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Neuromedia, cognitive offloading, and intellectual perseverance

Turner, Cody · 2022 · Synthese
Cited by 13

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This paper engages in what might be called anticipatory virtue epistemology, as it anticipates some virtue epistemological risks related to a near-future version of brain-computer interface technology that Michael Lynch (2014) calls 'neuromedia.' I analyze how neuromedia is poised to negatively affect the intellectual character of agents, focusing specifically on the virtue of intellectual perseverance, which involves a disposition to mentally persist in the face of challenges towards the realization of one’s intellectual goals. First, I present and motivate what I call ‘the cognitive offloading argument’, which holds that excessive cognitive offloading of the sort incentivized by a device like neuromedia threatens to undermine intellectual virtue development from the standpoint of the theory of virtue responsibilism. Then, I examine the cognitive offloading argument as it applies to the virtue of intellectual perseverance, arguing that neuromedia may increase cognitive efficiency at the cost of intellectual perseverance. If used in an epistemically responsible manner, however, cognitive offloading devices may not undermine intellectual perseverance but instead allow people to persevere with respect to intellectual goals that they find more valuable by freeing them from different kinds of menial intellectual labor.

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Turner, C.
Venue
Synthese
Published
2022-03-02
Volume
200
Issue
2
ISSN
  • 0039-7857
  • 1573-0964
Cited by
13
References
12
Language
en
Licence

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