The DOI matches its Crossref record; 65 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The politics of property rights: political instability, credible commitments, and economic growth in Mexico, 1876-1929
Abstract
1. Introduction 2. Theory: instability, credible commitments, and growth 3. VPI coalitions in historical perspective: Mexico's turbulent politics, 1876-1929 4. Finance 5. Industry 6. Petroleum 7. Mining 8. Agriculture 9. Conclusion.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Munger, M. C., & North, D. C. (1991) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060065 · Cited by 24,871
Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries
Barro, R. (1989) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3120 · Cited by 8,385
(1985) · Cited by 7,244
(1991) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 6,037
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China
Skocpol, T. (1979) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815805 · Cited by 5,408
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Structure and Change in Economic History
George, P., & North, D. C. (1983) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/135165 · Cited by 4,564
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
Olson, M. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938736 · Cited by 3,794
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x · Cited by 3,610
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.
Ness, G. D., & Moore, B. (1967) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2092029 · Cited by 2,261
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036930 · Cited by 2,224
The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History.
Kimmel, M. S., Goldfrank, W., North, D. C., & Thomas, R. P. (1977) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2066368 · Cited by 2,053
Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study
Cooper, R. N., & Barro, R. J. (1997) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20048292 · Cited by 2,001
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
Political instability and economic growth
Alesina, A., �zler, S., Roubini, N., & Swagel, P. (1996) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/bf00138862 · Cited by 1,830
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
Weingast, B. R. (1997) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2952354 · Cited by 1,750
Levi, M. (2019) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520909540 · Cited by 1,653
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1997) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.11.4.83 · Cited by 1,495
Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders
Greif, A. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009475 · Cited by 1,420
The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection.
Shapiro, S. P., & Gambetta, D. (1994) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2074312 · Cited by 1,245
Economic Behavior and Institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics
Eggertsson, T. (1990) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609404 · Cited by 1,234
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
Greif, A., Milgrom, P., & Weingast, B. R. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261953 · Cited by 1,220
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1073179 · Cited by 1,207
Power and prosperity: outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships
(2001) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-5688 · Cited by 1,151
The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force
McGuire, M. C., & Olson, M. (1998) · The Political Dimension of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-26284-7_3 · Cited by 1,002
Economic Behavior and Institutions
Myhrman, J., Eggertsson, T., & Eggertsson, T. (1991) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3440234 · Cited by 978
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power
Harbert, E. N., & Yergin, D. (1991) · The New England Quarterly · doi:10.2307/366363 · Cited by 921
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
Londregan, J. B., & Poole, K. T. (1990) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010462 · Cited by 790
Faure, D. (1991) · The Journal of Asian Studies · doi:10.2307/2058550 · Cited by 764
Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy.
Voss, T., & Miller, G. J. (1993) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2074545 · Cited by 702
The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy.
Broome, J., Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1988) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554477 · Cited by 698
Productivity Across Industries and Countries: Time Series Theory and Evidence
Bernard, A. B., & Jones, C. I. (1996) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/2109853 · Cited by 599
Zapata and the Mexican Revolution
Meyer, M. C. (1969) · Hispanic American Historical Review · doi:10.1215/00182168-49.4.775 · Cited by 542
Prosperity and violence: the political economy of development
(2001) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-5114 · Cited by 537
United States Bureau of the Census
(1998) · Electronic Resources Review · doi:10.1108/err.1998.2.2.10.9 · Cited by 519
Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution
De Long, J. B., & Shleifer, A. (1993) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4274 · Cited by 450
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change
(1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174633 · Cited by 431
Without a map: political tactics and economic reform in Russia
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6378 · Cited by 425
Individuals, Institutions, and Markets
Mantzavinos, C. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139175302 · Cited by 352
Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications
Levy, B., & Spiller, P. T. S. (1996) · Cited by 320
Institutional economics: social order and public policy
(1999) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-2271 · Cited by 302
Why Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the Cotton Mills
Clark, G. (1987) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700047458 · Cited by 292
Who is afraid of political instability?
Campos, N. F., & Nugent, J. B. (2002) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(01)00181-x · Cited by 199
Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth-Century Mexico
Coatsworth, J. (1978) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.1086/ahr/83.1.80 · Cited by 197
Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy during the Old Regime
Root, H. L. (1989) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463189001002005 · Cited by 174
Meyer, M. C., & Sherman, W. L. (1979) · Dominican Scholar (Dominican University of California) · Cited by 161
Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution.
Hall, L. B., & Hart, J. M. (1990) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/2163203 · Cited by 145
Sokoloff, K. L. (1984) · Explorations in Economic History · doi:10.1016/0014-4983(84)90002-0 · Cited by 134
Gruening, E. (1928) · Cited by 114
Growth against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in Porfirian Mexico
Pletcher, D. M., & Coatsworth, J. (1983) · The Journal of Interdisciplinary History · doi:10.2307/202979 · Cited by 111
Ma, D. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315241623-19 · Cited by 95
Reynolds, C. W. (1975) · Verfassung in Recht und Übersee · doi:10.5771/0506-7286-1975-2-299_1 · Cited by 71
Simpson, E. N. (1939) · Journal of Educational Sociology · doi:10.2307/2262118 · Cited by 54
Hall, L. B., & Brown, J. C. (1994) · Hispanic American Historical Review · doi:10.1215/00182168-74.3.524 · Cited by 50
The Mexican Agrarian Revolution.
Manning, E., & Tannenbaum, F. (1930) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/3015273 · Cited by 47
Reputation as a Mechanism Alleviating Opportunistic Host Government Behavior Against MNEs
Veugelers, R. (1993) · Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.2307/2950614 · Cited by 36
Assessing the Obstacles to Industrialisation: The Mexican Economy, 1830–1940
Haber, S. H. (1992) · Journal of Latin American Studies · doi:10.1017/s0022216x00022938 · Cited by 31
Political Instability And Economic Performance: Evidence from Revolutionary Mexico
Haber, S. H., & Razo, A. (1998) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100007802 · Cited by 30
INFLACIÓN Y ESTABILIZACIÓN MONETARIA EN MÉXICO DURANTE LA REVOLUCIÓN
Cárdenas, E., & Manns, C. (1989) · El Trimestre Económico · Cited by 27
Ficker, S. K. (2000) · Hispanic American Historical Review · doi:10.1215/00182168-80-2-267 · Cited by 23
Oil and the Mexican revolution
Rippy, M. (1950) · doi:10.26153/tsw/7816 · Cited by 16
Cited by
Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10766 · Cited by 3,545
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9890 · Cited by 752
Finance, Firm Size, and Growth
BECK, T., DEMIRGUC‐KUNT, A., LAEVEN, L., & LEVINE, R. (2008) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00164.x · Cited by 682
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2004-02-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 06
- Pages
- 41-3546-41-3546
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1544512349
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 65
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.