The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Anti-luck epistemology
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“To say that a belief is safe is to say that the belief couldn't easily have been false .”
From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Pritchard, 2007
Citations
Cites
(2000) · Cited by 5,055
Williamson, T. L. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
American Philosophical Quarterly
(2024) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.61.4.08 · Cited by 2,341
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174763 · Cited by 2,303
Wittgenstein, L. (1969) · Cited by 2,146
Goldman, A. I., & Nozick, R. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184523 · Cited by 2,056
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Lewis, D. (1996) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409612347521 · Cited by 1,450
Hawthorne, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 · Cited by 1,333
SMITH, D. P. (2005) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.x · Cited by 1,295
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5 of the 62 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Harman G. (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Cited by
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Items 201–300 of 408
Moderate Knowledge Externalism
Pritchard, D. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198866749.003.0006 · Cited by 1
Self-citationEtiological proper function and the safety condition
Mortini, D. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04412-y · Cited by 1
Scepticism About Self-Knowledge of Motives
Haerle, P. H. (2025) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onae033 · Cited by 1
Bar‐On, D., & Johnson, D. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2025.2476219 · Cited by 1
Does Safety Entail Context-Sensitivity?
Zaar, B. E. A. (2025) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-025-00960-6 · Cited by 1
Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism
Zhao, H. (2025) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1017/can.2026.10059 · Cited by 1
Defensa de la epistemología anti-suerte: en torno a la relación entre seguridad y habilidad
Paz, A. W. (2016) · Revista de filosofía · doi:10.4067/s0718-43602016000100012 · Cited by 1
Epistemic externalism in the philosophy of religion
Baker‐Hytch, M. (2017) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12411 · Cited by 1
Intellectual Norms and Epistemic Normativity
Robitzsch, A. (2019) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4_3 · Cited by 1
Kelp, C. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108666404.001 · Cited by 1
Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content
Boult, C., Kelp, C., Schnurr, J., & Simion, M. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108666404.003 · Cited by 1
Legal risk, legal evidence and the arithmetic of criminal justice
Pritchard, D. (2020) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.1201/9780429344329-10 · Cited by 1
Self-citationSosa, E. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.011 · Cited by 1
Introduction: Meet the Gettier Problem
Hetherington, S. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.002 · Cited by 1
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0001 · Cited by 1
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0002 · Cited by 1
Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible?
Naeem, H. (2023) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2023.2183240 · Cited by 1
Pritchard, Luck, Risk, and a New Problem for Safety-Based Accounts of Knowledge
Simpson, J. R. (2024) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-024-00591-6 · Cited by 1
Sosa on scepticism and the background
Pritchard, D. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02203-w · Cited by 1
Self-citationThe Essential Superficiality of the Voluntary
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0010 · Cited by 1
Safety, Closure, and the Flow of Information
Kipper, J. (2015) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9787-1 · Cited by 1
Epistemic Closure in ScienceEpistemic Closure in ScienceConor Mayo-Wilson
Mayo‐Wilson, C. (2018) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-4230067 · Cited by 1
Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics
Shaffer, M. J. (2018) · Axiomathes · doi:10.1007/s10516-018-9413-3 · Cited by 1
Eyghen, H. V. (2019) · Studia Humana · doi:10.2478/sh-2019-0005 · Cited by 1
The Gettier Problem and Context
Belleri, D., & Coliva, A. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.007 · Cited by 1
Correct Conceivability and its Role in the Epistemology of Modality
Michels, R. (2020) · Collège de France eBooks · doi:10.4000/books.cdf.8079 · Cited by 1
Shaffer, M. J. (2022) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-022-00510-7 · Cited by 1
The Gettier Problem and Intellectual Virtue
Greco, J. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.010 · Cited by 1
Milburn, J. (2015) · doi:10.1002/9781119030614.ch7 · Cited by 1
Actual Control: Demodalising Free Will
Heering, D. (2020) · White Rose eTheses Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) · Cited by 1
Virtue Epistemology and the Analysis of Knowledge
Church, I. M. (2023) · Bloomsbury Academic eBooks · doi:10.5040/9781350258419
The Problem of Easy Justification
Taylor, S. A. (2013) · doi:10.17077/etd.iqg3wic9
CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM AS MORAL DILEMMA
Woodward, J. (2011) · UKnowledge (University of Kentucky)
Luck and the control theory of knowledge
Broncano‐Berrocal, F. (2013) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas)
Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica
Branquinho, J., & Santos, R. M. (2013)
Milburn, J. (2015) · Principia an international journal of epistemology · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p183
Three Sosaian Responses and a Wittgensteinian Response to the Dream Argument in the Zhuangzi
Cheung, L. K. C. (2016) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9732-9
The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability
Taylor, S. A. (2013) · Iowa Research Online (University of Iowa)
Suerte, Seguridad y el Problema de la Generalidad
Paz, A. W. (2016) · Manuscrito · doi:10.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n3.ap
Sorte, Virtude, e Anulabilidade Epistêmica
Fett, J. R. V. (2017) · Principia an international journal of epistemology · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p179
Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem
Piazza, T. (2016) · International Journal for the Study of Skepticism · doi:10.1163/22105700-00001246
Can Epistemic Circumstances Be Safe
Broncano‐Berrocal, F. (2011)
Littlejohn, C. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.005
Kitcher, Mathematics, and Apriority
Roland, J. W. (2018) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-018-9977-8
Essays on Modalized Epistemology
Hirvelä, J. (2018)
Pritchard, D., Veber, M., Salvatore, N. C., & Borges, R. (2018) · Manuscrito · doi:10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n1.dp
Self-citationResponsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
Cloos, C. M. (2018) · eScholarship (California Digital Library)
A abordagem modal da sorte e a epistemologia anti-sorte de Duncan Pritchard
de Medeiros, B. B. (2018) · Cognitio-Estudos: revista eletrônica de filosofia · doi:10.23925/1809-8428.2018v15i2p230-246
Do Safety Failures Preclude Knowledge?
Fett, J. R. V. (2019) · Principia an international journal of epistemology · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n2p301
Scepticism and its Limits: An Investigation of Contextualist Strategies
Macpherson, M. M. (2018) · Research Explorer (The University of Manchester)
McKinnon, R. (2015) · doi:10.1002/9781119030614.ch6
Insensitive and unsafe knowledge
Melchior, G. (2011) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief. Virtue Epistemology and the Temporal Objection
Meylan, A. (2020) · Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) · doi:10.5167/uzh-200255
Broncano‐Berrocal, F. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108666404.004 · Cited by 1
Virtue Epistemology, Two Kinds of Internalism, and the Intelligibility Problem
Kvanvig, J. L. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108666404.007
Motivation, Strategy, and Definition
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.001
Testimony and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Luzzi, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.005
Acquittal from Knowledge Laundering
Glasscock, J. S. P. (2021) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12381
A Kierkegaardian Anti-Luck Epistemology
Black, T. (2021) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00484-y
Schurz, G. (2021) · J.B. Metzler eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-476-04755-7_3
Luzzi, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.001
The Place of Expert Intuition in Philosophy
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0008
The Accessibility of Expert Intuition
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0004
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0002
Perceptual Expertise and Perceptual Modularity
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0003
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0007
Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma
Church, I. M. (2021) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/meta.12518
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0002
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0003
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0004
Internalism, Externalism, and Autonomous Belief
Carter, J. A. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846921.003.0002
Radical Enhancement, Knowledge, and Autonomous Belief
Carter, J. A. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846921.003.0001
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0001
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0007
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0009
Know-How, Performance Enhancement, and Guidance Control
Carter, J. A. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846921.003.0004
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0010
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0008
The Value of Autonomous Knowledge
Carter, J. A. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846921.003.0005
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0006
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0005
Epistemic Autonomy and Knowledge Defeat
Carter, J. A. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846921.003.0003
Bootstrapping, Epistemic Circularity, and Justification Closure
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.011
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.006
Luzzi, F. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.009
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.004
Abominable Conjunctions, Contextualism, and the Spreading Problem
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.010
Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Luzzi, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.004
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.009
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.007
Inferential Knowledge from Falsehood
Luzzi, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.002
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.002
Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth
Luzzi, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.003
Millar, A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108666404.009
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.003
Hetherington, S. (2011) · doi:10.1002/9781118083178.refs
Hetherington, S. (2011) · doi:10.1002/9781444395938.refs
Memory and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Luzzi, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.006
Metadata
- Authors
- Pritchard, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Stirling (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pritchard, Duncan
- ORCID
- Pritchard, Duncan
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2006-10-10
- Volume
- 158
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 277-297
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2092707543
- Cited by
- 408
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 47.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/D500494/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic luck
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