The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness
Abstract
Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. Ever since Descartes formulated the mind-body problem, a long line of philosophers has found the physicalist view to be preposterous. According to John Perry, the history of the mind-body problem is, in part, the slow victory of physical monism over various forms of dualism. Each new version of dualism claims that surely something more is going on with us than the merely physical. In this book Perry defends a view that he calls antecedent physicalism. He takes on each of three major arguments against physicalism, showing that they pose no threat to antecedent physicalism. These arguments are the zombie argument (that there is a possible world inhabited by beings that are physically indiscernible from us but not conscious), the knowledge argument (that we can know facts about our own feelings that are not just physical facts, thereby proving physicalism false), and the modal argument (that the identity of sensation and brain state is contingent, but since there is no such thing as contingent identity, sensations are not brain states). Bradford Books imprint
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Cites
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A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science
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Cited by
Conway, M. A. (2005) · Journal of Memory and Language · doi:10.1016/j.jml.2005.08.005 · Cited by 2,155
The empathic brain: how, when and why?
de Vignemont, F., & Singer, T. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.008 · Cited by 1,691
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · Consciousness · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0009 · Cited by 383
Metadata
- Authors
- Perry, J.
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2001-04-13
- OpenAlex
- W2017531579
- Cited by
- 485
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 5.65
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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