Why Don't Apes Point?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Chimpanzees gesture to one another regularly. Although some of their gestures are relatively inflexible displays invariably elicited by particular environmental events, an important subset are learned by individuals and used flexibly—such things as “arm raise” to elicit play or “touch side” to request nursing. In an experiment with apes and human children, Tomasello et al. had one person, called the “hider,” hide food or toy from the subject in one of three distinctive containers. Classically, human infants are thought to point for two main reasons: they point imperatively when they want the adult to do something for them; and they point declaratively when they want the adult to share attention with them to some interesting event or object. No one knows how human infants come to point for others. A much more productive question, and one that can currently lead the people to much more interesting lines of empirical research, is asking the question why apes do not even point.
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Citations
Cites
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000129 · Cited by 4,882
Self-citationHow Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226218526.001.0001 · Cited by 2,268 · cited 1×
“But in analyses of the sequential unfolding of participant behavior over time in these hunts, many observers have characterized this activity as essentially identical to the group hunting of other social mammals such as lions and wolves (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Tomasello and Call 1997).”
BackgroundChimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent
Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00035-4 · Cited by 573 · cited 1×
“We now have data, however, that has convinced me that at least some great apes do understand that others have goals and perceptions (not, by the way, thought and beliefs), as summarized by Tomasello et al. (2003).”
BackgroundSelf-citationIntentional relations and social understanding
Barresi, J., & Moore, C. (1996) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00041790 · Cited by 523
A comparison of the gestural communication of apes and human infants
Tomasello, M., & Camaioni, L. (2010) · Human Development · doi:10.1159/000278540 · Cited by 147
Self-citation
Cited by
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., & Liszkowski, U. (2007) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01025.x · Cited by 1,039
Self-citationBunge, M. (2010) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9225-0_10 · Cited by 661
Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis.
Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2007) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2006.2000 · Cited by 531
Self-citationThe Oxford Handbook of Pragmatics
(2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697960.001.0001 · Cited by 509
A Prelinguistic Gestural Universal of Human Communication
Liszkowski, U., Brown, P., Callaghan, T., Takada, A., & de Vos, C. (2012) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01228.x · Cited by 334
Metadata
- Authors
- Tomasello, M.
- Venue
- Roots of Human Sociality
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2020-08-21
- Pages
- 506-524
- OpenAlex
- W844369558
- Cited by
- 150
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 15.24
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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