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Anti-luck epistemology
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“To say that a belief is safe is to say that the belief couldn't easily have been false .”
From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Pritchard, 2007
Citations
Cites
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Williamson, T. L. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
American Philosophical Quarterly
(2024) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.61.4.08 · Cited by 2,341
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174763 · Cited by 2,303
Wittgenstein, L. (1969) · Cited by 2,146
Goldman, A. I., & Nozick, R. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184523 · Cited by 2,056
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
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Hawthorne, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 · Cited by 1,333
SMITH, D. P. (2005) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.x · Cited by 1,295
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5 of the 62 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
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- Harman G. (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton
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Items 101–200 of 408
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“In recent decades, Safety has been the focus of much discussion (Pritchard, 2007; Sosa, 1999 ).”
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Becker, K. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.009 · Cited by 12
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pritchard, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Stirling (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pritchard, Duncan
- ORCID
- Pritchard, Duncan
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2006-10-10
- Volume
- 158
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 277-297
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2092707543
- Cited by
- 408
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 47.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/D500494/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic luck
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