The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Problems for Dogmatism
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
WHY OPEN-MINDED PEOPLE SHOULD ENDORSE DOGMATISM
Tucker, C. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00202.x · Cited by 291
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments
Korman, D. Z., & Locke, D. (2020) · Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15 · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198859512.003.0014 · Cited by 58
Metadata
- Authors
- White, R.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 131
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 525-557
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2033370584
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 51.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.