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Moral realism: a defence
Abstract
I. REALISM AND ITS CRITICS II. MORAL METAPHYSICS III. MORAL MOTIVATION IV. MORAL REASONS V. MORAL KNOWLEDGE
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Citations
Cited by
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Street, S. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6 · Cited by 1,247
Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action
Enoch, D. (2006) · Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-115-2-169 · Cited by 521
Meta‐Ethics and The Problem of Creeping Minimalism
Dreier, J. (2004) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00019.x · Cited by 431
THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Kauppinen, A. (2007) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790701305871 · Cited by 324
Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason)
Titelbaum, M. G. (2015) · Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0009 · Cited by 303
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
“See Cuneo (2007b) and Shafer-Landau (2003).”
BackgroundEnoch, D. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9333-6 · Cited by 224
SARKISSIAN, H., PARK, J., TIEN, D., WRIGHT, J. C., & KNOBE, J. (2011) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x · Cited by 184
Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?
Brosnan, K. (2011) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-010-9235-1 · Cited by 69
“There are different varieties of moral realism and my interest here is not to settle which of them is the most plausible (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; Railton 1986; Sturgeon 1985; Shafer-Landau 2003).”
BackgroundAre Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?
Kyriacou, C. (2016) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9780-1 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2004-07-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 41-6461-41-6461
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1592649896
- Cited by
- 490
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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