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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 31 of the 52 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk

Open access
Jabin, Md Shafiqur Rahman · 2026 · Frontiers in Digital Health

Abstract

Introduction: Health information technology (HIT) is now integral to healthcare delivery, supporting clinical documentation, prescribing, diagnostics, and care coordination. Although these technologies offer substantial benefits, they have also introduced new patient safety risks that are often difficult to anticipate, detect, or manage. Many HIT-related safety problems arise not from isolated technical failures or individual mistakes, but from complex interactions between digital systems, clinical work practices, organisational structures, and governance arrangements. Traditional patient safety models that focus on discrete errors or linear causality are therefore insufficient for explaining how digital risks emerge and persist in practice. Methods/theoretical approach: This article develops a sociotechnical theory of HIT-related risk grounded in patient safety science and sociotechnical systems theory. The theory is informed by empirical insights from incident-based research on HIT-related safety problems and synthesises evidence from real-world incident narratives. It adopts a conceptual, theory-building approach informed by purposive, iterative engagement with the relevant literature on health IT safety, sociotechnical systems, and resilience-oriented patient safety frameworks. Rather than analysing a single dataset, the paper identifies recurring mechanisms through which digital risks arise, remain hidden, propagate across contexts, and become recoverable or not. Results/theoretical propositions: The proposed theory conceptualises HIT-related risk as a dynamic process involving four interrelated mechanisms: risk emergence, risk concealment, risk propagation, and recoverability. Risks emerge through misalignments between system design, configuration, and clinical workflows; they are concealed by automation, information fragmentation, and adaptive workarounds; they propagate through tightly coupled digital infrastructures and shared dependencies; and their recoverability depends on organisational capacity for detection, escalation, and learning. Together, these mechanisms explain why HIT-related incidents may affect multiple patients or services, why attribution to individual error is misleading, and why safety problems may persist despite corrective efforts. Discussion/implications: By reframing HIT-related incidents as manifestations of system-level vulnerabilities rather than isolated failures, this sociotechnical theory provides a coherent explanatory framework for understanding digital patient safety. It highlights how risks can evolve silently within routine practice, vary in visibility and scale, and emphasises the importance of organisational learning, governance, and resilience in managing digital safety risks.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This paper develops a sociotechnical theory explaining health information technology (HIT)–related risk as a dynamic process of emergence, concealment, propagation, and recoverability. It argues that digital safety problems often remain silent within routine practice and are better understood as system-level vulnerabilities than as isolated technical failures or individual errors.

Key findings

  • HIT-related risk is conceptualised through four interrelated mechanisms: risk emergence, risk concealment, risk propagation, and recoverability.
  • Risks emerge from misalignments between system design, configuration, and clinical workflows; they are concealed by automation, information fragmentation, and adaptive workarounds.
  • Risks propagate through tightly coupled digital infrastructures and shared dependencies, potentially affecting multiple patients or services, while recoverability depends on organisational capacity for detection, escalation, and learning.
  • The theory reframes HIT-related incidents as manifestations of system-level vulnerabilities rather than isolated failures, arguing that attribution to individual error is misleading and that safety problems may persist despite corrective efforts.

Methods

  • Conceptual, theory-building approach grounded in patient safety science and sociotechnical systems theory.
  • Informed by empirical insights from incident-based research on HIT-related safety problems and synthesis of real-world incident narratives, rather than analysis of a single dataset.
  • Uses purposive, iterative engagement with literature on health IT safety, sociotechnical systems, and resilience-oriented patient safety frameworks to identify recurring mechanisms of digital risk.

Limitations

  • Stated: the paper’s contribution is primarily theoretical, and it does not analyse a single dataset.
  • Stated: the approach is conceptual and informed by purposive, iterative literature engagement rather than a formal empirical study.
  • Evident from the text: the theory is not empirically tested or validated in this paper, and no primary data collection, sample, or quantitative analysis is reported.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3389/fdgth.2026.1785086

Cites

57 of 57 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 A sociotechnical model of HIT-related risk as a dynamic and often silent process. Figure 1 illustrates how the proposed theory can be used to understand the development of HIT-related risk in practice. Rather than representing a linear sequence, the model depicts a dynamic cycle in which risks emerge from misalignments between system components, remain concealed through system opacity and adaptive practices, propagate across interconnected workflows and infrastructures, and become recoverable (or not) depending on organisational capacity for detection and response. Crucially, these mechanisms are interconnected: concealment can enable further propagation, propagation increases the likelihood of delayed detection, and limitations in recoverability can reinforce conditions that allow risks to persist. This cyclical and feedback-driven structure reflects the behaviour of complex sociotechnical systems and provides a practical framework for analysing how digital safety problems evolve over time in real-world settings.
Figure 1 A sociotechnical model of HIT-related risk as a dynamic and often silent process. Figure 1 illustrates how the proposed theory can be used to understand the development of HIT-related risk in practice. Rather than representing a linear sequence, the model depicts a dynamic cycle in which risks emerge from misalignments between system components, remain concealed through system opacity and adaptive practices, propagate across interconnected workflows and infrastructures, and become recoverable (or not) depending on organisational capacity for detection and response. Crucially, these mechanisms are interconnected: concealment can enable further propagation, propagation increases the likelihood of delayed detection, and limitations in recoverability can reinforce conditions that allow risks to persist. This cyclical and feedback-driven structure reflects the behaviour of complex sociotechnical systems and provides a practical framework for analysing how digital safety problems evolve over time in real-world settings.CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

21 Valid · 1 Not valid · 3 Not checked · 34 Own results and interpretations

29 more claims · 3 with their cited sources checked

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 20
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 7
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

2 of 2

Citations

Cites

Show all 52 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Jabin, 2019, Identifying and Characterising Problems Arising from Interactions Between Medical Imaging and Health Information Technology as a Basis for Improvements in Practice
  2. Pronovost, 2008, Improving the value of patient safety reporting systems, 95

Metadata

Authors
Jabin, M. S. R.
Affiliations
University of Bradford (GB)
Corresponding author
Jabin, Md Shafiqur Rahman
Venue
Frontiers in Digital Health
Published
2026-05-15
Volume
8
Pages
1785086-1785086
ISSN
2673-253X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7161296751
Cited by
10
References
52
Citations by year
2026: 10
FWCI
94.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Frontiers in Digital Health (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DiVA (Linkoping University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Patient Safety and Medication Errors
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Information Systems Theories and Implementation
Keywords
health information technology, patient safety, socio-technical systems theory, risk propagation, recoverability, automation, information fragmentation, organizational learning, resilience

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3389/fdgth.2026.1785086
The paper
Jabin, M. S. R. (2026). Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk. Frontiers in Digital Health. https://doi.org/10.3389/fdgth.2026.1785086

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.