De-Globalisation? Global Value Chains in the Post-COVID-19 Age
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the extent to which the world economy has entered a phase of de-globalisation, and it offers some speculative thoughts on the future of global value chains in the post-COVID-19 age. Although the growth of international trade flows relative to that of GDP has slowed down since the Great Recession, this paper finds little systematic evidence indicating that the world economy has already entered an era of de-globalisation. Instead, the observed slowdown in globalisation is a natural sequel to the unsustainable increase in globalisation experienced in the late 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. I offer a description of the mechanisms leading to that earlier expansionary phase, together with a discussion of why these forces might have run out of steam, and of the extent to which they may be reversible. I conclude that the main challenge for the future of globalisation is institutional and political in nature rather than technological, although new technologies might aggravate the trends in inequality that have created the current political backlash against globalisation. Zooming in on the COVID-19 global pandemic, I similarly conclude that the current health crisis may further darken the future of globalisation if it aggravates policy tensions across countries.
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Overview
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TL;DR
This paper evaluates whether the world economy has entered de-globalisation and offers speculative thoughts on global value chains in the post-COVID-19 age. It finds little systematic evidence of de-globalisation, arguing that the post-Great Recession slowdown is “slowbalisation” after an unsustainable 1986–2008 hyperglobalisation, with the main future challenge being institutional and political rather than technological.
Key findings
- World trade-to-GDP more than doubled from 13.7% in 1970 to 29.7% in 2018, with close to 80% of that increase occurring in 1986–2008; after the Great Recession it recovered to essentially its 2008 peak by 2018.
- Hyperglobalisation was driven by the ICT revolution, trade liberalisation, and the spread of capitalism: the weighted average tariff on traded manufactured goods fell from 13.6% in 1986 to 7.5% in 2008, and ten selected socialist countries accounted for 43.5% of world population in 1990.
- Technological factors such as automation and 3D printing are not clear-cut de-globalising forces; automation may raise demand for offshore inputs, and sunk costs make GVC location decisions sticky, explaining the intensive-margin response and V-shaped recovery after the 2008–09 trade collapse.
- COVID-19 caused a cumulative world trade decline of 17.6% by May 2020 relative to August 2019, reduced to a 4.4% year-on-year decline by August; seaborne trade had fully recovered by early October, and vehicle trade fell about 50% before recovering faster than other components.
Methods
- Descriptive review of globalisation measures using World Bank WDI, CPB World Trade Monitor, Borin and Mancini’s GVC trade measure, UN migration data, OECD AMNE data, and other sources, with charts covering world trade/GDP, GVC trade, migration, capital flows, and multinational activity.
- A simple conceptual framework building on Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004), extended to include fixed and sunk costs, multiple inputs, and sequential production, to interpret offshoring, reshoring, and GVC stickiness.
- The paper is largely a synthesis and speculative assessment rather than a new causal empirical estimation; it uses existing evidence and preliminary COVID-19 trade data.
Limitations
- The paper states that COVID-19 data are incomplete and imperfect, that much will be learned from future detailed studies, and that the effects of the 2018–19 U.S.-China trade war will be sorted out for years; it also notes that global input-output tables are lagged, coarse, and rely on strong assumptions.
- The paper states that many technologies discussed are general-purpose technologies whose full impact takes years to materialise, so available empirical evidence should be treated as tentative at best.
- Evident from the text: this is an NBER working paper not peer-reviewed, and many conclusions about the post-COVID-19 future are explicitly speculative and dependent on political developments such as the U.S. presidential election.
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Claims the paper makes
17 Valid · 20 Not valid · 42 Not checked · 177 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“it also reduced trade -policy uncertainty due to the binding commitments that countries made when entering the GATT/WTO or signing regional trade agreements.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Pierce and Schott, 2016 matched to “The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment” (2016) source
- Partly supportedcites Handley and Limao, 2017 matched to “Policy Uncertainty, Trade, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for China and the United States” (2017) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The opening discussion and Conclusion report that China’s WTO accession reduced trade-policy uncertainty, while “D. Outcomes and Policy Experiments” describes WTO tariff bindings as commitments. The paper also discusses how agreements can make trade policy more predictable, but the passages do not establish the claimed reduction for regional trade agreements specifically. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This ratio has in fact been quite stable at a value of one -half in recent decades (see Antràs and Chor, 2018).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Antràs and Chor, 2018 matched to “On the Measurement of Upstreamness and Downstreamness in Global Value Chains” (2018) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.3 equates the world value-added-to-gross-output ratio with the final-use-to-gross-output ratio; world value added corresponds to world GDP. Section 3.1 places that ratio near one-half from 1995 to 2011, but describes a perceptible, steady decline from 0.526 to 0.486. Thus the approximate value is supported, while calling it quite stable omits the reported trend. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“the 1980s and 1990s also witnessed technological developments that significantly reduced the quality -and time -adjusted costs of transporting goods across countries, in large part due to the increased reliance on air freight shipping (see Hummels, 2007).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Hummels, 2007 matched to “Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization” (2007) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Air Transportation Prices section reports falling air-freight prices through the 1980s and 1990s, and the Transportation Quality and Speed of Delivery section says that air shipping greatly reduced travel time. The Conclusions also document growing reliance on air freight. But the paper places the sharpest technology-driven air-price declines earlier, after the introduction of jet engines; it does not establish that technological developments specifically in the 1980s and 1990s largely caused the claimed reduction in quality- and time-adjusted costs. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“the findings of Bernard et al. (2009) suggest the external validity of these findings, as they document similar patterns in U.S. exports to and U.S. imports from several Asian countries during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Bernard et al. (2009) matched to “The Margins of US Trade” (2009) source
The opening summary states that the paper investigates U.S. exports and imports around the 1997 Asian financial crisis and finds that the intensive margin accounts for most export declines and import increases. Section IV identifies five Asian crisis countries and reports the export and import patterns. The external-validity inference is the citing authors’ interpretation, not a separate finding attributed to Bernard et al. (LLM, conf=0.93)
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“while automation might have a positive effect on offshoring in less developed economies (as documented by Artuc et al., 2018, or Stapleton and Webb, 2020)”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Artuc et al., 2018 matched to “Robots, Tasks and Trade” (2018) source
The indexed copy’s unpaginated description of Robots, Tasks and Trade reports that greater robot intensity leads to increased imports from less developed countries in the same industry. That supports the cautiously worded claim that automation might positively affect offshoring to those economies. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Stapleton and Webb, 2020 matched to “Automation, Trade and Multinational Activity: Micro Evidence from Spain” (2020) source
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Chart 16. The Impact of COVID -19 On World Trade
“the trade collapse in Chart 16 has not operated, at least up to this point, at the extensive margin.”
§ Chart 16. The Impact of COVID -19 On World Trade
“lessthan5%ofthedecreaseinSpanishexportsduringMarch-August of2020relativetoMarch-Augustof2019wasexplainedbytheintensivemargin”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 3.3 The Spread of Capitalism
“Table 1 provides information on the share of world population in 1990 accounted for by ten selected countries”
§ 3.3 The Spread of Capitalism
“| China | 21.5% | East Germany | 0.3% | |------------|---------|-----------------|--------| | India | 16.5% | Hungary | 0.2% | | Bangladesh | 2.0% | Czech Republic | 0.2% | | Vietnam | 1.3% | Bulgaria | 0.2% | | Poland | 0.7% | Serbia | 0.1% | | Romania | 0.4% | Slovak Republic | 0.1% |”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5.3 Structural Transformation, Investment, and Capital Goods
“panel A of Chart 12, borrowed from García -Santana et al. (2020), indicates that the relationship between country -level investment rates and the level of development (measured by log GDP per capita) exhibits a clear inverted -U shape”
§ 5.3 Structural Transformation, Investment, and Capital Goods
“Chart 12. The Decline in Investment Rates Panel A. World Investment Rate (World Gross Capital Formation as % of World GDP) <!-- image --> Source: García - Santana et al. (2020). Data have been all been filtered out from country fixed effects. Projections (in red) based on a cubic polynomial of log GDP per capita.”
Citations
Cites
The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.
Research works printed but not linked: 6
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- Clemens, Michael A., and Jeffrey G. Williamson (2004), 'Why Did the Tariff-Growth Correlation Change After 1950?' Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 1: pp. 5 -46. Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig (2018 a ), 'The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe,' American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 4: 936 -953. Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig (2018 b ), 'Global Competition and Brexit,' American Political Science Review , 2018 -112 (2): 201 -218.
- Dixit, Avinash and Gene M. Grossman (2005), 'The Limits of Free Trade,' Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 3: 241 -244.
- Helpman, Elhanan, ed. (1998), General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth . MIT press.
- Krugman, Paul R. (1980), 'Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade,' American Economic Review , 70(5), 950 -959.
- Summers, Lawrence (2013), 'Secular Stagnation', speech at 14th Annual IMF Research Conference, Washington DC, November.
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Satoğlu, E. B. (2022) · Science, technology and innovation studies · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-13142-4_7 · Cited by 4
Effect of COVID-19 on the mutual trade between Germany and the Visegrad Four
Jindřichovská, I., & Uğurlu, E. (2024) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-024-03563-8 · Cited by 4
Sub‐Saharan Africa's participation in global value chains: 1995–2021
Mancini, M., Mattoo, A., Taglioni, D., & Winkler, D. E. (2023) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/twec.13497 · Cited by 4
Rymarczyk, J. (2022) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su14095518 · Cited by 5
Shimbov, B., Éltető, A., & Alguacil, M. (2025) · Journal of Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/15140326.2025.2564968 · Cited by 5
“This was a period of “hyperglobalization” caused by factors like trade liberalization, information and communication technologies (ICT) development, fall of communist systems (Antrás, 2020).”
Guillén, A., & Torres, I. C. (2025) · Agrarian South Journal of Political Economy A triannual Journal of Agrarian South Network and CARES · doi:10.1177/22779760241313169 · Cited by 4
“It became evident that supply networks were overly rigid and dependent on a small number of locations abroad, particularly in China (Antràs, 2020; Gereffi, 2023, 2024).”
Article 5 - Global Value Chains and the Slowing Down of Globalisation
Posta, P. D. (2022) · Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science · doi:10.21814/perspectivas.4564 · Cited by 3
Protektionismus und Abschottungstendenzen bremsen und verändern die Globalisierung
Kolev, G., & Matthes, J. (2021) · Wirtschaftsdienst · doi:10.1007/s10273-021-3041-z · Cited by 4
“Auch bei den Portfolio-Investitionen ist ein ähnlicher Einbruch zu beobachten (Antràs, 2020).”
Contract Incompleteness and the Boundaries of the Firm in Times of COVID-19
Bernasconi, M., Galetti, S., Gattai, V., & Natale, P. (2022) · Journal of Industry Competition and Trade · doi:10.1007/s10842-022-00387-7 · Cited by 3
“7 See Osservatorio nazionale della salute nelle regioni italiane Homepage.”
BackgroundInfluentialConditions and Impact of Globalization Transformations on the Activities of Business Structures
But-Gusaim, O. H. (2024) · Business Inform · doi:10.32983/2222-4459-2024-1-29-45 · Cited by 3
Gao, M., & Zhuo, F. (2023) · International Journal of Emerging Markets · doi:10.1108/ijoem-06-2022-1008 · Cited by 3
Vasilakis, C., & Nikolopoulos, K. I. (2023) · IMA Journal of Management Mathematics · doi:10.1093/imaman/dpad023 · Cited by 3
Sztajerowska, M. (2023) · OECD working papers on international investment · doi:10.1787/5fcc2892-en · Cited by 9
Institution Building without Commitment
Bassetto, M., Huo, Z., & Ŕıos-Rull, J.-V. (2024) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20201365 · Cited by 5
Trade Disruptions and Reshoring
Chakrabarti, A. S., Mahajan, K., & Tomar, S. (2024) · American Economic Journal Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20230270 · Cited by 3
Beyond Domar Weights: A New Measure of Systemic Importance in Production NetworksPreprint
Bahal, G. N., & Lenzo, D. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4512514 · Cited by 3
Robust cross-dock assignment problem with uncertain cost parameters
Altaf, A., Amraoui, A. E., Delmotte, F., & Lecoutre, C. (2025) · International Journal of Production Research · doi:10.1080/00207543.2025.2469164 · Cited by 3
A bibliometric analysis of the global value chains research field
Matić, I., & Sunjka, N. (2022) · Management · doi:10.30924/mjcmi.27.2.12 · Cited by 6
Assessing the Supply Chain Effect of Natural Disasters: Evidence from Chinese ManufacturersPreprint
Laengle, K., Xu, A., & Tian, R. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4139996 · Cited by 3
“Antràs (2020), for instance, argues that the COVID-19 pandemic alone is unlikely to alter firms’ supply chain organisation, as a temporary shock is unlikely to induce firms to sever international ties and incur fixed costs in identifying and establishing new suppliers.”
BackgroundJones, E. C. (2025) · Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports · doi:10.1007/s40518-025-00256-x · Cited by 3
“This illustrates that as the economy has globalized, trade has become more important for most major economies [53].”
Family firms, productivity and input specificity: An empirical assessment of Italian firms’ sourcing
Ponti, P. D., & Gattai, V. (2022) · Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/00036846.2022.2141458 · Cited by 4
Navigating trade uncertainty: The role of trade financing and the spillover effects
Mauricio Calani, C., Margaretic, P., & Moreno, D. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.104043 · Cited by 3
How did China 's zero Covid policy affect its exports?
Tang, H., & Zheng, X. (2023) · Review of International Economics · doi:10.1111/roie.12696 · Cited by 3
Are We Fragmented Yet? Measuring Geopolitical Fragmentation and Its Causal EffectPreprint
Fernández‐Villaverde, J., Mineyama, T., & Song, D. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4881219 · Cited by 3
The impact of trade on schooling over the last five decades in developing countries
Williams, K. (2023) · Journal of International Trade & Economic Development · doi:10.1080/09638199.2023.2171476 · Cited by 3
“Trade liberalization causes the supply chain of production to run through many countries, with heterogeneous skilled-intensity (Antràs 2019, 2020).”
BackgroundThe Impact of Supplier Diversification on Supply Chain Resilience in the Post-COVID Era
Qureshi, N. A., & Ali, S. A. (2025) · The Critical Review of Social Sciences Studies · doi:10.59075/gtef5x07 · Cited by 3
The Economics of Relational Spaces
Wieland, J. (2024) · Relational economics and organization governance · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-71608-9_3 · Cited by 2
Exploring Structural Convergence: Dynamics of Technology Diversification among World Regions
Radošević, S., Szczygielski, K., & Wójcik, P. T. (2026) · Journal of the Knowledge Economy · doi:10.1007/s13132-026-03314-x · Cited by 2
“Moreover, global convergence in diversification stalled after 2008, consistent with broader evidence of weakening global integration and technology diffusion (Antras, 2020 ; Witt, 2019 ).”
Tasks, Occupations, and Slowbalization: On the Limits of FragmentationPreprint
Brakman, S., & van Marrewijk, C. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4009414 · Cited by 2
Loon, P. W. (2025) · Asia in transition · doi:10.1007/978-981-97-6926-1_7 · Cited by 3
Rethinking Regional Innovation Systems in the Age of De‐Globalisation
Molica, F., Cappellano, F., & Makkonen, T. (2026) · Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie · doi:10.1111/tesg.70077 · Cited by 2
Blockchain Exploratory Analysis in Strategic Management
Podile, V., Rishika, Y., Manasa, K., Ramyasri, B., Kumar, A., & Yadav, T. G. (2023) · International Conference on Advance Computing and Innovative Technologies in Engineering (ICACITE) · doi:10.1109/icacite57410.2023.10182901 · Cited by 2
Mhonyera, G. (2024) · Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research (JEECAR) · doi:10.15549/jeecar.v11i3.1594 · Cited by 2
Chen, X. (2022) · New Global Studies · doi:10.1515/ngs-2022-0002 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Antràs, P.
- Corresponding author
- Antràs, Pol
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2020-11
- OpenAlex
- W3107339002
- Semantic Scholar
- 55eefc617dfacf1bdd0c3362734149479d5d340b
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 61 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 62 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 70 · 2021: 44
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.nber.org
- Locations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Globalization, Economics, and Policies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Global trade, sustainability, and social impact
- Keywords
- deglobalization, global value chains, globalization, COVID-19 pandemic, international trade, inequality, policy tensions
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.