Consciousness, self-consciousness, and meditation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence of this presence.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2017) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262529365.001.0001 · Cited by 2,449
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409 · cited 2×
“this transparency as only apparent), Searle 1992, 96; Harman 1997, 667; Grice 2002, 45. 12 Of course this is not supposed to mean that a conscious experience has no features but the features the”
BackgroundSubjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective
Zahavi, D. (2005) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6541.001.0001 · Cited by 1,104
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574 · cited 2×
“, in Hill 2002, Papineau 1995 and Churchland 1985 and corresponds to what Chalmers calls “type-B materialism” (Chalmers 2002).”
BackgroundMeditation and the neuroscience of consciousness: an introduction
Lutz, A., Dunne, J. D., & Davidson, R. J. (2007) · The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511816789.020 · Cited by 485
Cited by
Psychedelics, meditation, and self-consciousness
Millière, R., Carhart-Harris, R. L., Roseman, L., Trautwein, F.-M., & Berkovich-Ohana, A. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01475 · Cited by 390
“However, he goes on to argue that “in perception I am necessarily co-conscious of myself ” (Fasching, 2008, p. 472), because the subject/object polarity is built in all conscious representational states.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialParnas, J., & Henriksen, M. G. (2016) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.05.010 · Cited by 132
“As the taking place of presence, pure consciousness is present to us in each and everything that is present (Fasching, 2008, p. 476).”
Metzinger, T. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00746 · Cited by 84
“…and aparasomatic OBEs in terms of the “pure consciousness” variant (i.e., the unit of identification being phenomenality per se, or the global unity of consciousness as such, as frequently described when referring to mystical or meditation experiences, see Fasching, 2008; Hölzel et al., 2011).”
InfluentialWhen the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation
Ciaunica, A., Charlton, J., & Farmer, H. (2021) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-020-09677-z · Cited by 78
“This view seems to echo some Buddhist approaches, according to which there is a type of self-presentation that “does not consist in any objects at all, be they ‘internal’ or ‘external’, for ‘the Self is neither within nor without’ (Ramana Maharshi, in Sastri 1997: 27” (quoted by Fasching 2008: 466).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Fasching, W.
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2008-04-19
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 463-483
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2060998258
- Cited by
- 41
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 0.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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