The learning-consciousness connection
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This is a response to the nine commentaries on our target article “Unlimited Associative Learning: A primer and some predictions”. Our responses are organized by theme rather than by author. We present a minimal functional architecture for Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) that aims to tie to together the list of capacities presented in the target article. We explain why we discount higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness. We respond to the criticism that we have overplayed the importance of learning and underplayed the importance of spatial modelling. We decline the invitation to add a negative marker to our proposed positive marker so as to rule out consciousness in plants, but we nonetheless maintain that there is no positive evidence of consciousness in plants. We close by discussing how UAL relates to development and to its material substrate.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 1×
“We see this minimal architecture as compatible with, but not committed to, the predictive processing movement in cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Friston 2010; Clark 2016).”
BackgroundSurfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind
Clark, A. (2016) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217013.001.0001 · Cited by 1,358
A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks
Dehaene, S., Kerszberg, M., & Changeux, J.-P. (1998) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.95.24.14529 · Cited by 1,347
Towards a true neural stance on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001 · Cited by 1,149
Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine
Merker, B. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000891 · Cited by 868
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632
What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness.
Barron, A. B., & Klein, C. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1520084113 · Cited by 446 · cited 1×
“As Irvine notes, Merker (2005) and Barron and Klein (2016) can be seen as positing such a transition marker, albeit without calling it a transition marker.”
BackgroundThe Evolution of the Sensitive Soul: Learning and the Origins of Consciousness
Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2019) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11006.001.0001 · Cited by 372
Self-citationThe search for invertebrate consciousness
Birch, J. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12351 · Cited by 254 · cited 2×
“The evidence is inconclusive (as Birch 2020a emphasizes) but we take the evidence that exists to be mostly supportive.”
BackgroundSelf-citationMerker, B. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00002-3 · Cited by 251 · cited 1×
“As Irvine notes, Merker (2005) and Barron and Klein (2016) can be seen as positing such a transition marker, albeit without calling it a transition marker.”
BackgroundClassical conditioning, awareness, and brain systems
Clark, R. E., Manns, J. R., & Squire, L. R. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)02041-7 · Cited by 249
The Ancient Origins of Consciousness: How the Brain Created Experience
Feinberg, T. E., & Mallatt, J. M. (2016) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/10714.001.0001 · Cited by 243
Unlimited Associative Learning and the origins of consciousness: a primer and some predictions
Birch, J., Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2020) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-020-09772-0 · Cited by 149 · cited 1×
“This is a response to the nine commentaries on our target article “Unlimited Associative Learning: A primer and some predictions” (Birch et al. 2020).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144 · cited 2×
“For example, although humans do possess a global workspace, of course (working memory), many deny that entry into that workspace is what constitutes a state as phenomenally conscious (Block, 2007, 2011; Boly et al., 2017; Haun et al., 2017).”
BackgroundThe unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., Hess, K., & Herzog, M. H. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.04.002 · Cited by 140
The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness
Neander, K. (1998) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18 · Cited by 124 · cited 1×
“If we say “red”, the content of the HOT is now all-important, clashing with evidence that our experiences have fine-grained content that outruns our concepts (Neander 1998; Block 2011b; Block 2019; Carruthers 2019).”
BackgroundBirch, J. (2020) · Acta Biotheoretica · doi:10.1007/s10441-019-09363-x · Cited by 42
Self-citation
Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Self-citationLearning and the Evolution of Conscious Agents
Jablonka, E., & Ginsburg, S. (2022) · Biosemiotics · doi:10.1007/s12304-022-09501-y · Cited by 61
Self-citationWhat if Consciousness has no Function?
Belardinelli, S., & Pievani, T. (2023) · Biosemiotics · doi:10.1007/s12304-023-09533-y · Cited by 4
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Birch, J., Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E.
- Venue
- Biology & Philosophy
- Published
- 2021-10
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 5
- ISSN
- 0169-3867 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8404
- OpenAlex
- W3174666838
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 8.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.