Cited by 158Advanced Authentication Protocols SecurityCryptography and Data SecurityCryptography and Residue Arithmetic

Recommendation for pair-wise key-establishment schemes using discrete logarithm cryptography

Open access
Barker, Elaine, Chen, Lily, Roginsky, Allen, Vassilev, Apostol, Davis, Richard·2018

Abstract

This publication has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283.NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems.This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority.Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering

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Crossref · 10.6028/nist.sp.800-56ar3

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  • NIST changed its recommendation in the 3rd revision of SP800-56A and now advocates using a fixed set of safe-prime groups with moduli of length up to 8192 bits, with short or full length exponents.

    “NIST changed this recommendation in the 3rd revision of SP800-56A [4], and are now advocating using a fixed set of safe-prime groups with moduli of length up to 8192 bits, with short or full length exponents.”
  • An n bit prime order elliptic curve group provides approximately n/2 bits of classical security, whilst RSA-1024, RSA-2048 and RSA-3072 provide approximately 80, 112 and 128 bits of classical security, respectively, according to the model used by NIST.

    “Note that an n bit prime order elliptic curve group provides approximately n/ 2 bits of classical security (see Appendix D to [4]), since the best classical attacks are cycle-finding attacks, whilst RSA-1024, RSA-2048 and RSA-3072 provide approximately 80 , 112 and 128 bits of classical security, respectively, according to the model used by NIST (see Appendix D to [5]).”

    From How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits (2021) · cites this paper as [4]

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1 of the 17 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. S. Blake-Wilson, A. Menezes, Unknown Key-Share Attacks on the Station- to-Station (STS) Protocol, Technical Report CORR 98-42, University of Waterloo, 1998. Available at: http://cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca.
  2. A. Menezes, Another look at HMQV. Journal of Mathematical Cryptology, Vol.1(1), pp. 47-64, 2007
  3. Section 5.7.2.3: Clarified error handling in step 3. This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3 47. Section 6.2.1.1-6.2.1.4: Clarified error handling. 48. Section 6.2.2: Modified the first assumption to refer to Section 5.5.1 for the domain parameter information. Now refer to Section 5.9.3 for the minimum MacKey and Mac tag lengths. 49. Section 6.2.2.1-6.2.2.2: Clarified error handling. · DOI

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Authors
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., & Davis, R.
Affiliations
  • Information Technology Laboratory (US)
  • National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)
Published
2018-04
OpenAlex
W4298016935
Cited by
158
References
17
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 3
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Funders
Information Technology Laboratory
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
Keywords
pairwise key establishment, key exchange, public-key cryptography, cryptographic standards, digital signatures

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