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Incentives, Risk , and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy
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Metadata
- Authors
- Stiglitz, J. E.
- Venue
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
- Publisher
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- Published
- 1975-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W1830936945
- Cited by
- 355
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 12.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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