The DOI matches its Crossref record; 65 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The politics of property rights: political instability, credible commitments, and economic growth in Mexico, 1876-1929
Abstract
1. Introduction 2. Theory: instability, credible commitments, and growth 3. VPI coalitions in historical perspective: Mexico's turbulent politics, 1876-1929 4. Finance 5. Industry 6. Petroleum 7. Mining 8. Agriculture 9. Conclusion.
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Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2004-02-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 06
- Pages
- 41-3546-41-3546
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1544512349
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 65
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.