Pragmatism and the predictive mind
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Abstract
Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the mind and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic, “narcissistic” character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive processing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide.
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“Second, while Williams [76] shows that cognition is always pragmatically oriented toward action rather than passive representation, Haraldsen [27] emphasizes that AI systems often embody agential forces that diverge from user intentions.”
From 4E cognition and the coevolution of human–AI interaction (2025) · cites this paper as [76]
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Cited by
Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Hipólito, I. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22080889 · Cited by 103
“We find approaches in the biological sciences and in the neuroscience less committed to the view of cognition as a representational process taking place within the boundaries of the brain (Calvo and Friston, 2017; Engel et al., 2016; Hipolito and Kirchhoff, 2019; Ramstead et al., 2019b; Williams, 2018).”
Williams, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1768-x · Cited by 63
“…the seemingly novel cognitive capacities we exhibit not just to a deeper and more richly structured neocortex, but also to “the influence of flexible structured symbolic language… and an almost obsessive drive to engage in shared cultural practices” (Clark 2016, p. 276; see Williams 2018).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Williams, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Williams, Daniel
- ORCID
- Williams, Daniel
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2018-01-13
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 835-859
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2783917573
- Cited by
- 22
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2025: 6 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 4
- FWCI
- 1.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Apollo (cc-by)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
- Keywords
- predictive processing, pragmatism, prediction error minimization, Bayesian inference, hierarchical generative models, intentionality, intentional content, communitarianism, philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.