Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets
Open accessAbstract
In multi‐platform markets, complementors often choose to offer their products or services across several platforms—a strategy known as complementor multihoming. This approach has gained significant attention from both industry practitioners and management scholars. Building on existing research regarding the factors that influence complementors' decision to multihome and the associated performance implications, this study examines the timing strategies involved in complementors' multihoming decisions. Specifically, we investigate the drivers of the timing of complementors' sequential multihoming, focusing on the factors that affect the timing of their first and subsequent multihoming. The empirical context of our research is the ecosystem of platforms and complementors in the nascent smart home market. Our results show that early entrants transition more quickly from single‐homing to multihoming (i.e., joining a second platform) than late entrants, suggesting that they adopt a hedging strategy in response to the high uncertainty present in the early stages of the ecosystem. We also find that the drivers of the timing of multihoming may differ for the first and subsequent multihoming. For the first multihoming, the market traction of non‐adopted platforms is associated with how quickly complementors multihome. However, this relationship dissipates in subsequent multihoming decisions. Nevertheless, certain factors influence the timing of all multihoming: when joining a second or third platform, complementors are faster to adopt platforms that are technologically similar to those they have already joined. We discuss the managerial implications of these findings for platforms and complementors navigating multi‐platform ecosystems.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This study examines when complementors multihome in nascent platform markets, using the smart home ecosystem to model the timing of first and subsequent multihoming. It finds that early entrants multihome faster, platform traction speeds first multihoming in Cox models, and shorter technological distance speeds both first and subsequent multihoming.
Key findings
- Early entrants multihome faster to a second platform: each month of delay in market entry decreases the hazard of first multihoming by 0.21% (Cox model), supporting Hypothesis 1; the Weibull robustness check also supports this.
- Greater traction of non-adopted platforms increases the hazard of first multihoming by 1% per month in the Cox model, supporting Hypothesis 2, but the Weibull model finds this association insignificant and rejects Hypothesis 2.
- Shorter technological distance speeds multihoming: it decreases the hazard of first multihoming by 43.1% per month and the hazard of subsequent multihoming to a third platform by 63.3% per month, supporting Hypotheses 3a and 3b; a Z-test found no significant difference between the two coefficients.
- Descriptively, 49.7% of smart device manufacturers adopted at least one platform; 27.2% multihomed to at least a second platform (54.7% of all complementors), 12.6% multihomed to a third, and 3.3% multihomed to all four. Average time was 45.8 months to first platform, 9.4 months to first multihoming, and 4.1 months to subsequent multihoming.
Methods
- Empirical setting: the nascent global smart home market, focusing on four platforms (Google Nest, Samsung SmartThings, Amazon Alexa, Wink) and five product categories (lights, appliances, smoke detectors, security systems, thermostats).
- Data: firm-product category-month panel of 4,983 observations (151 firm-product category observations over 33 months) from September 2014 to May 2017, covering 136 unique firms; sources include IoT Analytics, manual platform compatibility data, Google Trends, GitHub-based Jaccard technological distance, USPTO patents, Crunchbase, and app store review scores.
- Analysis: semi-parametric Cox survival analysis with time-dependent covariates to relax proportional hazards, plus robustness checks using parametric Weibull regression and random-effects linear probability models.
Limitations
- Stated: findings may not extend to non-platform industries, industries in which only one platform emerges, or mature platform markets where the winning platform(s) are well understood; the study only considers multihoming timing from the complementors’ perspective, and future work could examine simultaneous complementor and user multihoming.
- Stated: analysis of adoption of a fourth platform could not be conducted because too few complementors multihomed to a fourth platform during the study period.
- Evident: platform traction is supported in the Cox model but not in the Weibull robustness check, so the evidence for Hypothesis 2 is mixed; the correlation matrix also shows technological distance correlated with time to first platform (−0.796) and time to multihome to a second platform (−0.756), above the paper’s stated 0.7 threshold, suggesting possible multicollinearity concerns.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
21 of 68 cited sources checked · 2 supported · 1 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Research on complementor multihoming has largely been conducted in mature platform contexts where platform dynamics have been reduced to interactions between two dominant platforms, leading to a one-off multihoming decision with only one multihoming option.
“research on complementor multihoming has largely been conducted in mature platform contexts where platform dynamics have been reduced to the interactions between two dominant platforms; consequently, complementors face a one-off multihoming decision with only one multihoming option”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Cennamo et al. 2018 source
The Introduction (page unavailable) says existing multihoming research largely neglects technological dynamics, and §3 describes a common assumption that complementors decide whether to multihome without further platform-specific investment. The copy does not say that research was largely conducted in mature markets with two dominant platforms, or that complementors consequently faced a one-off decision with only one multihoming option. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Corts and Lederman 2009 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 2 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Landsman and Stremersch 2011 source
- Premisecitation
Network effects are present in most platform markets.
“Since network effects are present in most platform markets, the nonlinear properties of network effects create a dynamic situation in multi-platform spaces.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Rochet and Tirole 2003 source
The Introduction describes network effects in videogame and payment-card platforms. But its broader statement runs in the other direction: many, if not most, markets with network externalities have two sides that interact through a platform. It does not establish that most platform markets have network effects. No page number is available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Gawer and Cusumano 2014 source
- cites Parker et al. 2016 source
- Premisecitation
Homing costs usually arise from the adaptation, coordination, and communication requirements associated with joining a new platform.
“Nevertheless, research suggests that homing costs usually arise from the adaptation, coordination, and communication requirements (Kogut and Zander 1992) associated with joining a new platform (Cennamo et al. 2018;Kapoor and Lee 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Kogut and Zander 1992 source
- cites Cennamo et al. 2018 source
- cites Kapoor and Lee 2013 source
In “Organization of Firms and Complementors” (page unavailable), the paper says commercializing a new technology requires coordinated adaptation among firms and complementors, and discusses communication channels that facilitate it. It does not characterize these requirements as homing costs or say that they arise from joining a new platform. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Multihoming carries important costs for complementors which tend to increase with the technological distance between platforms and different versions of platform architecture.
“multihoming carries important costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which tend to increase with the technological distance between platforms and different versions of platform architecture”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Armstrong and Wright 2007 source
- cites Cennamo et al. 2018 source
Section 2, “Multihoming: The Benefits and Implications” (page not available), says differences in platform architecture can increase multihoming costs. Section 3.2, “Complex vs. Simple Platform Technology,” links differences in platform complexity to greater resource-allocation and integration tradeoffs for complementors. These passages support the claim about technological differences between platforms, but do not establish that costs increase across different versions of a platform architecture. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Chen et al. 2022 source
- Premisecitation
Existing platform literature has primarily focused on the determinants and the consequences of complementors' decision to multihome.
“Existing platform literature has primarily focused on the determinants and the consequences of complementors' decision to multihome”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Agarwal and Kapoor 2023 source
- cites Gastaldi et al. 2024 source
Section 2.3 discusses conditions that make multi-homing easier and its effects on platforms and complementors. The Introduction also describes complementors’ reasons for multi-homing and its drawbacks. These passages support the topic of the claim, but do not establish that determinants and consequences of the decision to multi-home have been the primary focus of existing platform literature; section 2.3 says the literature remains unclear about its impact. (LLM, conf=0.79)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Tian et al. 2022 source
- Premisecitation
Prior literature has largely overlooked the timing of multihoming as a key strategic dimension.
“this focus has largely overlooked a key strategic dimension of complementors' multihoming decisions: when to multihome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Agarwal and Kapoor 2023 source
- cites Gastaldi et al. 2024 source
Section 2.3, “What is still missing from the debate?” (page unavailable), says the literature provides little understanding of how content creators exploit platforms over time and that the impact of multi-homing remains unclear. This supports a broader research gap, but the paper does not specifically say that prior literature overlooked when complementors decide to multihome. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Tian et al. 2022 source
- Findingreasoning
Complementors are faster to multihome to platforms that are technologically closer to the platform(s) they have already joined.
“Finally, our results indicate that complementors are faster to multihome to platforms that are technologically closer to the one(s) they have already joined”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Complementors multihoming for the first time tend to join non-adopted platforms with stronger market traction more quickly.
“We also find that complementors multihoming for the first time tend to 3 join non-adopted platforms with stronger market traction more quickly”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Complementors that enter a nascent platform market early tend to multihome to a second platform faster than late entrants.
“we find a hedging strategy by the early entrants of the market: complementors that enter the nascent platform market early tend to multihome to a second platform faster than late entrants”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The smart home market has been at a nascent stage during the study period.
“Second, unlike existing research on multihoming that has focused on mature industries (e.g., video games, mobile phone applications), the smart home market has been at a nascent stage, which allows us to observe complementor strategies in a highly uncertain environment (Anderson and Tushman 1990).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Market traction gained by non-adopted platforms increases a complementor's hazard to multihome for the first time by 1% each month.
“Market traction gained by the non-adopted platforms increases a complementor's hazard to multihome for the first time by 1% each month.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Complementor resources have a positive and significant (p < 0.01) effect on the complementors' probability of first multihoming.
“Among the control variables, complementor resources appear to have a positive and significant (p < 0.01) effect on the complementors' probability of first multihoming.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Technological distance between a complementor's adopted and non-adopted platforms decreases the hazard to join a third platform by 63.3% each month.
“Technological distance between a complementor's adopted and non-adopted platforms decreases the hazard to join a third platform by 63.3% each month.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Technological distance has a negative and significant (p < 0.01) association with the firms' probability of entering the smart home market by adopting their first platform.
“In Models 1 and 4, it is observed that technological distance has a negative and significant (p < 0.01) association with the firms' probability of entering the smart home market by adopting their first platform.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Technological distance has a negative and significant (p < 0.05) relationship with the hazard to subsequent multihome.
“The results show that the technological distance variable has a negative and significant (p < 0.05) relationship with the hazard to subsequent multihome, lending support for Hypothesis 3b.”
- Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
“technological distance has a negative and significant (p < 0.01) relationship with the timing of complementors' subsequent multihome.”
- Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · hedged
“In both models, the technological distance coefficient is negative and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that technological distance also reduces the probability of subsequent multihoming.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
- Findingcitation
Early entry does not influence the timing of complementors' subsequent multihoming.
“Early entry does not influence the timing of complementors' subsequent multihoming”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Denovo firms have a positive and significant (p < 0.01) effect, indicating that they are faster than other firm types to join a third platform.
“Denovo firms have a positive and significant (p < 0.01) effect, indicating that they are faster than other firm types to join a third platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The effect of complementor product quality on time to first platform disappears when platform traction and technological distance are added (Model 2).
“yet this effect disappears with the addition of the explanatory variables in Model 2”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Complementor resources are positively related (p < 0.05) to the complementors' time to multihome.
“whereas complementor resources are positively related (p < 0.05) to the complementors' time to multihome”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The percentage of complementors that decided to multihome to at least a second platform was 27.2% (i.e., 54.7% of all complementors).
“The percentage of complementors that decided to multihome to at least a second platform was 27.2% (i.e., 54.7% of all complementors).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Technological distance between a complementor's adopted and non-adopted platforms decreases the hazard to multihome to a second platform by 43.1% each month.
“Technological distance between a complementor's adopted and non-adopted platforms decreases the hazard to multihome to a second platform by 43.1% each month.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Platform traction has a positive and significant (p < 0.01) relationship with the hazard to first multihome.
“The platform traction variable has a positive and significant (p < 0.01) relationship with the hazard to first multihome, lending support for Hypothesis 2.”
- Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
“Platform traction presents a positive and significant (p < 0.01) association with the probability of first multihome”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
- Findingown data
Within-category competition in platforms has a negative and significant relationship with the complementors' speed to subsequent multihome.
“It shows that the withincategory competition in platforms has a negative and significant relationship with the complementors' speed to subsequent multihome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Technological distance has a negative association (p < 0.01) with the speed at which firms enter the smart home market by joining their first platform.
“The estimation in Model 2 on firms' time to first platform shows that technological distance (p < 0.01) has a negative association with the speed at which firms enter the smart home market by joining their first platform.”
- Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
“In model 1, the results show that technological distance has a negative and significant (p < 0.01) relationship with the firms' time to enter the smart home market by joining their first platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
- Findingown data
Complementor product quality is positively associated (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05) with the firms' probability of adopting their first platform.
“Likewise, complementor product quality is positively associated (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05) with the firms' probability of adopting their first platform.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Model 1, complementor product quality has a positive relationship (p < 0.01) with time to first platform.
“Model 1 shows that complementor product quality has a positive relationship (p < 0.01) with time to first platform”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Complementors in the appliances category are significantly slower (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01) to multihome to a second platform.
“Models 3 and 4 indicate that complementors in the appliances category are significantly slower (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively) to multihome to a second platform”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Each month that a complementor delays entry into the platform market, its hazard of multihoming is decreased by 0.21%.
“For each month that a complementor delays entry into the platform market, its hazard of multihoming is decreased by 0.21%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Complementors that joined the Wink platform as their first choice are fast to join a second platform.
“Complementors that joined the Wink platform as their first choice are also fast to join a second platform”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Technological distance has a negative and significant (p < 0.01) relationship with the hazard to first multihome.
“Finally, we observed that the technological distance variable presents a negative and significant (p < 0.01) relationship with the hazard to first multihome (in line with Hypothesis 3a).”
- Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
“Technological distance shows a negative and significant (p < 0.01) relationship with the timing of complementors' first multihome.”
- Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
“technological distance presents a negative and significant (p < 0.01) relationship with the probability of first multihome”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
- Findingown data
In the linear probability model, technological distance is negatively associated with the probability of multihoming on the third platform (coefficient -0.674, p<0.001).
“Third platform | (6) | Multihome | -0.001 | (0.002) | 0.001* | (0.001) | -0.674*** | (0.083)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In the linear probability model, time to market entry is negatively associated with the probability of multihoming on the second platform (coefficient -0.006, p<0.01).
“Second platform | (5) | Multihome | -0.006** | (0.003) | 0.003*** | (0.001) | -0.770*** | (0.137)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the linear probability model, technological distance is negatively associated with the probability of adopting the first platform (coefficient -1.153, p<0.001).
“First platform | (1) | Adopt | | | 0.001 | (0.000) | -1.153*** | (0.023)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the Weibull survival model, technological distance is negatively associated with time to multihome on the second platform (coefficient -5.906, p<0.001).
“Technological distance (Hypotheses | -10.520*** | -5.906*** | -6.360***”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the linear probability model, technological distance is negatively associated with the probability of multihoming on the second platform (coefficient -0.770, p<0.001).
“Second platform | (5) | Multihome | -0.006** | (0.003) | 0.003*** | (0.001) | -0.770*** | (0.137)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the Weibull survival model, technological distance is negatively associated with time to first platform (coefficient -10.520, p<0.001).
“Technological distance (Hypotheses | -10.520*** | -5.906*** | -6.360***”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the Weibull survival model, technological distance is negatively associated with time to multihome on the third platform (coefficient -6.360, p<0.001).
“Technological distance (Hypotheses | -10.520*** | -5.906*** | -6.360***”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the Weibull survival model, time to market entry is negatively associated with time to multihome on the second platform (coefficient -0.045, p<0.05).
“Time to market entry (Hypothesis 1) | | -0.045** | -0.017”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the linear probability model, platform traction is positively associated with the probability of multihoming on the second platform (coefficient 0.003, p<0.001).
“Second platform | (5) | Multihome | -0.006** | (0.003) | 0.003*** | (0.001) | -0.770*** | (0.137)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Multihoming can help complementors lower their R&D, production, and marketing costs by achieving scale and scope economies.
“Second, multihoming can help complementors lower their R&D, production, and marketing costs by achieving scale and scope economies (Venkataraman et al. 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Venkataraman et al. 2018 source
- Premisecitation
Fast-paced technological advancements provide late entrants with the possibility of using superior technology to design products that outperform those of early entrants.
“Moreover, fast-paced technological advancements provide late entrants with the possibility of using superior technology to design products that outperform those of early entrants (Eggers and Kaplan 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Eggers and Kaplan 2009 source
- Premisecitation
Rapidly growing market demand allows late entrants to acquire customers and expand their installed base on a platform without directly competing with existing complementors.
“Rapidly growing market demand also allows late entrants to acquire customers and expand their installed base on a platform without directly competing with the existing complementors (Suarez and Lanzolla 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Suarez and Lanzolla 2007 source
- Interpretationcitation
In nascent multi-platform settings, due to the ongoing battle for market dominance and the potential for a winner-take-all outcome, complementors are likely to seek market signals that help them assess which platform(s) have a higher potential to outperform their rivals.
“In nascent multi-platform settings, due to the ongoing battle for market dominance among platforms and the potential for a winner-take-all outcome (Schilling 2002), complementors are likely to seek market signals that help them assess which platform(s) have a higher potential to outperform their rivals.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schilling 2002 source
- Rests on an assumption: Market traction at an early stage of platform development is a noisy signal when predicting how platform competition will evolve.
- Rests on an assumption: There is high volatility in platform dynamics.
- Rests on an assumption: For a complementor, the ideal scenario is selecting the platform with the highest growth potential as their initial choice.
- Premisecitation
The early stage of an industry exhibits high technological and market uncertainty.
“Research shows that the early stage of an industry exhibits high technological and market uncertainty (Anderson and Tushman 1990).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Anderson and Tushman 1990 source
- Premisecitation
The power of network effects in platform landscapes intensifies uncertainty.
“This uncertainty is intensified by the power of network effects in platform landscapes (Frattini et al. 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frattini et al. 2014 source
- Premisecitation
Multihoming can shield complementors against the risk of a platform's market failure.
“and by shielding against the risk of a platform's market failure (Schilling 2002)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schilling 2002 source
- Premisecitation
Complementors that enter a platform market at an early stage are likely to face a high risk of failure.
“Following the extant literature on entry timing in fast-cycle industries (Bohlmann et al. 2002;Suarez and Lanzolla 2007), complementors that enter a platform market at an early stage are likely to face a high risk of failure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationnone given
Each additional platform adoption stretches complementors' resources further.
“Moreover, each additional platform adoption stretches complementors' resources further.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The earlier a complementor enters a nascent platform market, the higher the uncertainty it faces.
“The earlier the entry, the higher the uncertainty in the nascent platform ecosystem.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Existing market uncertainty makes complementors more likely to multihome rather than stay as single-homing complementors.
“Due to the difficulties in predicting market evolution, existing market uncertainty makes complementors more likely to multihome rather than stay as single-homing complementors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Market traction at an early stage of platform development is a noisy signal when predicting how platform competition will evolve.
- Rests on an assumption: There is high volatility in platform dynamics.
- Interpretationreasoning
Identifying and quickly joining a second platform with strong market traction can offer complementors protection against early-stage platform competition.
“Identifying and quickly joining a second platform with strong market traction has the potential to offer complementors protection against the earlystage platform competition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The cost of joining a new platform is likely to influence complementors' timing of both the first and subsequent multihoming.
“Thus, the cost of joining a new platform is likely to influence complementors' timing of both the first and subsequent multihoming.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Multihoming to a platform that is technologically distant from the platform(s) a complementor has already joined is likely to reduce the speed with which it will multihome.
“Thus, multihoming to a platform that is technologically distant from the platform(s) a complementor has already joined is likely to reduce the speed with which it will multihome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
It can be a time-consuming process to learn the specifications of a new platform architecture and technological idiosyncrasies and update the current design accordingly.
“It can be a time-consuming process to learn the specifications of a new platform architecture and technological idiosyncrasies and update the current design accordingly (Nobeoka and Cusumano 1997).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nobeoka and Cusumano 1997 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Early entrants have a higher probability of choosing the wrong platform compared to late entrants.
“Consequently, the early entrant has a higher probability of choosing the wrong platform compared to the late entrant, which enters the market at a time when the uncertainty is relatively lower.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Despite being a noisy signal, fast multihoming to a second platform that is on the rise increases the chances that a complementor builds a comparative advantage over other complementors that are slower to join that platform.
“Despite being a noisy signal, fast multihoming to a second platform that is on the rise increases the chances that a complementor builds a comparative advantage over other complementors that are slower to join that platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The ease with which a complementor multihomes depends on how technologically similar the target platform's architecture is to that of the complementor's current platform(s).
“Studies have shown that the ease with which a complementor multihomes depends on how technologically similar the target platform's architecture is to that of the complementor's current platform(s) (Chen et al. 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chen et al. 2022 source
- Premisecitation
Significant portions of the software code may need to be overhauled, rewritten, and retested when multihoming to a technologically distant platform.
“Significant portions of the software code may also need to be overhauled, rewritten, and retested (Cusumano and Yoffie 1998).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cusumano and Yoffie 1998
- Interpretationreasoning
Once they secure a safer position in the multi-platform market through this strategic maneuver, and as uncertainty continues to decrease over time, the influence of these imperfect market indicators gradually dissipates.
“Once they secure a safer position in the multi-platform market through this strategic maneuver, and as uncertainty continues to decrease over time, the influence of these imperfect market indicators gradually dissipates.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Platforms with dissimilar technological architectures lack common APIs and system protocols, forcing multihoming complementors to incur the cost of customizing their products to meet the unique technological requirements of each platform.
“Platforms with dissimilar technological architectures lack common APIs and system protocols, forcing multihoming complementors to incur the cost of customizing their products to meet the unique technological requirements of each platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Platform owners are aware of these costs and offer a variety of technological support to complementors with the aim of incentivizing them to join their platforms.
“Platform owners are aware of these costs and, therefore, offer a variety of technological support to the complementors with the aim of incentivizing them to join their platforms (Parker and Van Alstyne 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Parker and Van Alstyne 2016 source
- Interpretationreasoning
In a multi-platform setting where complementors have the option to join multiple platforms, cost considerations play a significant role in determining how fast complementors will multihome.
“We expect that, in a multi-platform setting where complementors have the option to join multiple platforms, cost considerations will play a significant role in determining how fast complementors will multihome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The nonlinear properties of network effects create a dynamic situation in multi-platform spaces.
“the nonlinear properties of network effects create a dynamic situation in multi-platform spaces.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Adaptation and integration costs generally stem from the differences in the technological architecture of the corresponding platforms.
“These adaptation and integration costs generally stem from the differences in the technological architecture of the corresponding platforms (Srinivasan and Venkatraman 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Srinivasan and Venkatraman 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Complementors on nascent platforms are incentivized to multihome to avoid the worst-case scenario of later realizing they joined the wrong platform, one likely to fail.
“Complementors on nascent platforms are also incentivized to multihome to avoid a worst-case scenario: namely, realizing at a later stage-when new conditions make it hard to attempt a changethat they have joined the wrong platform, one likely to fail.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If rivals of a complementor benefit from a larger installed base because of having chosen another platform that gains stronger market traction, even success in its first platform may turn inconsequential for the focal complementor.
“If rivals of a complementor benefit from a larger installed base because of having chosen another platform that gains stronger market traction, even success in its first platform may turn inconsequential for the focal complementor.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Delaying multihoming when a second platform has recently experienced considerable growth and may overtake rival platforms can have lasting negative consequences for the complementor, particularly if network effects are strong.
“Delaying multihoming in this case may have lasting negative consequences for the complementor, particularly if network effects are strong in the platform market.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Multihoming increases the coordination costs for the complementor, as the envisioned changes and updates in the complementor's products must consider the adopted platforms' technological state and evolution.
“Besides, multihoming increases the coordination costs for the complementor, as the envisioned changes and updates in the complementor's products must consider the adopted platforms' technological state and evolution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Due to the heightened risk of being stuck on a low-performing platform and the uncertainty around the ultimate winner(s) in the market, complementors in nascent platform spaces are likely to scout market signals that could indicate which platforms are gaining traction in the market.
“In sum, due to the heightened risk of being stuck on a lowperforming platform and the uncertainty around the ultimate winner(s) in the market, complementors in nascent platform spaces are likely to scout market signals that could indicate which platforms are gaining traction in the market.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Complementors are faster to multihome to platforms that are technologically closer to their already-adopted platforms.
“Complementors are faster to multihome to platforms that are technologically closer to their already-adopted platforms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The effect of platform traction on first multihoming disappears as the market evolves and uncertainty decreases, particularly for complementors that have already hedged their entry risks by joining two platforms.
“This effect disappears as the market evolves and uncertainty decreases, particularly for complementors that have already hedged their entry risks by joining two platforms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
An alternative specification of the technological distance variable based on platform updates corroborates the finding that technological distance is negatively associated with the complementors' timing of the first and subsequent multihoming.
“The results (not shown) corroborate the finding that the technological distance is negatively associated with the complementors' timing of the first and subsequent multihoming.14”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The faster multihoming by early entrants reflects a hedging strategy to mitigate the potential adverse impact of choosing the wrong platform and enhance survival chances.
“This reflects a hedging strategy to mitigate the potential adverse impact of choosing the wrong platform in rapidly changing market conditions and enhance the chances of survival in the early stage of a multi-platform ecosystem.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Complementors adopt their first platform not knowing whether the platform they choose to join will grow faster than its rivals or eventually fall behind.
- Study design and conductown data
The Z-test conducted on the coefficients of technological distance in the first and subsequent multihoming estimations showed no significance (Z-value = 0.87), suggesting that the influence of technological distance on complementors' timing of sequential multihomings is at the same level.
“The Z-test conducted on the coefficients of technological distance in the first and subsequent multihoming estimations showed no significance (Z-value = 0.87), suggesting that the influence of technological distance on complementors' timing of sequential multihomings is at the same level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Technological distance plays a crucial role in how fast a firm enters the smart home market and joins its second and third platforms.
“our findings suggest that technological distance plays a crucial role in how fast a firm enters the smart home market and joins its second and third platforms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Technological distance impacts a complementor's time to all platform adoptions.
“Overall, the results on technological distance indicate that technological distance impacts a complementor's time to all platform adoptions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A hedging strategy is relevant specifically when complementors transition from single-homing to multihoming (joining a second platform).
“Our results point to the relevance of a hedging strategy specifically when complementors transition from single-homing to multihoming-when joining a second platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The complementors' entry risk is at its highest early in the industry lifecycle.
“lending support to the notion that the complementors' entry risk is at its highest early in the industry lifecycle”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Cusumano et al. 2019
- cites Eisenmann 2006 source
- Interpretationown data
The significance of factors influencing multihoming timing can vary with the order of multihoming.
“The significance of these factors can vary with the order of multihoming.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Platform traction provides complementors with information about the current state of platform competition which they can incorporate into their timing strategies when deciding to multihome for the first time.
“platform traction provides complementors with information about the current state of platform competition which they can incorporate into their timing strategies when deciding to multihome for the first time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Complementors that enter the smart home market early tend to multihome faster to a second platform.
“these estimations lend support to the idea that complementors that enter the smart home market early tend to multihome faster to a second platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The emergence of a multi-platform market brings high technological and market uncertainty.
“it also brings high technological and market uncertainty as several platforms compete and seek ways to leverage the network effects in their favor to achieve market dominance”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frattini et al. 2014 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Early entrants tend to switch from single-homing to multihoming faster than late entrants.
“In particular, we observed that early entrants tend to switch from single-homing to multihoming faster than late entrants.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Joining a third platform fast can be part of a strategy for Denovo entrants to solidify their position in the market.
“Therefore, joining a third platform fast can be part of a strategy to solidify their position in the market.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Denovo entrants typically lack the reputation that incumbents enjoy in the market.
- May combine two claims. 26
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 34
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMultihoming can enable complementors to access additional user bases, quickly drive up their revenues, and shorten the time to profitability.
“First, multihoming can enable complementors to access additional user bases, quickly drive up their revenues, and shorten the time to profitability (Bresnahan et al. 2014;Corts and Lederman 2009;Rietveld and Eggers 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Bresnahan et al. 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Corts and Lederman 2009 source
Section II (Industry Background; page not available) says multi-platform releases let publishers sell to users of another console, earn additional revenue, and make some games profitable that would not be profitable as exclusive releases. Section VI (Conclusion; page not available) says they can spread development costs across platforms. Neither section establishes that revenues rise quickly or that the time to profitability is shortened. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Rietveld and Eggers 2018 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe smart home market is at an early stage of development with several competing platforms and much uncertainty regarding which platform will dominate.
“This market is at an early stage of development (Hilbolling et al. 2021) with several competing platforms and much uncertainty regarding which platform will dominate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Hilbolling et al. 2021 source
The citation is attached to the claim that the smart-home market is at an early stage. The Research Setting section says a platform ecosystem emerged around Philips Hue and quotes its developer-program manager saying it would be difficult to turn smart homes and smart lighting into a success. That supports an emerging ecosystem, but does not establish the developmental stage of the smart-home market as a whole. The later statement about competing platforms is not directly attached to this citation. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFast multihoming to another platform can help complementors expand their market and spread the fixed costs of production and marketing.
“While achieving scale is often challenging in nascent markets, fast multihoming to another platform can help complementors expand their market (Kretschmer and Claussen 2016) and spread the fixed costs of production and marketing (Corts and Lederman 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Kretschmer and Claussen 2016 source
The citation to Kretschmer and Claussen attaches to the claim that fast multihoming helps complementors expand their market; the fixed-cost claim cites a different paper. The Introduction and §3 discuss backward compatibility across platform generations, not complementors rapidly joining another platform to expand their market. Searches for multihoming and games offered across multiple platforms found no passage addressing that claim. (LLM, conf=0.74)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Corts and Lederman 2009 source
The Conclusion says multi-platform releases let publishers spread fixed game-development costs across users of competing platforms; Industry Background likewise explains how a second platform can help recoup those costs. The cited paper does not establish that publishers spread fixed marketing costs, which the citing sentence also attributes to it. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationA significant fraction of multihoming investments tends to be co-specialized, such that they cannot be easily redeployed or re-used on other platforms, increasing the risk of holdup and the costs of multihoming to a distant platform.
“A significant fraction of these multihoming investments tends to be co-specialized, such that they cannot be easily redeployed or re-used on other platforms (Jacobides et al. 2018), increasing the risk of holdup and the costs of multihoming to a distant platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Jacobides et al. 2018 source
Section 3.4 (page not provided) says that joining an ecosystem involves some nonfungible investment that cannot easily be redeployed elsewhere without cost; it also links co-specialization to the cost of retooling for another ecosystem. It does not establish that a significant fraction of multihoming investments tends to be co-specialized. Nor does it specifically establish increased holdup risk or the cost of multihoming to a distant platform. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationBoundary resources have become a standard in platform markets, usually taking the form of technical conferences or seminars, the release of software development kits (SDKs), and application programming interfaces (APIs), and technical support to the developer community.
“They have become a standard in platform markets, usually taking the form of technical conferences or seminars, the release of software development kits (SDKs), and application programming interfaces (APIs), and technical support to the developer community (Von Hippel and Katz 2002).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Von Hippel and Katz 2002 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationSmart home platforms are typically considered as innovation platforms that provide the necessary technological architecture upon which participants create value by offering novel complementary products and services.
“Platforms that have emerged in the smart home market are typically considered as innovation platforms that provide the necessary technological architecture upon which the participants create value by offering novel complementary products and services”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Cusumano et al. 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Gawer 2021 source
The section “Two types of platforms: transaction platforms and innovation platforms” describes innovation platforms as technological foundations on which participants develop complementary products and services. It gives examples from computer and smartphone ecosystems, but does not establish that smart home platforms are typically considered innovation platforms. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Trabucchi and Buganza 2022 source
“The evolution of the field” (p. 3) describes innovation platforms as foundations on which outside firms develop complementary products, technologies, or services. It gives operating systems as an example, but does not discuss smart home platforms or establish that they are typically classified this way. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMost studies in the platform literature have centered around complementors' market entry strategies and have mainly examined single-platform settings.
“Most studies in this field have centered around complementors' market entry strategies (Ceccagnoli et al. 2012;Cennamo et al. 2018;Corts and Lederman 2009;Huang et al. 2013;Kapoor and Agarwal 2017), and they have mainly examined single-platform settings (Ceccagnoli et al. 2012;Kapoor and Agarwal 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Ceccagnoli et al. 2012 source
- cites Cennamo et al. 2018 source
The Introduction says the literature generally treats complementors’ multihoming choice as a trade-off between market size and costs, which supports a focus on platform participation decisions. But this paper’s stated question concerns the quality of complements developed for multiple platforms, rather than market entry strategies. The citing sentence attributes the separate single-platform claim to other sources, not to Cennamo et al. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Corts and Lederman 2009 source
The Industry Background discusses publishers’ choices to release games on one or multiple platforms, which relates to complementors’ platform-entry strategies. But it explicitly says explaining changes in exclusivity is not the research focus; the focus is how exclusivity affects indirect network effects. The single-platform-settings clause cites other works, not Corts and Lederman. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationCurrent digital platforms, with their modular approach and exposed interfaces, have created the appropriate technological infrastructure, allowing extended connectivity and opening the gate to a wide array of highly innovative IoT products.
“it is the current digital platforms, with their modular approach and exposed interfaces, that have created the appropriate technological infrastructure, allowing extended connectivity and opening the gate to a wide array of highly innovative IoT products”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Hoffman and Novak 2025 source
- cites Raff et al. 2020 source
The Conceptualization and Capabilities and performance sections describe connected products joining IoT networks through connectors and communication software. Value Creation through Smart Products discusses modular smart-product components and software-based innovation. The paper does not establish the claim that current digital platforms, specifically through modularity and exposed interfaces, created the technological infrastructure enabling a wide array of innovative IoT products. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Schulz et al. 2023 source
Section 2.3 describes modular product architectures with interchangeable digital interfaces, and section 2.2 describes connections among smart products, firms, and third parties. The paper does not establish that current digital platforms have exposed interfaces or that those platforms have enabled a wide array of highly innovative IoT products. The cited passages give narrower support for modularity and connectivity. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe early stages of innovation platforms are particularly challenging as they require their participants to engage in complementary innovation.
“the early stages of innovation platforms are shown to be particularly challenging as they require their participants to engage in complementary innovation”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone givenThe smart home market has seen the emergence of several competing platforms, providing complementors with the option of joining more than one platform.
“First, the smart home market has seen the emergence of several competing platforms, providing complementors with the option of joining more than one platform.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataComplementors that multihomed to a third platform were 12.6%.
“Complementors that multihomed to a third platform were 12.6%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationThe smart home market had a worldwide household penetration rate of 2.4% by 2017.
“Although the smart home market was at a ferment stage during our study period, by 2017, it had already reached a worldwide household penetration rate of 2.4% and was expected to grow rapidly.5”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [5] source
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataNone of the explanatory or control variables show high correlation with the dependent variables (correlations below 0.7), except Technological Distance, which has -0.796 correlation with Time to First Platform and -0.756 correlation with Time to Multihome (second platform).
“As shown in the table, none of the explanatory or control variables show high correlation with the dependent variables, that is, the correlations are below the 0.7 threshold, except Technological Distance, which has -0.796 correlation with Time to First Platform and -0.756 correlation with the Time to Multihome (second platform).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe adopted and non-adopted platforms present an average of 0.856 technological distance on the Jaccard scale of 0 to 1.
“While the average traction gained by the non-adopted platform categories is 0.13, the adopted and non-adopted platforms present an average of 0.856 technological distance on the Jaccard scale of 0 to 1.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOn average, it took 45.8 months for complementors to join their first platform, 9.4 months to their first multihoming, and 4.1 months to their subsequent multihoming.
“On average, it took 45.8 months (from the inception of the smart home market) for complementors to join their first platform, 9.4 months to their first multihoming (joining a second platform), and 4.1 months to their subsequent multihoming (joining a third platform).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAmazon Alexa was the most popular platform among complementors; it was selected by 34 firms as their first platform.
“Amazon Alexa was the most popular platform among complementors; it was selected by 34 firms as their first platform.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe average traction gained by the non-adopted platform categories is 0.13.
“While the average traction gained by the non-adopted platform categories is 0.13, the adopted and non-adopted platforms present an average of 0.856 technological distance on the Jaccard scale of 0 to 1.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the Weibull model, platform traction has a positive coefficient but an insignificant association with the timing of first multihome, rejecting Hypothesis 2.
“While platform traction presents the expected directionality with a positive coefficient, the p-value indicates an insignificant association with the timing of first multihome and rejects Hypothesis 2.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataWink was the first entry point to the smart home market for 14 firms.
“Lastly, Wink was the first entry point to the smart home market for 14 firms.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataTime to market entry has a negative and significant (p < 0.05) effect on the hazard to multihome to a second platform.
“In both estimations, time to market entry shows a negative and significant (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05) relationship with the probability of multihome for the first time.”
- Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
“the model shows that time to market entry has a negative and significant (p < 0.05) relationship with the timing of the complementors' first multihome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 5.1 | Empirical Results · plain
May combine two claims.
Findingown data50.3% of smart device manufacturers preferred to remain as a provider of stand-alone smart products, while 49.7% decided to adopt at least one platform.
“Our preliminary analyses showed that 50.3% of smart device manufacturers preferred to remain as a provider of stand-alone smart products, while 49.7% decided to adopt at least one platform.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataOnly 3.3% of the complementors were multihomed to all four platforms.
“Only 3.3% of the complementors were multihomed to all four platforms.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe SmartThings platform was the second most popular platform adopted by 23 firms, while Nest was able to attract 16 firms to the smart home market.
“The SmartThings platform was the second most popular platform adopted by 23 firms, while Nest was able to attract 16 firms to the smart home market.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataIn the linear probability model, time to market entry is not significantly associated with the probability of multihoming on the third platform (coefficient -0.001, not significant).
“Third platform | (6) | Multihome | -0.001 | (0.002) | 0.001* | (0.001) | -0.674*** | (0.083)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenTechnological distance is negatively associated with the time to first (b = -0.01, p < 0.01) and second (b = -0.07, p < 0.01) multihoming.
“Technological distance is negatively associated with the time to first (b = -0.01,p < 0.01) and second (b = -0.07,p < 0.01) multihoming.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataIn the Weibull survival model, platform traction is not significantly associated with time to multihome on the second platform (coefficient 0.011, not significant).
“Platform traction (Hypothesis 2) | -0.005 | 0.011 | -0.085”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataIn the linear probability model, platform traction is positively associated with the probability of multihoming on the third platform (coefficient 0.001, p<0.05).
“Third platform | (6) | Multihome | -0.001 | (0.002) | 0.001* | (0.001) | -0.674*** | (0.083)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationMultihoming can improve complementors' chances of survival by mitigating the risk of opportunistic behavior by a focal platform.
“complementors, multihoming can improve their chances of survival by mitigating the risk of opportunistic behavior by a focal platform (Hagiu 2005)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hagiu 2005
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRapidly expanding their presence on a competing platform enables complementors to reduce dependency on a single platform and mitigate the risk of holdup.
“Third, rapidly expanding their presence on a competing platform enables complementors to reduce dependency on a single platform and mitigate the risk of holdup (Hagiu 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hagiu 2005
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationFirms tend to hedge by investing in competing technologies during the early stages of an industry lifecycle.
“For instance, Hatfield et al. (2001) showed how firms tend to hedge by investing in competing technologies during the early stages of an industry lifecycle.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hatfield et al. (2001) source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMultihoming is a costly endeavor for complementors; it requires compliance with technical specifications and esthetic standards unique to each platform.
“However, multihoming is a costly endeavor for complementors; it requires compliance with the technical specifications and esthetic standards unique to each platform (Armstrong and Wright 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Armstrong and Wright 2007 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationFirms hedge the risks associated with uncertainty in new geographic markets they do not know well by entering several markets.
“Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) used the real options framework to investigate how firms hedge the risks associated with uncertainty in new geographic markets they do not know well by entering several markets.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe timing of multihoming is an important dimension of complementors' competitive strategies in platform ecosystems and can have a substantial impact on their performance.
“The timing of multihoming is an important dimension of complementors' competitive strategies in platform ecosystems, and it can have a substantial impact on their performance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenManagement research has largely overlooked when to multihome as a key aspect of complementors' multihoming strategies.
“it has largely overlooked a key aspect of complementors' multihoming strategies-when to multihome.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationHedging by investing in competing alternatives is an important strategy for firms that compete in nascent markets characterized by high uncertainty.
“Hedging by investing in competing alternatives has long been identified as an important strategy for firms that compete in nascent markets characterized by high uncertainty.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationMultihoming between technologically closer platforms can be less costly.
“It has been argued that multihoming between technologically closer platforms can be less costly (Chen et al. 2022;Srinivasan and Venkatraman 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Chen et al. 2022 source
- cites Srinivasan and Venkatraman 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMultihoming requires the development of a wider pool of technological capabilities at the complementor firm, resulting in a higher cost structure.
“Multihoming also requires the development of a wider pool of technological capabilities at the complementor firm (Anderson et al. 2014), resulting in a higher cost structure.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Anderson et al. 2014 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningUnlike market uncertainty, which diminishes over time as complementors learn more about the market dynamics in the nascent platform ecosystem and develop maneuvering strategies to enhance their chances of survival and growth, the technological differences and the associated costs of joining a new platform remain relevant across sequential multihoming.
“Unlike market uncertainty, which diminishes over time as complementors learn more about the market dynamics in the nascent platform ecosystem and develop maneuvering strategies to enhance their chances of survival and growth, the technological differences and the associated costs of joining a new platform remain relevant across sequential multihoming.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMultihoming to a platform that shows high market traction allows complementors to hedge market risks effectively and increase their chances of survival.
“Multihoming to a platform that shows high market traction allows complementors to hedge the market risks effectively and increase their chances of survival.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe momentum enjoyed by a given platform is likely to trickle down to its complementors, allowing them to grow user bases, secure external visibility, and achieve customer lock-in, giving them an advantage over rival complementors that chose platforms with slower traction.
“The momentum enjoyed by a given platform is likely to trickle down to its complementors, allowing them to also grow their user bases, secure external visibility, and achieve customer lock-in (Farrell and Klemperer 2007), giving them an important advantage over the rival complementors that may have chosen platforms with slower traction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Farrell and Klemperer 2007 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningA complementor will multihome faster to target platforms (either as a second and third platform) that are technologically closer to the platform(s) it has already joined, as this represents a lower-cost and less-complex option to expand their presence in the market and reach a larger user base.
“Consequently, we expect a complementor to multihome faster to target platforms (either as a second and third platform) that are technologically closer to the platform(s) it has already joined, as this will represent a lower-cost and less-complex option to expand their presence in the market and reach a larger user base.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA complementor could potentially abandon the initial platform and switch to the one with stronger traction, but this is unlikely to be the optimal strategy in the nascent stage of a multi-platform market, due to substantial uncertainty over whether network effects will lead to a winner-take-all outcome or allow coexistence of several strong platforms.
“Although a complementor could potentially abandon the initial platform and switch to the one with stronger traction, this is unlikely to be the optimal strategy in the nascent stage of a multi-platform market, due to the substantial uncertainty over whether network effects will lead to a winner-take-all outcome (e.g., Google in web search) or allow for the coexistence of several strong platforms (”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningComplementors that have already joined a platform consider the traction other platforms have achieved when deciding on the timing of their multihoming to a second platform.
“When complementors that have already joined a platform decide on the timing of their multihoming to a second platform, they are expected to consider the traction other platforms have achieved in the market.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationMultihoming to a platform with a substantially different technological architecture from the platforms a complementor has already joined can strain the complementor's limited development resources and increase coordination costs.
“Multihoming to a platform with a substantially different technological architecture from the platforms a complementor has already joined can strain the complementor's limited development resources and increase coordination costs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationMultihoming carries substantial costs for complementors, which must be weighed against the marginal benefits of joining yet another platform.
“Multihoming carries substantial costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which must be weighed against the marginal benefits of joining yet another platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Armstrong and Wright 2007 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningComplementors are expected to make their multihoming timing decisions with the aim of reducing uncertainty and increasing their chances of survival.
“Hence, in the nascent stage of a multi-platform market, complementors are expected to make their multihoming timing decisions with the aim of reducing the uncertainty and increasing their chances of survival.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataThe survival analyses were retested with Weibull models.
“To check the robustness of our survival analyses, we retested our theoretical predictions with Weibull models.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataTechnological distance between platforms decelerates not only the complementors' time to enter the smart home market but also their speed to multihome to a second and third platform.
“Moreover, technological distance between platforms decelerates not only the complementors' time to enter the smart home market but also their speed to multihome to a second and third platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe authors lagged the Complementor Product Quality variable by 1 month.
“We lagged this variable by 1 month.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe smart home market was transformed from several independent markets of stand-alone products into a platform-mediated market, where producers in different product categories serve as complementors to various platforms.
“These changes have transformed the traditional home products categories from several independent markets of stand-alone products into a platform-mediated market, where the producers in different product categories now serve as complementors to various platforms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningThe authors relaxed the proportional hazards assumption by using time-dependent covariates that include interactions between the covariates and time in an extended Cox model.
“Therefore, we relaxed the proportional hazards assumption by using time-dependent covariates that include interactions between the covariates and time in our extended Cox model using the tvc function in Stata (Piao and Zajac 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenProbabilities were re-estimated by clustering the error terms at the firm-category level in the random effects LPM regression.
“Models 4, 5, and 6 re-estimate the probabilities by clustering the error terms at the firm-category level in the random effects LPM regression.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningThe authors lagged the Complementor Resources variable by 1 month to minimize the potential for reverse causality.
“We lagged this variable by 1 month to minimize the potential for reverse causality.12”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningThe authors ran random effects LPM estimations with robust standard errors clustered at the firm-category level.
“Due to the time-invariant characteristic of some of our variables, we ran the random effects LPM estimations with robust standard errors clustered at the firm-category level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductcitationThe authors employed a parametric Weibull regression model to test the robustness of their analyses.
“To test the robustness of our analyses, we employed a parametric Weibull regression model, as done in prior studies (e.g., Kapoor and Lee 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationComplementors that join the multi-platform ecosystem are the main side of the platform that brings innovative products and services to a platform, expanding its functionality and value to the users.
“Complementors that join the multi-platform ecosystem are the main side of the platform (Parker et al. 2016) that brings innovative products and services to a platform, expanding its functionality and value to the users.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Parker et al. 2016 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataIn robustness checks, winsorizing the complementor resources variable at the 90% level achieved qualitatively similar results.
“In our robustness checks, we have winsorized the complementor resources variable at the 90% level and achieved qualitatively similar results.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenOur findings may not necessarily extend to non-platform industries, industries in which only one platform emerges, or mature platform markets where the winning platform(s) is (are) well understood.
“Our findings may not necessarily extend to non-platform industries, industries in which only one platform emerges, or mature platform markets where the winning platform(s) is (are) well understood.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe addition of Google Trends product queries to sales forecast models has been shown to improve prediction power in a wide variety of contexts.
“The addition of Google Trends product queries to sales forecast models has been shown to improve prediction power in a wide variety of contexts”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Boone et al. 2018 source
- cites Du and Hsieh 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
The paper relies on this without support.
Market traction at an early stage of platform development is a noisy signal when predicting how platform competition will evolve.
“However, the decision is not simple, as market traction at an early stage of platform development is a noisy signal when predicting how platform competition will evolve.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There is high volatility in platform dynamics.
“There is high volatility in platform dynamics.”
The paper relies on this without support.
For a complementor, the ideal scenario is selecting the platform with the highest growth potential as their initial choice.
“For a complementor, the ideal scenario is selecting the platform with the highest growth potential as their initial choice.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Denovo entrants typically lack the reputation that incumbents enjoy in the market.
“Denovo entrants typically lack the reputation that incumbents enjoy in the market.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Complementors adopt their first platform not knowing whether the platform they choose to join will grow faster than its rivals or eventually fall behind.
“Because complementors adopt their first platform not knowing whether the platform they choose to join will grow faster than its rivals or eventually fall behind”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Mutually exclusive first-platform indicators have a positive correlation
MinorTable 3 reports a positive correlation of 0.080 between the SmartThings and Alexa first-adopted-platform indicators. Under the stated definition, a complementor cannot have both platforms as its first adopted platform, so these indicators cannot be positively correlated.
“23 First adopted platform SmartThings (dummy) 0.402* 0.393* 0.314* -0.303* -0.001 -0.274* 0.124* 0.081* 0.002 -0.018 0.146* -0.178* 0.080*”
“we included a dummy variable for each platform that denoted whether the first adopted platform was Google-Nest, Amazon-Alexa, Samsung-SmartThings, or Wink.”
Product-quality minimum falls outside its labeled range
MinorTable 2 labels product quality as ranging from 1 to 5 but reports an observed minimum of 0.1.
“| Complementor product quality (on a range of 1-5) | 3865 | 2.746 | 0.922 | 0.1 | 5 |”
“The average complementor product quality is 2.75 with a 0.1-5 range.”
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Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Van Berlo A., 1999, Design Guidelines on Smart Homes: A COST 219bis Guidebook
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Roshani, S., & Rajabzadeh, M. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7354067
Liu, M., Wang, Q., Li, L., & Li, G. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7434353
Berends, H., Deken, F., & Hummel, J. T. (2026) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2026.105609
- Authors
- Aydin Ozden, S., Suarez, F. F., Libaers, D., & Bart, Y.
- Affiliations
- City St George's, University of London Bayes Business School London UK
- Northeastern University D'Amore McKim School of Business Boston Massachusetts USA
- University of South Florida (US)
- Northeastern University (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Product Innovation Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2025-09-18
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 690-714
- ISSN
- 0737-6782 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5885
- OpenAlex
- W4414366776
- Semantic Scholar
- 8a4ca552bdf4254f5ad47a1eb05a3c4c7324bee5
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 89
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3
- FWCI
- 2.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Product Innovation Management (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- City Research Online (City University London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Business Strategy and Innovation
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Innovation and Knowledge Management
- Keywords
- platform ecosystems, early entrants, hedging strategies, market uncertainty, smart home market, platform adoption, technological similarity
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