The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
Open accessAbstract
Suppose two players repeatedly meet each other to play a game where 1. each uses a learning rule with the property that it is a calibrated forecast of the other's plays, and 2. each plays a myopic best response to this forecast distribution. Then, the limit points of the sequence of plays are correlated equilibria. In fact, for each correlated equilibrium there is some calibrated learning rule that the players can use which results in their playing this correlated equilibrium in the limit. Thus, the statistical concept of a calibration is strongly related to the game theoretic concept of correlated equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72,D83,C44.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation.
Carter, C. F., & Koopmans, T. C. (1952) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2226909 · Cited by 1,934
Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies
Aumann, R. J. (1974) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 · Cited by 1,630
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
Aumann, R. J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911154 · Cited by 1,613
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game
Robinson, J. (1951) · The Annals of Mathematics · doi:10.2307/1969530 · Cited by 868
An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
Blackwell, D. (1956) · Pacific Journal of Mathematics · doi:10.2140/pjm.1956.6.1 · Cited by 740
Dawid, A. P. (1982) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1982.10477856 · Cited by 625
1. Some Topics in Two-Person Games
Shapley, L. S. (1964) · Advances in Game Theory. (AM-52) · doi:10.1515/9781400882014-002 · Cited by 539
Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1991) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(91)90006-z · Cited by 334
Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
Samuelson, L., & Zhang, J. (1992) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(92)90041-f · Cited by 327
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.
Jeffrey, R., & Skyrms, B. (1992) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108221 · Cited by 308
Conditional Universal Consistency
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Levine, D. K. (1999) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0705 · Cited by 171
Subjective games and equilibria
Kalai, E., & Lehrer, E. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80019-3 · Cited by 117
Coherent behavior in noncooperative games
Nau, R. F., & McCardle, K. F. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90011-8 · Cited by 105
Self-Calibrating Priors Do Not Exist
Oakes, D. (1985) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1985.10478117 · Cited by 99
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1999) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0726 · Cited by 62
Cited by
Prediction, Learning, and Games
Cesa-Bianchi, N., & Lugosi, G. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511546921 · Cited by 3,162
Foundations of Machine Learning
Mohri, M., Rostamizadeh, A., & Talwalkar, A. (2018) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/10290.001.0001 · Cited by 1,122
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00153 · Cited by 1,088
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits
Slivkins, A. (2019) · Foundations and Trends® in Machine Learning · doi:10.1561/2200000068 · Cited by 780
Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks
Acemoglu, D., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1 · Cited by 705
Metadata
- Authors
- Foster, D. P., & Vohra, R. V.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1997-10
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 40-55
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2073242866
- Cited by
- 365
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 10.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.