The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
Abstract
This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95(1):384-394, 2005). We show that Gneezy's data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person's decision of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but broadly similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. While we also confirm that there is an aversion to lying in our subject population, our data cannot reject the simple hypothesis described above either.
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Citations
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Cited by
LIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
Fischbacher, U., & Föllmi-Heusi, F. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12014 · Cited by 1,243
Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449 · Cited by 698
Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
KARTIK, N. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00559.x · Cited by 607
Self-citationTrust in Forecast Information Sharing
Özer, Ö., Zheng, Y., & Chen, K.-Y. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1334 · Cited by 421
Wang, J. T.-Y., Spezio, M., & Camerer, C. F. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.984 · Cited by 416
Metadata
- Authors
- Hurkens, S., & Kartik, N.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-06
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 180-192
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W2059425370
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 34.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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