The intrinsic value of choice: The propensity to under-delegate in the face of potential gains and losses
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Human beings are often faced with a pervasive problem: whether to make their own decision or to delegate the decision task to someone else. Here, we test whether people are inclined to forgo monetary rewards in order to retain agency when faced with choices that could lead to losses and gains. In a simple choice task, we show that participants choose to pay in order to control their own payoff more than they should if they were to maximize monetary rewards and minimize monetary losses. This tendency cannot be explained by participants' overconfidence in their own ability, as their perceived ability was elicited and accounted for. Nor can the results be explained by lack of information. Rather, the results seem to reflect an intrinsic value for choice, which emerges in the domain of both gains and of losses. Moreover, our data indicate that participants are aware that they are making suboptimal choices in the normative sense, but do so anyway, presumably for psychological gains.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897 · cited 2×
“of regret for selecting the wrong option; in the same vein, regret avoidance may lead people to prefer to accept the status quo rather than make errors of commission (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).”
BackgroundRegret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042 · cited 2×
“This finding runs counter to the idea that people prefer to delegate decisions involving unwanted outcomes in order to avoid regret (Loomes and Sugden 1982) and instead supports the notion that in important contexts, choice may be preferred regardless of expected valence of the outcome (Cockburn et…”
ResultPatall, E. A., Cooper, H., & Robinson, J. C. (2008) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.270 · Cited by 1,101
Representation of Action-Specific Reward Values in the Striatum
Samejima, K., Ueda, Y., Doya, K., & Kimura, M. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1115270 · Cited by 939
Born to choose: the origins and value of the need for control
Leotti, L. A., Iyengar, S. S., & Ochsner, K. N. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.08.001 · Cited by 717 · cited 1×
“In support of that heuristic, environments in which we can and do exercise choice are usually (of course not always) more rewarding to us (Leotti et al. 2010; Patall et al. 2008; Rotter 1966).”
BackgroundLeotti, L. A., & Delgado, M. R. (2011) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797611417005 · Cited by 318 · cited 1×
“…decisions involving unwanted outcomes in order to avoid regret (Loomes and Sugden 1982) and instead supports the notion that in important contexts, choice may be preferred regardless of expected valence of the outcome (Cockburn et al. 2014; Leotti and Delgado 2011, 2014; Sharot et al. 2009, 2010a).”
BackgroundLieberman, M. D., Ochsner, K. N., Gilbert, D. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2001) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00323 · Cited by 317
The Value of Exercising Control Over Monetary Gains and Losses
Leotti, L. A., & Delgado, M. R. (2014) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613514589 · Cited by 110 · cited 1×
“…decisions involving unwanted outcomes in order to avoid regret (Loomes and Sugden 1982) and instead supports the notion that in important contexts, choice may be preferred regardless of expected valence of the outcome (Cockburn et al. 2014; Leotti and Delgado 2011, 2014; Sharot et al. 2009, 2010a).”
Background
Cited by
Corticostriatal Circuits Encode the Subjective Value of Perceived Control
Wang, K. S., & Delgado, M. R. (2019) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhz045 · Cited by 42
Don’t patronize me! An experiment on preferences for authorship
Lübbecke, S., & Schnedler, W. (2020) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/jems.12347 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Bobadilla-Suarez, S., Sunstein, C. R., & Sharot, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Published
- 2017-06
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 187-202
- ISSN
- 0895-5646 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0476
- OpenAlex
- W2284347057
- Cited by
- 89
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 6.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Bobadilla-Suarez, S., Sunstein, C. R., & Sharot, T. (2017). The intrinsic value of choice: The propensity to under-delegate in the face of potential gains and losses. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-017-9259-x
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