The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Anti-luck epistemology
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Integrity signals
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In the citing paper
“To say that a belief is safe is to say that the belief couldn't easily have been false .”
From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Pritchard, 2007
Citations
Cites
(2000) · Cited by 5,055
Williamson, T. L. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
American Philosophical Quarterly
(2024) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.61.4.08 · Cited by 2,341
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174763 · Cited by 2,303
Wittgenstein, L. (1969) · Cited by 2,146
Goldman, A. I., & Nozick, R. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184523 · Cited by 2,056
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Lewis, D. (1996) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409612347521 · Cited by 1,450
Hawthorne, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 · Cited by 1,333
SMITH, D. P. (2005) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.x · Cited by 1,295
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Harman G. (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 301–400 of 408
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.012
Transmission, Skepticism, and Conditions of Warrant
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.005
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.008
Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck
Shaffer, M. J. (2022) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-022-00511-6
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.013
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0009
Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement
(2018) · Bloomsbury Methuen Drama eBooks · doi:10.5040/9781474218849.0007
Kelp, C., & Greco, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108666404.012
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0001
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0005
Luzzi, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.008
The Gettier Problem’s Explicability Problem
Hetherington, S. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.015
The Gettier Problem and Externalism
Borges, R. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.006
Hetherington, S. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.001
Hetherington, S. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.016
Hetherington, S. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.017
Intuition in the Gettier Problem
Chudnoff, E. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.013
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0003
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0007
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0012
The Bias Blind Spot and the Biases of Introspection
Kelly, T. A. F. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0005
(2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.002.0003
Knowledge, Skepticism, and Reliability
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0010
(2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.002.0004
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0009
Bias Attributions and the Epistemology of Disagreement
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0011
Symmetry and Bias Attributions
Kelly, T. A. F. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0008
The Norm-Theoretic Account of Bias
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0004
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0006
Sensitivity, Safety, and Brains in Vats
Zhao, H. (2023) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-022-09845-7
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.002.0003
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0008
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0012
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0006
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0013
Philosophically Accommodating Accounts
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0011
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0003
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0010
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0009
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0002
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.002.0007
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0001
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0004
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.002.0005
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.002.0004
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0005
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.002.0003
Pinillos, N. Á. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198871965.003.0007
Deliberative Trust and Convictively Apt Trust
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0005
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0008
Trust, Pistology, and the Ethics of Cooperation
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0004
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0002
Trust, Vulnerability, and Monitoring
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0007
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0003
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0006
Conclusions and a Research Agenda
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0010
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.003.0001
Carter, J. A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191982460.002.0005
Carter, J. A. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846921.002.0003
Carter, J. A. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846921.002.0004
Carter, J. A. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846921.002.0005
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.002.0003
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.002.0004
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.002.0007
Chudnoff, E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863021.002.0006
Epistemically Vicious Knowledge
Paulson, S. (2024) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-024-00855-y
Self-Knowledge of Belief Requires Understanding of Propositions
Schwengerer, L. (2024) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-024-00917-1
Luck and normative achievements: Let not safety be our guide
Guindon, B. (2025) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2024.35
Is the Unity of Normativity Safe?
Whiting, D. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780198927761.003.0004
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0009
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0002
Confidence, Reflection, and Knowledge
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0004
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0006
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0008
Introduction: Appraising Concepts
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0001
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0003
Conclusion: Tailoring Thought to Need
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0012
The Politics of Conflicting Concerns
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0011
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0007
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0005
Alves, E., Fett, J. R. V., & Posselt, V. F. (2025) · Veritas (Porto Alegre) · doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2025.1.46598
The Recovery Problem’s Threat to Consent Testimony
Suda, Y. (2023) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2023-0016
Dunne, G. (2025) · Future in Educational Research · doi:10.1002/fer3.70010
Smith, N. D. (2025) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-96041-3_4
Topey, B. (2025) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-98717-5_9
Justification does not aggregate: de-generalizing the lottery paradox
Ochoa, A. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05342-7
Carter, J. A., & Kallestrup, J. (2026) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.70041
Lord, E. (2026) · doi:10.1093/9780191988264.001.0001
Talk about luck! On the role of knowledge in communication
Simpson, V. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05499-9
The authority and politics of epiphanic experience
Queloz, M. (2026) · Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie · doi:10.1007/s42048-026-00250-y
Bourdoncle, R. (2022) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/a94996a0zb442z4caaz9ad1z238cd31618b2
Lottery, Neural Phase and Safety
Zhao, B. (2026) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/theo.70088
Epistemic Risk of the Quantitative Risk: Meta Level Decision Making in QRMPreprint
Assa, H. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6724924
A liberal view of consciousness and cognition
Pelczar, M. W. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05638-2
The Safety Versus Sensitivity Debate Revisited
Pritchard, D. (2026) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies11040122
Self-citationThe Epistemic Illusion of Large Language ModelsPreprint
Vannacci, A. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6608420
Self‐attributing religious knowledge
Munro, D. (2026) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.70033
Hirvelä, J. (2026) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzag038
Metadata
- Authors
- Pritchard, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Stirling (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pritchard, Duncan
- ORCID
- Pritchard, Duncan
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2006-10-10
- Volume
- 158
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 277-297
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2092707543
- Cited by
- 408
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 47.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/D500494/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic luck
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