Models of consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
A model of consciousness is a theoretical description that relates brain properties of consciousness (e.g., fast irregular electrical activity, widespread brain activation) to phenomenal properties of consciousness (e.g., qualia, a first-person-perspective, the unity of a conscious scene). Because of the diverse nature of these properties (Seth et al. 2005), useful models can be either mathematical/logical or verbal/conceptual.
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Citations
Cited by
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573
Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Brief Maintenance of Seen and Unseen Sensory Information
King, J.-R., Pescetelli, N., & Dehaene, S. (2016) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.10.051 · Cited by 206
van Gaal, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2012) · The Neuroscientist · doi:10.1177/1073858411404079 · Cited by 181
Bor, D., & Seth, A. K. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00063 · Cited by 143
“…consciousness theories have attempted to link experimental findings in consciousness science to cognitive and neurophysiological architectures (see Seth, 2007; Kouider, 2009 for reviews): prominent examples of theories articulated at the neural level include (neuronal) global workspace theory…”
BackgroundSelf-citationDynamic functional connectivity and brain metastability during altered states of consciousness
Cavanna, F., Vilas, M. G., Palmucci, M., & Tagliazucchi, E. (2018) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.09.065 · Cited by 137
“…forward from the more descriptive notion of neural correlates of consciousness, the formulation of theoretical models of consciousness aims towards a mechanistic explanation, i.e. knowing the “how” (mechanism) it should be possible to predict then “when” and “where” (Seth, 2007).”
BackgroundA landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications
Kuhn, R. L. (2024) · Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology · doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2023.12.003 · Cited by 135
Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification
Signorelli, C. M., Szczotka, J., & Prentner, R. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab021 · Cited by 91
“Models of consciousness set out to provide a principled description of how the physical domain relates to conscious experience (Seth 2007; Seth 2009; Durham et al. 2020).”
BackgroundMetzinger, T. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00746 · Cited by 84
“During the last three decades, research on the problem of conscious experience has emerged as a field of systematic, rigorous research in its own right (Metzinger, 1995, 2000; Seth, 2007).”
A roadmap for the study of conscious audition and its neural basis
Dykstra, A. R., Cariani, P. A., & Gutschalk, A. (2017) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0103 · Cited by 61
Falsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab001 · Cited by 46
“Note that we refer to both “theories” of consciousness and also “models” of consciousness, and use these interchangeably (Seth 2007).”
MethodGlobal Workspace Theory, its LIDA model and the underlying neuroscience
Franklin, S., Strain, S., Snaider, J., McCall, R., & Faghihi, U. (2012) · Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures · doi:10.1016/j.bica.2012.04.001 · Cited by 47
Falsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2004.03541 · Cited by 46
Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument.
Kleiner, J. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/jdcfh · Cited by 37
Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument
Kleiner, J. (2020) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2020.102981 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Seth, A.
- Venue
- Scholarpedia
- Publisher
- Scholarpedia
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1328
- ISSN
- 1941-6016 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1993813734
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 1.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.