Cited by 0Ethics and Social Impacts of AIDigitalization, Law, and RegulationInformation Technology Governance and Strategy

Who Owns AI When It Breaks? The Convergence of AI Governance and Cybersecurity Accountability

Open access
Montgomery, Jess, Copeland, Joshua·2026·The Pinnacle: A Journal by Scholar-Practitioners

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) system failures are often silent. Applications may remain operational and continue to generate polished outputs even as recommendations degrade, manipulated inputs alter behavior, or automated agents exceed their intended authority. This lack of transparency creates a governance vacuum, obscuring responsibility when AI systems malfunction. The primary concern is not ownership of the AI system itself, but ownership of the consequential decisions the system informs or executes. Drawing on cybersecurity incident research, AI governance literature, and legal case studies, including Robodebt and SyRI, this paper distinguishes system ownership, which concerns maintenance and operation, from decision ownership, which concerns accountability for outcomes. Further, this discussion addresses three structural failures that undermine AI accountability: capability without authority, inclusion without operational integration, and detection without execution. The common assumption that human-in-the-loop oversight provides meaningful control also is challenged, as automation bias frequently renders this safeguard ineffective. As agentic AI systems acquire greater autonomous authority, these accountability gaps become increasingly consequential. This paper proposes an AI Decision Authority Charter for each significant AI use case. The charter assigns decision rights by domain, identifies a single accountable owner for each consequential decision, defines required cross-functional participation and concurrence, and establishes escalation and containment authority before deployment. Within this distributed governance model, the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) should possess bounded preauthorized stop-work authority when defined security conditions are exceeded. This authority does not make the CISO the owner of enterprise AI or its business outcomes; it provides the authority necessary to contain systems during security events.

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Crossref · 10.61643/c79060

Cites

24 of 24 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Kroll, J. A., Huey, J., Barocas, S., Felten, E. W., Reidenberg, J. R., Robinson, D. G., & Yu, H. (2017). Accountable algorithms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 165(3), 633-705. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol165/iss3/3/

Authors
Montgomery, J., & Copeland, J.
Affiliations
  • Colorado Technical University
  • Colorado Technical University (US)
Venue
The Pinnacle: A Journal by Scholar-Practitioners
Published
2026-09-17
Volume
4
Issue
2
ISSN
2994-7502 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7213471485
Cited by
0
References
23
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nd
Locations
  • The Pinnacle A Journal by Scholar-Practitioners (publishedVersion, cc-by-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Information Technology Governance and Strategy
Keywords
AI governance, AI accountability, automation bias, human-in-the-loop oversight, agentic AI, chief information security officer, Robodebt, SyRI

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