The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 31 of the 52 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk
Open accessAbstract
Introduction: Health information technology (HIT) is now integral to healthcare delivery, supporting clinical documentation, prescribing, diagnostics, and care coordination. Although these technologies offer substantial benefits, they have also introduced new patient safety risks that are often difficult to anticipate, detect, or manage. Many HIT-related safety problems arise not from isolated technical failures or individual mistakes, but from complex interactions between digital systems, clinical work practices, organisational structures, and governance arrangements. Traditional patient safety models that focus on discrete errors or linear causality are therefore insufficient for explaining how digital risks emerge and persist in practice. Methods/theoretical approach: This article develops a sociotechnical theory of HIT-related risk grounded in patient safety science and sociotechnical systems theory. The theory is informed by empirical insights from incident-based research on HIT-related safety problems and synthesises evidence from real-world incident narratives. It adopts a conceptual, theory-building approach informed by purposive, iterative engagement with the relevant literature on health IT safety, sociotechnical systems, and resilience-oriented patient safety frameworks. Rather than analysing a single dataset, the paper identifies recurring mechanisms through which digital risks arise, remain hidden, propagate across contexts, and become recoverable or not. Results/theoretical propositions: The proposed theory conceptualises HIT-related risk as a dynamic process involving four interrelated mechanisms: risk emergence, risk concealment, risk propagation, and recoverability. Risks emerge through misalignments between system design, configuration, and clinical workflows; they are concealed by automation, information fragmentation, and adaptive workarounds; they propagate through tightly coupled digital infrastructures and shared dependencies; and their recoverability depends on organisational capacity for detection, escalation, and learning. Together, these mechanisms explain why HIT-related incidents may affect multiple patients or services, why attribution to individual error is misleading, and why safety problems may persist despite corrective efforts. Discussion/implications: By reframing HIT-related incidents as manifestations of system-level vulnerabilities rather than isolated failures, this sociotechnical theory provides a coherent explanatory framework for understanding digital patient safety. It highlights how risks can evolve silently within routine practice, vary in visibility and scale, and emphasises the importance of organisational learning, governance, and resilience in managing digital safety risks.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper develops a sociotechnical theory explaining health information technology (HIT)–related risk as a dynamic process of emergence, concealment, propagation, and recoverability. It argues that digital safety problems often remain silent within routine practice and are better understood as system-level vulnerabilities than as isolated technical failures or individual errors.
Key findings
- HIT-related risk is conceptualised through four interrelated mechanisms: risk emergence, risk concealment, risk propagation, and recoverability.
- Risks emerge from misalignments between system design, configuration, and clinical workflows; they are concealed by automation, information fragmentation, and adaptive workarounds.
- Risks propagate through tightly coupled digital infrastructures and shared dependencies, potentially affecting multiple patients or services, while recoverability depends on organisational capacity for detection, escalation, and learning.
- The theory reframes HIT-related incidents as manifestations of system-level vulnerabilities rather than isolated failures, arguing that attribution to individual error is misleading and that safety problems may persist despite corrective efforts.
Methods
- Conceptual, theory-building approach grounded in patient safety science and sociotechnical systems theory.
- Informed by empirical insights from incident-based research on HIT-related safety problems and synthesis of real-world incident narratives, rather than analysis of a single dataset.
- Uses purposive, iterative engagement with literature on health IT safety, sociotechnical systems, and resilience-oriented patient safety frameworks to identify recurring mechanisms of digital risk.
Limitations
- Stated: the paper’s contribution is primarily theoretical, and it does not analyse a single dataset.
- Stated: the approach is conceptual and informed by purposive, iterative literature engagement rather than a formal empirical study.
- Evident from the text: the theory is not empirically tested or validated in this paper, and no primary data collection, sample, or quantitative analysis is reported.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
21 Valid · 1 Not valid · 3 Not checked · 34 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“As digital health infrastructures increasingly span organisational and sectoral boundaries, risks associated with design, configuration, and interoperability cannot be managed solely at the local level (1, 42, 61).”
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > Discussion > Policy and system-level implications
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [1] Jabin, 2019 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [42] Castro, 2016, The contribution of sociotechnical factors to health information technology-related sentinel events, Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf source
- Partly supportedcites [61] Jabin, 2025, Ethical and quality of care–related challenges of digital health twins in care settings for older adults: scoping review, JMIR Aging sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction describes digital health twins as interconnected and calls for collaborative efforts to address their privacy and security risks. Results > Strategies to Mitigate DHT Challenges also calls for multidisciplinary collaboration and governance, supporting the point that these risks are not solely local. The paper does not specifically discuss design, configuration, or interoperability risks across organisational and sectoral boundaries; its focus is digital health twins in older-adult care. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The synthesis of findings across investigations, such as national thematic reviews, demonstrates the value of aggregating insights to identify recurrent patterns of risk that may not be apparent within single organisations (1, 63, 64).”
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > Discussion > Policy and system-level implications
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [1] Jabin, 2019 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [63] Wright, 2015, Lessons learned from implementing service-oriented clinical decision support at four sites: a qualitative study, Int J Med Inf source
- Partly supportedcites [64] Ong, 2013, Syndromic surveillance for health information system failures: a feasibility study, J Am Med Inform Assoc sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion (page not available in our copy) says that combining information from different surveillance approaches may improve error diagnosis and detection. It does not discuss synthesising findings across investigations, national thematic reviews, or identifying risks that single organisations might miss; its study was based on one hospital. (LLM, conf=0.79)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Digitisation redistributes responsibility across human and technical actors.”
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > Reframing “error” and responsibility in digital healthcare > Redistribution of responsibility in sociotechnical systems
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [1] Jabin, 2019 source
- Partly supportedcites [13] Sittig, 2010, A new sociotechnical model for studying health information technology in complex adaptive healthcare systems, Qual Saf Health Care sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Moving towards a New Socio-technical Model for HIT” (page unavailable), the paper says care is shifting toward patients’ homes, software can enforce organizational policies, and some apparent user problems arise from system design. These passages support a change in how work and problems are distributed with HIT, but the paper does not explicitly assign responsibility to technical actors. (LLM, conf=0.78)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The work on incidents affecting multiple patients highlights how shared digital dependencies can create situations in which no single individual has full visibility or control over the conditions that give rise to harm (8, 29).”
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > Reframing “error” and responsibility in digital healthcare > Redistribution of responsibility in sociotechnical systems
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [8] Jabin, 2022, Characterizing healthcare incidents in Sweden related to health information technology affecting care management of multiple patients, Health Inform J source
- Partly supportedcites [29] Pan, 2024, A review of incidents related to health information technology in Swedish healthcare to characterise system issues as a basis for improvement in clinical practice, Health Informatics J sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The ‘Involvement of multiple mechanisms’ section (p. 17) describes failures that propagate across systems and clinical workflows, and says reporters may not know the underlying mechanism. ‘Human versus technical factors’ (p. 15) likewise describes system components as ‘black boxes.’ These passages support limited visibility into shared digital failures, but do not establish the broader claim that no single individual has full visibility or control over the conditions producing harm. (LLM, conf=0.83)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This diffusion complicates accountability and can create gaps in oversight, particularly when responsibilities for monitoring, escalation, and remediation are not clearly defined (13).”
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > Reframing “error” and responsibility in digital healthcare > Redistribution of responsibility in sociotechnical systems
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [13] Sittig, 2010, A new sociotechnical model for studying health information technology in complex adaptive healthcare systems, Qual Saf Health Care sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The HIT Use section reports missed follow-up of abnormal test results and identifies organizational policies about who was responsible as relevant. The Background section calls for defined decision-making, monitoring, and governance processes. The paper does not specifically say that diffusion of responsibility creates oversight gaps, or discuss unclear escalation and remediation responsibilities. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
29 more claims · 3 with their cited sources checked
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 20
- It may state two separate claims as one. 7
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > Introduction: the paradox of safety in digital healthcare
“In the UK, a 2025 thematic review by the Health Services Safety Investigations Body (HSSIB) synthesised multiple investigations into electronic patient record systems, highlighting recurring safety issues related to implementation, workflow fit, and organisational capacity to detect and respond to hazards (19).”
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > References
“19. World Health Organisation. WHOQOL: Measuring Quality of Life (1995).”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > Introduction: the paradox of safety in digital healthcare
“In the patient safety domain, models such as the sociotechnical framework proposed by Sittig and Singh (2010) and broader systems-based approaches have advanced understanding of how technology-related risks arise from interactions across multiple system dimensions (24).”
§ Why digital health fails silently: a sociotechnical theory of health information technology–related risk > References
“24. Sittig DF Wright A Simonaitis L Carpenter JD Allen GO Doebbeling BN The state of the art in clinical knowledge management: an inventory of tools and techniques. Int J Med Inf. (2010) 79(1): 44– 57.”
Citations
Cites
Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user acceptance of information technology
Davis, F. D. (1989) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/249008 · Cited by 68,483 · cited 1×
“…adoption models, such as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), have been widely applied to explain user uptake and acceptance of digital systems, emphasising perceived usefulness, ease of use, and behavioural intention (20, 21).”
User Acceptance of Information Technology: Toward A Unified View1
Venkatesh, V., Morris, M. G., Davis, G. B., & Davis, F. D. (2003) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/30036540 · Cited by 45,035
The DeLone and McLean Model of Information Systems Success: A Ten-Year Update
(2003) · Journal of Management Information Systems · doi:10.1080/07421222.2003.11045748 · Cited by 11,791
Human error: models and management
Reason, J. (2000) · BMJ · doi:10.1136/bmj.320.7237.768 · Cited by 5,665
Sociomaterial practices: exploring technology at work
Orlikowski, W. J. (2007) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840607081138 · Cited by 3,248
Greenhalgh, T., Wherton, J., Papoutsi, C., Lynch, J., Hughes, G., A'Court, C., Hinder, S., Fahy, N., Procter, R., & Shaw, S. (2017) · Journal of Medical Internet Research · doi:10.2196/jmir.8775 · Cited by 2,887
Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies
Cummings, L. L., & Perrow, C. (1984) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392945 · Cited by 2,861
The challenge of complexity in health care
Plsek, P. E., & Greenhalgh, T. (2001) · BMJ · doi:10.1136/bmj.323.7313.625 · Cited by 2,578
Work system design for patient safety: the SEIPS model
Carayon, P., Schoofs Hundt, A., Karsh, B.-T., Gurses, A. P., Alvarado, C. J., Smith, M., & Flatley Brennan, P. (2006) · Quality in Health Care · doi:10.1136/qshc.2005.015842 · Cited by 1,795 · cited 2×
“This redistribution of cognitive work also reshapes how clinicians engage with information, often requiring them to manage multiple digital interfaces and reconcile fragmented data sources (25, 33).”
Ash, J. S. (2003) · Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association · doi:10.1197/jamia.m1471 · Cited by 1,789
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Jabin, 2019, Identifying and Characterising Problems Arising from Interactions Between Medical Imaging and Health Information Technology as a Basis for Improvements in Practice
- Pronovost, 2008, Improving the value of patient safety reporting systems, 95
Cited by
From emergence to recoverability: a sociotechnical control trajectory theory of HIT-related risk
Jabin, M. S. R. (2026) · Frontiers in Digital Health · doi:10.3389/fdgth.2026.1811981 · Cited by 5
Self-citationNyatuka, D. R., Siva, F., & Jabin, M. S. R. (2026) · Frontiers in Digital Health · doi:10.3389/fdgth.2026.1883524 · Cited by 5
Self-citationMoghadam, S. T., & Jabin, M. S. R. (2026) · doi:10.2196/preprints.111956
Self-citationOsei-Donkor, B., Hassoun, A., & Jabin, M. S. R. (2026) · Frontiers in Health Services · doi:10.3389/frhs.2026.1872556
Self-citationNyatuka, D. R., Cherinet, P., & Jabin, M. S. R. (2026) · Frontiers in Digital Health · doi:10.3389/fdgth.2026.1860703 · Cited by 2
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Jabin, M. S. R.
- Affiliations
- University of Bradford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Jabin, Md Shafiqur Rahman
- Venue
- Frontiers in Digital Health
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2026-05-15
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 1785086-1785086
- ISSN
- 2673-253X (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC13231400
- OpenAlex
- W7161296751
- Semantic Scholar
- c2ea9779287c19893a74f53bb479bfe606d02492
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 52
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10
- FWCI
- 94.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Frontiers in Digital Health (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DiVA (Linkoping University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Patient Safety and Medication Errors
- Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Information Systems Theories and Implementation
- Keywords
- health information technology, patient safety, socio-technical systems theory, risk propagation, recoverability, automation, information fragmentation, organizational learning, resilience
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