactured goods fell from 13.6% in 1986 to 7.5% in 2008, and ten selected socialist countries accounted for 43.5% of world population in 1990.
- Technological factors such as automation and 3D printing are not clear-cut de-globalising forces; automation may raise demand for offshore inputs, and sunk costs make GVC location decisions sticky, explaining the intensive-margin response and V-shaped recovery after the 2008–09 trade collapse.
- COVID-19 caused a cumulative world trade decline of 17.6% by May 2020 relative to August 2019, reduced to a 4.4% year-on-year decline by August; seaborne trade had fully recovered by early October, and vehicle trade fell about 50% before recovering faster than other components.
Methods
- Descriptive review of globalisation measures using World Bank WDI, CPB World Trade Monitor, Borin and Mancini’s GVC trade measure, UN migration data, OECD AMNE data, and other sources, with charts covering world trade/GDP, GVC trade, migration, capital flows, and multinational activity.
- A simple conceptual framework building on Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004), extended to include fixed and sunk costs, multiple inputs, and sequential production, to interpret offshoring, reshoring, and GVC stickiness.
- The paper is largely a synthesis and speculative assessment rather than a new causal empirical estimation; it uses existing evidence and preliminary COVID-19 trade data.
Limitations
- The paper states that COVID-19 data are incomplete and imperfect, that much will be learned from future detailed studies, and that the effects of the 2018–19 U.S.-China trade war will be sorted out for years; it also notes that global input-output tables are lagged, coarse, and rely on strong assumptions.
- The paper states that many technologies discussed are general-purpose technologies whose full impact takes years to materialise, so available empirical evidence should be treated as tentative at best.
- Evident from the text: this is an NBER working paper not peer-reviewed, and many conclusions about the post-COVID-19 future are explicitly speculative and dependent on political developments such as the U.S. presidential election.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures





















Verification
Claims the paper makes
17 Valid · 20 Not valid · 42 Not checked · 177 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“it also reduced trade -policy uncertainty due to the binding commitments that countries made when entering the GATT/WTO or signing regional trade agreements.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Pierce and Schott, 2016 matched to “The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment” (2016) source
- Partly supportedcites Handley and Limao, 2017 matched to “Policy Uncertainty, Trade, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for China and the United States” (2017) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The opening discussion and Conclusion report that China’s WTO accession reduced trade-policy uncertainty, while “D. Outcomes and Policy Experiments” describes WTO tariff bindings as commitments. The paper also discusses how agreements can make trade policy more predictable, but the passages do not establish the claimed reduction for regional trade agreements specifically. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This ratio has in fact been quite stable at a value of one -half in recent decades (see Antràs and Chor, 2018).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Antràs and Chor, 2018 matched to “On the Measurement of Upstreamness and Downstreamness in Global Value Chains” (2018) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.3 equates the world value-added-to-gross-output ratio with the final-use-to-gross-output ratio; world value added corresponds to world GDP. Section 3.1 places that ratio near one-half from 1995 to 2011, but describes a perceptible, steady decline from 0.526 to 0.486. Thus the approximate value is supported, while calling it quite stable omits the reported trend. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“the 1980s and 1990s also witnessed technological developments that significantly reduced the quality -and time -adjusted costs of transporting goods across countries, in large part due to the increased reliance on air freight shipping (see Hummels, 2007).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Hummels, 2007 matched to “Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization” (2007) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Air Transportation Prices section reports falling air-freight prices through the 1980s and 1990s, and the Transportation Quality and Speed of Delivery section says that air shipping greatly reduced travel time. The Conclusions also document growing reliance on air freight. But the paper places the sharpest technology-driven air-price declines earlier, after the introduction of jet engines; it does not establish that technological developments specifically in the 1980s and 1990s largely caused the claimed reduction in quality- and time-adjusted costs. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“the findings of Bernard et al. (2009) suggest the external validity of these findings, as they document similar patterns in U.S. exports to and U.S. imports from several Asian countries during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Bernard et al. (2009) matched to “The Margins of US Trade” (2009) source
The opening summary states that the paper investigates U.S. exports and imports around the 1997 Asian financial crisis and finds that the intensive margin accounts for most export declines and import increases. Section IV identifies five Asian crisis countries and reports the export and import patterns. The external-validity inference is the citing authors’ interpretation, not a separate finding attributed to Bernard et al. (LLM, conf=0.93)
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“while automation might have a positive effect on offshoring in less developed economies (as documented by Artuc et al., 2018, or Stapleton and Webb, 2020)”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Artuc et al., 2018 matched to “Robots, Tasks and Trade” (2018) source
The indexed copy’s unpaginated description of Robots, Tasks and Trade reports that greater robot intensity leads to increased imports from less developed countries in the same industry. That supports the cautiously worded claim that automation might positively affect offshoring to those economies. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Stapleton and Webb, 2020 matched to “Automation, Trade and Multinational Activity: Micro Evidence from Spain” (2020) source
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
135 more claims · 7 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 256 claims and to verify the 3 references still open.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 69
- Probably not a substantial claim. 63
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Chart 16. The Impact of COVID -19 On World Trade
“the trade collapse in Chart 16 has not operated, at least up to this point, at the extensive margin.”
§ Chart 16. The Impact of COVID -19 On World Trade
“lessthan5%ofthedecreaseinSpanishexportsduringMarch-August of2020relativetoMarch-Augustof2019wasexplainedbytheintensivemargin”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 3.3 The Spread of Capitalism
“Table 1 provides information on the share of world population in 1990 accounted for by ten selected countries”
§ 3.3 The Spread of Capitalism
“| China | 21.5% | East Germany | 0.3% | |------------|---------|-----------------|--------| | India | 16.5% | Hungary | 0.2% | | Bangladesh | 2.0% | Czech Republic | 0.2% | | Vietnam | 1.3% | Bulgaria | 0.2% | | Poland | 0.7% | Serbia | 0.1% | | Romania | 0.4% | Slovak Republic | 0.1% |”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5.3 Structural Transformation, Investment, and Capital Goods
“panel A of Chart 12, borrowed from García -Santana et al. (2020), indicates that the relationship between country -level investment rates and the level of development (measured by log GDP per capita) exhibits a clear inverted -U shape”
§ 5.3 Structural Transformation, Investment, and Capital Goods
“Chart 12. The Decline in Investment Rates Panel A. World Investment Rate (World Gross Capital Formation as % of World GDP) <!-- image --> Source: García - Santana et al. (2020). Data have been all been filtered out from country fixed effects. Projections (in red) based on a cubic polynomial of log GDP per capita.”
Citations
Cites
The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- Bhagwati, Jagdish, Arvind Panagariya, and Thirukodikaval N. Srinivasan (2004), 'The Muddles Over Outsourcing,' Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 4: pp. 93 -114. Bilir, L. Kamran (2014), 'Patent Laws, Product Life -Cycle Lengths, and Multinational Activity,' American Economic Review 104, no. 7: pp. 1979 -2013.
- Clemens, Michael A., and Jeffrey G. Williamson (2004), 'Why Did the Tariff-Growth Correlation Change After 1950?' Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 1: pp. 5 -46. Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig (2018 a ), 'The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe,' American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 4: 936 -953. Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig (2018 b ), 'Global Competition and Brexit,' American Political Science Review , 2018 -112 (2): 201 -218.
- Dixit, Avinash and Gene M. Grossman (2005), 'The Limits of Free Trade,' Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 3: 241 -244.
- Helpman, Elhanan, ed. (1998), General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth . MIT press.
- Krugman, Paul R. (1980), 'Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade,' American Economic Review , 70(5), 950 -959.
- Summers, Lawrence (2013), 'Secular Stagnation', speech at 14th Annual IMF Research Conference, Washington DC, November.
Cited by
Infectious disease in an era of global change
Baker, R. E., Mahmud, A. S., Miller, I. F., Rajeev, M., Rasambainarivo, F., Rice, B. L., Takahashi, S., Tatem, A. J., Wagner, C. E., Wang, L.-F., et al. (2022) · Nature Reviews Microbiology · doi:10.1038/s41579-021-00639-z · Cited by 2,059
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers
(2010) · OECD social employment and migration working papers · doi:10.1787/1815199x · Cited by 731
Risks and Global Supply Chains: What We Know and What We Need to Know
Baldwin, R., & Freeman, R. (2022) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-113737 · Cited by 395
The Economic Impacts of the US–China Trade War
Fajgelbaum, P. D., & Khandelwal, A. K. (2022) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-110410 · Cited by 388
Decoupling in international business: Evidence, drivers, impact, and implications for IB research
Witt, M. A., Lewin, A. Y., Li, P. P., & Gaur, A. (2023) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2022.101399 · Cited by 290
Global Supply Chains: The Looming “Great Reallocation”
Alfaro, L., & Chor, D. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31661 · Cited by 220
(2022) · Handbook of International Economics · doi:10.1016/bs.hesint.2022.02.005 · Cited by 189
Self-citationChanging global linkages: A new Cold War?
Gopinath, G., Gourinchas, P., Presbitero, A., & Topalova, P. B. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.104042 · Cited by 189
Investing in friends: The role of geopolitical alignment in FDI flows
Aiyar, S. S., Malacrino, D., & Presbitero, A. (2024) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102508 · Cited by 233
Global supply chain pressures, inflation, and implications for monetary policy
Guido Ascari, Y., Bonam, D., & Smădu, A. (2024) · Journal of International Money and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2024.103029 · Cited by 181
“The role of global value chains in the international propagation of shocks is largely associated with their sticky nature, as shown by Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2023) and Antràs (2020a).”
BackgroundCOVID-19 Supply Chain Disruptions
Meier, M., & Pinto, E. P. (2024) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104674 · Cited by 134
Is the Global Economy Deglobalizing? And if so, why? And what is next?
Goldberg, P. K., & Reed, T. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31115 · Cited by 129
Globalisation in reverse? Reconfiguring the geographies of value chains and production networks
Gong, H., Hassink, R., Foster, C., Heß, M., & Garretsen, H. (2022) · Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society · doi:10.1093/cjres/rsac012 · Cited by 161
How COVID‐19 vaccine supply chains emerged in the midst of a pandemic
Bown, C. P., & Bollyky, T. J. (2021) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/twec.13183 · Cited by 122
“For global value chains more broadly and the pandemic, see Antràs (2020).”
Supply Shocks in Supply Chains: Evidence from the Early Lockdown in China
Lafrogne-Joussier, R., Martin, J., & Méjean, I. (2022) · IMF Economic Review · doi:10.1057/s41308-022-00166-8 · Cited by 156
Springboard MNEs under de-globalization
Luo, Y., & Witt, M. A. (2021) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-021-00423-4 · Cited by 126
OECD Working Papers on International Investment
Pohl, J., Bouchard, M., Gordon, K., Pohl, J., Bouchard, M., & Jel Classifications, F. (2010) · OECD working papers on international investment · doi:10.1787/18151957 · Cited by 104
De-globalization and Decoupling: Game Changing Consequences?
Witt, M. A., Li, P. P., Välikangas, L., & Lewin, A. Y. (2021) · Management and Organization Review · doi:10.1017/mor.2021.9 · Cited by 113
“This is consistent with the argument that offshoring and automation are substitutes (Antràs, 2020).”
ResultOECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2023 Issue 2
OECD (2023) · OECD economic outlook · doi:10.1787/7a5f73ce-en · Cited by 111
“Win-lose” globalization and the weaponization of economic policies by nation-states
Mariotti, S. (2024) · Critical Perspectives on International Business · doi:10.1108/cpoib-09-2023-0089 · Cited by 116
Antràs, P., & Chor, D. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w28549 · Cited by 123
Self-citationGlobal Value Chains: Measurement, Trends and DriversPreprint
Cigna, S., Gunnella, V., & Quaglietti, L. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4007756 · Cited by 103
“32 See Baldwin (2006) and Antràs (2020a).”
BackgroundInfluentialAdoption of ICTs in Agri-Food Logistics: Potential and Limitations for Supply Chain Sustainability
Vernier, C., Loeillet, D., Thomopoulos, R., & Macombe, C. (2021) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su13126702 · Cited by 75
Relationship Stickiness, International Trade, and Economic Uncertainty
Martin, J., Méjean, I., & Parenti, M. (2026) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_01396 · Cited by 96
Global Supply Chains: The Looming “Great Reallocation”Preprint
Alfaro, L., & Chor, D. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4567667 · Cited by 63
Risks and global supply chains: What we know and what we need to know
Baldwin, R., & Freeman, R. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29444 · Cited by 94
OECD Supply Chain Resilience Review: Navigating Risks
OECD (2025) · OECD eBooks · doi:10.1787/94e3a8ea-en · Cited by 120
Global value chains and labour markets – simultaneous analysis of wages and employment
Szymczak, S., & Wolszczak‐Derlacz, J. (2021) · Economic Systems Research · doi:10.1080/09535314.2021.1982678 · Cited by 73
“In other words, they are specialised in relatively low-value-added production segments (Antràs, 2020a).”
BackgroundReshoring and plant closures in Covid-19 times: Evidence from Italian MNEs
Stefano, E. D., Giovannetti, G., Mancini, M., Marvasi, E., & Vannelli, G. (2022) · International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.inteco.2022.09.009 · Cited by 73
Natural Disasters and the Reshaping of Global Value Chains
Freund, C. L., Mattoo, A., Mulabdić, A., & Ruta, M. (2022) · IMF Economic Review · doi:10.1057/s41308-022-00164-w · Cited by 73
“…have argued that the same technological and institutional factors that have underpinned the international fragmentation of production in the past decades would make such retrenchment postCOVID-19 unlikely, unless there is a radical change in the policy environment (Antràs 2021; Baldwin 2020).”
BackgroundThe Economic Impacts of the US-China Trade War
Fajgelbaum, P., & Khandelwal, A. K. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29315 · Cited by 108
“(2016), Grossman and Helpman (2020), and Antràs et al. (2021) for recent analyses of tariffs with supply chains.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialСмородинская, Н. В., Katukov, D. D., & Malygin, V. E. (2021) · Baltic Region · doi:10.5922/2079-8555-2021-3-5 · Cited by 74
“6 After the Great Recession, due to a combination of factors,7 the world trade growth relative to that of world GDP had slowed down, which is considered a natural sequel to the previous upsurge in globalization [5].”
BackgroundColantone, I., Ottaviano, G. I. P., & Stanig, P. (2022) · Handbook of international economics · doi:10.1016/bs.hesint.2022.02.007 · Cited by 94
Modelling the impact of historic landscape change on soil erosion and degradation
Brandolini, F., Kinnaird, T. C., Srivastava, A., & Turner, S. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-31334-z · Cited by 48
Are We Fragmented Yet? Measuring Geopolitical Fragmentation and Its Causal Effect
Fernández‐Villaverde, J., Mineyama, T., & Song, D. (2024) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w32638 · Cited by 77
The changing contours of global value chains post-COVID: Evidence from the Commonwealth
Khorana, S., Escaith, H., Ali, S., Kumari, S., & Do, Q. (2022) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.07.044 · Cited by 52
“This said, decoupling and deglobalisation (reshoring at home from previously offshored activities) are not (yet) a reality (Antràs, 2021) despite the 2022 Ukraine-Russia conflict, which has dramatically increased geopolitical tensions, resulting in trade and investment embargoes.”
Wang, R., Qamruzzaman, M., & Karim, S. (2024) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e30142 · Cited by 39
RetractedAutomation, Bargaining Power, and Labor Market Fluctuations
Leduc, S., & Liu, Z. (2024) · American Economic Journal Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.20220181 · Cited by 77
“Recent supply-chain disruptions stemming from the U.S.-China trade wars and the COVID-19 pandemic further highlight the fragility of global supply chains (Antràs, 2020).”
BackgroundFrom globalization to regionalization? Assessing its potential environmental and economic effects
Zhang, Y., Tian, K., Li, X., Jiang, X., & Yang, C. (2022) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.118642 · Cited by 40
Hidden Exposure: Measuring US Supply Chain Reliance
Baldwin, R., Freeman, R., & Theodorakopoulos, A. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31820 · Cited by 63
The Network Effect of Deglobalisation on European Regions
Giammetti, R., Papi, L., Teobaldelli, D., & Ticchi, D. (2021) · Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society · doi:10.1093/cjres/rsac006 · Cited by 36
Do firms react to supply chain disruptions?
de Lucio, J. J., Mora, C. D., Mínguez, R., Minondo, A., & Silvente, F. R. (2023) · Economic Analysis and Policy · doi:10.1016/j.eap.2023.07.004 · Cited by 35
“The lack of a widespread use of strategies to cope with supply-chain disruptions can be explained by the hysteresis and the stickiness of offshoring decisions (Antràs, 2020; Antràs and Chor, 2022). The fixed costs associated with offshoring, such as the gathering of information about suitable providers (search costs),…”
InfluentialCastellani, D., Lamperti, F., & Lavoratori, K. (2022) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-021-00204-y · Cited by 46
“This has revived the conversation about GVC configurations and more “regionalised” global networks, and how automation and digitalisation can speed such restructuring process, although the sticky nature of GVCs needs to be considered (The Antràs, 2021; Economist, 2020).”
BackgroundGlobalisation in agriculture and food: the role of multinational enterprises
Scoppola, M. (2021) · European Review of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1093/erae/jbab032 · Cited by 38
The Impact of Robot Adoption on Global Sourcing
Cilekoglu, A. A., Moreno, R., & Ramos, R. (2021) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2024.104953 · Cited by 39
The Impact of U.S. Monetary Policy on Foreign Firms
di Giovanni, J., & Rogers, J. H. (2022) · IMF Economic Review · doi:10.1057/s41308-023-00218-7 · Cited by 36
Song, Y., Hao, X., Hu, Y., & Lu, Z. (2021) · Frontiers in Public Health · doi:10.3389/fpubh.2021.683821 · Cited by 31
“Meanwhile, based on the GVC division of labor method constructed by Koopman et al. (36), the paper measures the level of the division of labor in the GVCs by introducing Equation (4) and Equation (5).”
BackgroundInfluentialDemand and supply exposure through global value chains: Euro‐Mediterranean countries during COVID
Ayadi, R., Giovannetti, G., Marvasi, E., Vannelli, G., & Zaki, C. R. (2021) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/twec.13156 · Cited by 39
“…in international relationships will hardly occur, since the shock, despite its strength, is perceived as transitory, and thus there is a weak incentive for firms to tear down their network of cross-borders linkages laboriously built up over time and at great cost, largely sunk (Antràs, 2020).”
BackgroundFreeman, R., & Lewis, J. (2021) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109873 · Cited by 33
Kalotay, K., & Sass, M. (2021) · Acta Oeconomica · doi:10.1556/032.2021.00030 · Cited by 30
Cerra, V. (2021) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.5089/9781513572734.001 · Cited by 47
Risks and opportunities of reshaping global value chains
Crowe, D., & Rawdanowicz, Ł. (2023) · OECD Economics Department working papers · doi:10.1787/f758afe8-en · Cited by 34
Reshoring to survive? The other side of de-globalization
D’Ambrosio, A., & Lavoratori, K. (2025) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-025-00342-7 · Cited by 39
“Due to the important role of fixed costs, scale matters for the decision to offshore in the first place (Antràs, 2020; Antràs & Helpman, 2004; Helpman et al., 2004).”
InfluentialSupply spillovers during the pandemic: Evidence from high‐frequency shipping data
Cerdeiro, D. A., & Komáromi, A. (2022) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/twec.13306 · Cited by 29
Trade fragmentation unveiled: five facts on the reconfiguration of global, US and EU trade
Conteduca, F. P., Giglioli, S., Giordano, C., Mancini, M., & Panon, L. (2025) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-024-00337-w · Cited by 27
“In the subsequent decade, global trade integration of goods slowed, entering a phase called “slowbalization” (Antràs, 2020), on account of both structural and cyclical factors (IRC Task Force, 2016 ).”
Capello, R., Dellisanti, R., & Perucca, G. (2023) · Environment and Planning A Economy and Space · doi:10.1177/0308518x231211788 · Cited by 32
COVID-19, lockdowns and international trade: evidence from firm-level data
Amador, J. L. M., Gouveia, C. M., & Pimenta, A. C. (2023) · Empirical Economics · doi:10.1007/s00181-023-02421-x · Cited by 28
“A different impact of lockdowns on international trade flows along the countries dimension, after controlling for the impact of the pandemics on country-specific demand, suggests that geography and GVCs play a role, as discussed in Antràs (2020).”
BackgroundTrade and inequality in Europe and the US
Dorn, D., & Levell, P. (2024) · Oxford Open Economics · doi:10.1093/ooec/odad046 · Cited by 49
The Unequal Effects of Globalization
Goldberg, P. K., & Larson, G. (2023) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14839.001.0001 · Cited by 33
Global Value Chain Resilience and Reshoring During Covid-19: Challenges in a Post-Covid World
Marvasi, E. (2023) · The Academy of International Business · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-24090-4_10 · Cited by 33
Slowbalisation or a “New” type of GVC participation? The role of digital services
Blázquez, L., Mora, C. D., & González‐Díaz, B. (2022) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-022-00245-x · Cited by 30
“The literature recognises this new phase, also known as deglobalisation or slowbali‑ sation 1 (Antràs, 2021; Javorcik, 2020; Titievskaia et al., 2020; Van Bergeijk, 2019).”
BackgroundNenci, S., Fusacchia, I., Giunta, A., Montalbano, P., & Pietrobelli, C. (2022) · Bio-based and Applied Economics · doi:10.36253/bae-12558 · Cited by 24
Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on SMEs and possible innovation responses
Paunović, B. Ž., & Aničić, Z. (2021) · Ekonomika preduzeca · doi:10.5937/ekopre2103169p · Cited by 22
How should we think about globalization in a post-globalization era?
Roudometof, V. N. (2024) · Dialogues in sociology. · doi:10.1177/29768667241293053 · Cited by 26
“It appears that, at least in international trade, the world economy has entered a phase characterized by trends running counter to the 1990s era of unrestricted trade, liberalization of markets and global fi nance (Antràs, 2021).”
The European Union in the age of slowbalisation
Posta, P. D. (2023) · Journal of Policy Modeling · doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2023.07.006 · Cited by 19
Slowbalisation in the Context of US-China Decoupling
García-Herrero, A. (2022) · Intereconomics · doi:10.1007/s10272-022-1086-x · Cited by 22
Tasks, occupations and slowbalisation: on the limits of fragmentation
Brakman, S., & van Marrewijk, C. (2022) · Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society · doi:10.1093/cjres/rsac014 · Cited by 25
Li, Q., Wu, S., Liu, Q., & Li, S. (2024) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107346 · Cited by 19
Navigating a Covid World: The European Union’s Internal Rebirth and External Quest
Alcaro, R., & Tocci, N. (2021) · The International Spectator · doi:10.1080/03932729.2021.1911128 · Cited by 19
Long live globalization: geopolitical shocks and international trade
Cevik, S. (2025) · International Economics and Economic Policy · doi:10.1007/s10368-025-00660-0 · Cited by 25
“3 International trade as a share of GDP remained strong despite the fears of discriminatory geopolitical fragmentation–consistent with the pre-pandemic evidence provided by Goldberg (2019) and Antràs (2021) as well as post-pandemic developments reported by Goldberg and Reed (2023).”
Theme issue: open innovation and ‘catch-up’: globalist or localist?
Yun, J. J., Cooke, P. N., Jung, K., & Yang, B. (2022) · European Planning Studies · doi:10.1080/09654313.2022.2146942 · Cited by 17
“In a study of ICT de-globalization after the 2007–2008 Financial Crash, Antras (2020) concluded that while shocks to the world economy were likely to lead to significant changes in the geography of global production it would only be so if such shocks were large and perceived to be persistent.”
BackgroundThe international dimension of trend inflation
Ascari, G., & Fosso, L. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103896 · Cited by 27
From globalization to reshoring? The role of Industry 4.0 in global value chains across Europe
Lamperti, F., Lavoratori, K., & Tredicine, L. (2025) · Economics of Innovation and New Technology · doi:10.1080/10438599.2025.2487145 · Cited by 24
“…decades, wages in most emerging economies have increased, implying that the cost benefits of producing there have decreased when compared to more developed countries, along with the increase in shipping and insurance costs (Antràs 2020; Cigna, Gun-nella, and Quaglietti 2022; De Backer et al. 2016).”
InfluentialОнлайн-дейтинг: рынок или базар? Процесс поиска брачной пары на православном сайте знакомств
Galitsina, K., Kalinovskaya, P., & Khvorostianova, O. (2022) · Journal of Economic Sociology · doi:10.17323/1726-3247-2022-2-65-90 · Cited by 17
Modelling regional exposure to new trade wars
Almazán‐Gómez, M. Á., Khatabi, F. E., Llano, C., & Pérez, J. (2025) · Journal of Policy Modeling · doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2025.04.001 · Cited by 21
Pillich, S. M. (2024) · Management Review Quarterly · doi:10.1007/s11301-024-00414-3 · Cited by 28
Смородинская, Н. В., & Katukov, D. D. (2021) · Voprosy Ekonomiki · doi:10.32609/0042-8736-2021-12-21-47 · Cited by 18
Globalization and the Fallout of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Ghazalian, P. L. (2025) · World · doi:10.3390/world6010004 · Cited by 17
“The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have fostered these patterns with continuing/emerging economic/political tensions, global supply chain reconfiguration, and further doses of nationalism/populism in politics and policies [23,27,30,140,141].”
Understanding firm networks in global agricultural value chains
Beck, A., Lim, S., & Taglioni, D. (2024) · Food Policy · doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2024.102689 · Cited by 16
“However, anecdotal evidence suggests that recent events, including the US-China Trade War, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Suez Canal blockage, the invasion of Ukraine, and severe weather events pose potential major disruptions (Antràs, 2020; Garicano et al., 2022; Alfaro and Chor, 2023).”
Trade and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons from French Firms
Brussevich, M., Papageorgiou, C., & Wibaux, P. (2022) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.5089/9798400204364.001 · Cited by 18
“However, Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010), Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2013), and Gopinath and Neiman (2014) show that, during previous crises (e.g., Global Financial Crisis in the US and Argentinian crisis in early 2000s), inventory intensity tended to amplify the trade collapse, since…”
BackgroundBlázquez, L., Mora, C. D., & González‐Díaz, B. (2023) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/twec.13454 · Cited by 18
Whitehead, C., & Williams, P. (2017) · OECD social employment and migration working papers · doi:10.1787/e16ab00e-en · Cited by 27
Consequences of legislation-based reshoring for EU carbon emissions in global value chains
López, L.-A., Ortiz, M., García‐Alaminos, Á., & Cadarso, M. (2025) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-025-00216-8 · Cited by 17
“The interest in such dynamics, which has already been addressed in the literature (Antràs, 2020; Antràs & Chor, 2018; Gereffi, 2020), started with the financial crisis in 2008 and the disaster in Fukushima in 2011, which pointed out the lower resilience of GVCs to sudden disruptions.”
Gaweł, A., & Патлатой, О. (2025) · Journal of Economics and Management · doi:10.22367/jem.2025.47.19 · Cited by 1
“Despite the multidirectional nature of current globalization processes, some-times described as “deglobalization” or “slowbalization” (Antràs, 2020), GVCs, as a form of global production (Neilson et al., 2014) and international division of labor (Coveri & Zanfei, 2023; Fritsch & Matthes, 2020),…”
Jacob, N. R., Thomas, N. M., Agarwal, S., Saini, N., & Vasa, L. (2023) · Environment Development and Sustainability · doi:10.1007/s10668-023-04158-0 · Cited by 17
“Antras (2020) has put together literature and brings evidence to prove that the world is now at the start of de-globalisation (B2), which may very well be the end of the global interconnected trade, although it may not hamper it entirely.”
Bontadini, F., Meliciani, V., Savona, M., & Wirkierman, A. L. (2025) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-025-00361-4 · Cited by 13
Labour market impacts of the China shock: Why the tide of Globalisation did not lift all boats
Dorn, D., & Levell, P. (2024) · Labour Economics · doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2024.102629 · Cited by 17
“Frictionless mobility in the domestic labour market ensures that workers smoothly relocate from the shrinking import sector to the expanding export sector until wages equate across sectors for each skill group.”
Globalisation versus Deglobalisation
Halmai, P. (2023) · Financial and Economic Review · doi:10.33893/fer.22.2.5 · Cited by 20
“…goods contracted from 13.6 per cent in 1986 to 7.5 per cent in 2008 and then to 3.9 per cent in 2019, but the marginal benefits of advancements in communication technologies, which enabled the geographical dispersion of production processes, are yielding diminishing returns (Antràs 2020).”
BackgroundInfluentialInternational Schools and De-globalisation: Exploring the tensions during the Covid-19 crisis
Bailey, L., & Gibson, M. T. (2024) · Journal of Research in International Education · doi:10.1177/14752409241241533 · Cited by 12
“Theirs was a unique experience and although international schools have received some attention in the pandemic-related literature (see for instance Jan, 2020; Putri et al, 2020; Stasel, 2020), to date this has not been proportionate to international schools' numeric position in global education.”
BackgroundThe impact of Covid-19 on global value chainsPreprint
Simola, H. (2021) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 12
Scalamonti, F. (2024) · National Accounting Review · doi:10.3934/nar.2024019 · Cited by 12
Costa, J. (2022) · Economies · doi:10.3390/economies10070170 · Cited by 12
Funke, M., & Zhong, D. (2022) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/ecpo.12235 · Cited by 18
Cascading effect of COVID-19: de-globalisation and its impact on global governance
Permal, S. (2021) · Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs · doi:10.1080/18366503.2021.1962080 · Cited by 11
“Further, Antras (2020) has alluded that an episode of de-globalisation occurred in the twentieth century during the interwar period following the 1918 influenza pandemic.”
BackgroundThe Impact of U.S. Monetary Policy on Foreign FirmsPreprint
di Giovanni, J., & Rogers, J. H. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4276946 · Cited by 11
Geostrategic dimensions of recent food policy decisions
Wieck, C., Rudloff, B., Mensah, K., Kareem, O. I., Montesclaros, J. M. L., Orden, D., Søndergaard, N., & Yu, W. (2024) · Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy · doi:10.1002/aepp.13479 · Cited by 10
Global value chains and inward FDI : An empirical investigation of European firms
Imbruno, M., Pittiglio, R., Reganati, F., Szymczak, S., & Wolszczak‐Derlacz, J. (2024) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/twec.13624 · Cited by 10
Robinson, G. M. (2023) · Research in Globalization · doi:10.1016/j.resglo.2023.100146 · Cited by 13
Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Spatial Inequality: the Case of Russian Education
Adamovich, K. (2022) · Journal of Economic Sociology · doi:10.17323/1726-3247-2022-2-147-161 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Antràs, P.
- Corresponding author
- Antràs, Pol
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2020-11
- OpenAlex
- W3107339002
- Semantic Scholar
- 55eefc617dfacf1bdd0c3362734149479d5d340b
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 61 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 62 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 70 · 2021: 44
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.nber.org
- Locations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Globalization, Economics, and Policies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Global trade, sustainability, and social impact
- Keywords
- deglobalization, global value chains, globalization, COVID-19 pandemic, international trade, inequality, policy tensions
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.