Is it time for robot rights? Moral status in artificial entities
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Some authors have recently suggested that it is time to consider rights for robots. These suggestions are based on the claim that the question of robot rights should not depend on a standard set of conditions for ‘moral status’; but instead, the question is to be framed in a new way, by rejecting the is/ought distinction, making a relational turn, or assuming a methodological behaviourism. We try to clarify these suggestions and to show their highly problematic consequences. While we find the suggestions ultimately unmotivated, the discussion shows that our epistemic condition with respect to the moral status of others does raise problems, and that the human tendency to empathise with things that do not have moral status should be taken seriously—we suggest that it produces a “derived moral status”. Finally, it turns out that there is typically no individual in real AI that could even be said to be the bearer of moral status. Overall, there is no reason to think that robot rights are an issue now.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024717 · Cited by 4,663
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Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1416950 · Cited by 3,340
On the Morality of Artificial Agents
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2004) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1023/b:mind.0000035461.63578.9d · Cited by 1,218 · cited 1×
“(Floridi & Saunders, 2004: 349).”
Coeckelbergh, M. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-019-00146-8 · Cited by 475 · cited 2×
“M. Coeckelbergh also seems to take this line into account, recently (Coeckelbergh, 2020c).”
BackgroundThe Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, and Ethics
Gunkel, D. J. (2012) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8975.001.0001 · Cited by 449
Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent
Allen, C., Varner, G., & Zinser, J. (2000) · Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1080/09528130050111428 · Cited by 326
Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence
Turner, J. (2019) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96235-1 · Cited by 184 · cited 1×
“Some people in the field take the view that it should be seriously considered whether robots should be allocated rights now (Cappuccio et al., 2020; Coeckelbergh, 2012, 2018, 2020a; Danaher, 2020; Gunkel, 2018a, 2018b, 2020; Tavani, 2018; Turner, 2019).”
BackgroundCritiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
van Wynsberghe, A., & Robbins, S. (2019) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8 · Cited by 161
Artificial Moral Agents: A Survey of the Current Status
Cervantes, J.-A., López, S., Rodríguez, L.-F., Cervantes, S., Cervantes, F., & Ramos, F. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-019-00151-x · Cited by 151
Cited by
Understanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
“This concerns particularly two questions: First, there is a recent debate on robot rights and the moral status of AI systems (Gunkel 2018; Ladak 2023; Moosavi 2023; Müller 2021; Schwitzgebel and Garza 2015; Shevlin 2021).”
BackgroundHow to deal with risks of AI suffering
Dung, L. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2238287 · Cited by 21
The conductor model of consciousness, our neuromorphic twins, and the human-AI deal
Benitez, F., Pennartz, C., & Senn, W. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/gbzd6 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Müller, V. C.
- Venue
- Ethics and Information Technology
- Published
- 2021-05-17
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 579-587
- ISSN
- 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8439
- OpenAlex
- W3163428404
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 37.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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