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Coordinating and competing in ecosystems: How organizational forms shape new technology investments

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Kapoor, Rahul, Lee, Joon Mahn·2013·Strategic Management Journal
DOI 10.1002/smj.2010
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Abstract

We consider firms in the context of their business ecosystems and explore how differences in the ways in which firms are organized with respect to complementary activities affect their decision to invest in new technologies. We argue that, in addition to creating differences in incentives and bureaucratic costs, firm‐complementor organizational form plays an important role in the firm's ability to coordinate accompanying changes in complementary activities so as to shape the benefits from investing early in the new technology. We test our predictions in the U.S. healthcare industry from 1995–2006. The study makes a strong case for viewing firms' competitive strategies in the context of their business ecosystems and for the existence of an important link between firms' coordination choices and their strategic investments. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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  • Homing costs usually arise from the adaptation, coordination, and communication requirements associated with joining a new platform.

    “Nevertheless, research suggests that homing costs usually arise from the adaptation, coordination, and communication requirements (Kogut and Zander 1992) associated with joining a new platform (Cennamo et al. 2018;Kapoor and Lee 2013).”

    From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Kapoor and Lee 2013

    In “Organization of Firms and Complementors” (page unavailable), the paper says commercializing a new technology requires coordinated adaptation among firms and complementors, and discusses communication channels that facilitate it. It does not characterize these requirements as homing costs or say that they arise from joining a new platform. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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Authors
Kapoor, R., & Lee, J. M.
Affiliations
Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
Corresponding author
Kapoor, Rahul
ORCID
Venue
Strategic Management Journal
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2012-08-21
Volume
34
Issue
3
Pages
274-296
ISSN
  • 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
  • 1097-0266
DOI
10.1002/smj.2010
OpenAlex
W2098927478
Cited by
502
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 43 · 2023: 56 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 73 · 2020: 49 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 34 · 2017: 37 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 1
FWCI
39.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Strategic Management Journal (publishedVersion)
  • ScholarlyCommons (University of Pennsylvania) (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • Seoul National University Open Repository (Seoul National University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Innovation and Knowledge Management
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Business Strategy and Innovation
Keywords
business ecosystems, organizational forms, new technology investment, complementary activities, coordination, competitive strategy, health sector, early investment, administrative costs

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