The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
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Metadata
- Authors
- Aumann, R. J., & Brandenburger, A.
- Venue
- Readings in Formal Epistemology
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2016
- Pages
- 863-894
- OpenAlex
- W2122336644
- Cited by
- 635
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 83.40
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.