Expertise
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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“However, as we will comment on in this section, Croce's account of epistemic expert successfully overcomes some difficulties that emerge from previous functionalist approaches to expertise (Goldman, 2018;Jäger, 2016).”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Goldman, 2018
Citations
Cites
(2000) · Cited by 5,055
Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
Goldman, A. I. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001 · Cited by 2,166
Self-citationKnowledge and Practical Interests
Stanley, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 · Cited by 1,653 · cited 1×
“Some epistemologists (e.g., DeRose 2002; Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; Williamson 2000) contend that knowledge is the norm of assertion.”
BackgroundGoldman, A. I. (1979) · Justification and Knowledge · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1 · Cited by 1,468 · cited 1×
“6 Cf. Goldman (1979), in which a similar rationale is offered for endorsing a vague analysis of justifiedness.”
BackgroundSelf-citationLewis, D. (1996) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409612347521 · Cited by 1,450
Smith, D. (2005) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.x · Cited by 1,281
Hawthorne, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 · Cited by 1,267 · cited 1×
“Some epistemologists (e.g., DeRose 2002; Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; Williamson 2000) contend that knowledge is the norm of assertion.”
BackgroundExpert political judgment: how good is it? how can we know?
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-3634 · Cited by 1,260 · cited 1×
“In 2005 Philip Tetlock published a book on political forecasting (Tetlock 2005).”
BackgroundSuperforecasting: the art and science of prediction
(2016) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.196400 · Cited by 919 · cited 1×
“In a more recent book, however, Tetlock and Gardner (2015) largely reject the debunking stance that readers of the earlier book imputed to it.”
BackgroundExperts: Which Ones Should You Trust?
GOLDMAN, A. I. (2001) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x · Cited by 911 · cited 1×
“In a previous paper (Goldman 2001) I pursued this question in some depth, and I won’t re-visit all the nuances here.”
BackgroundSelf-citationAssertion, Knowledge, and Context
DeRose, K. (2002) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-111-2-167 · Cited by 742 · cited 1×
“Some epistemologists (e.g., DeRose 2002; Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; Williamson 2000) contend that knowledge is the norm of assertion.”
BackgroundOxford Studies In Epistemology
(2007) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199237067.001.0001 · Cited by 602
Lackey, J. A. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00664.x · Cited by 427
What is the Problem with Experts?
Turner, S. (2001) · Social Studies of Science · doi:10.1177/030631201031001007 · Cited by 399 · cited 1×
“8 This paragraph follows the exegesis of Stephen Turner (2001). all—then the perpetrators of the referenced deceptions are not genuine experts by our present lights, but merely pseudo-experts.”
BackgroundFree Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry
Schauer, F. F. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · Cited by 390
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Douven, I. (2006) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-010 · Cited by 357
Social Epistemology: Essential Readings
Goldman, A. I., & Whitcomb, D. (2011) · Cited by 308
Self-citationSkepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism
McGrath, S., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2011) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil201110837 · Cited by 306 · cited 1×
“However, as Sarah McGrath (2011) argues convincingly, to the extent that this reaction to moral deference seems right, it seems to be peculiar to the proper basis for moral judgment rather than to the absence of expertise in the moral terrain.”
BackgroundSpeech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas
Goldman, A. I., & Cox, J. C. (1996) · Legal Theory · doi:10.1017/s1352325200000343 · Cited by 106 · cited 1×
“However, a careful analysis of this claim demonstrates that economic theory entails no such thesis (Goldman and Cox 1996; Goldman 1999: chap.”
BackgroundSelf-citationExpertise: A Practical Explication
Quast, C. (2016) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9411-2 · Cited by 73 · cited 2×
“He writes: ‘‘The conceptual function (point, role) of expertise is to substantially improve the social deployment of available agential resources apt for client[s’] relevant ends …’’ (Quast 2016: Sect.”
BackgroundSome telling examples: A reply to Tsohatzidis
Holton, R. (1997) · Journal of Pragmatics · doi:10.1016/s0378-2166(96)00081-1 · Cited by 64
Seidel, M. (2014) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9781137377890 · Cited by 43
Epistemic relativism : a constructive critique
Seidel, M. (2014) · Cited by 31
Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Expertise and Experts
Stichter, M. (2015) · Humana.mente · Cited by 28
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Feldman R (2007) Reasonable religious disagreement. In: Antony L (ed) Philosophers without gods. Oxford University Press, New York
- Mill JS (1975) On liberty (D. Spitz, ed). W.W. Norton, New York
- Milton J (1968) Areopagitica (J. C. Suffolk, ed). University Tutorial Press, London
Cited by
Bartsch, A., Neuberger, C., Stark, B., Karnowski, V., Maurer, M., Pentzold, C., Quandt, T., Quiring, O., & Schemer, C. (2025) · Communication Theory · doi:10.1093/ct/qtae020 · Cited by 88
Individual Representation in a Community of Knowledge
Rabb, N., Fernbach, P. M., & Sloman, S. A. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.07.011 · Cited by 104
On What it Takes to be an Expert
Croce, M. (2019) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqy044 · Cited by 62
What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing?
DiPaolo, J. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01657-6 · Cited by 84
Ferrario, A., Facchini, A., & Termine, A. (2024) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-024-09681-1 · Cited by 64
“In fact, an expert may be recognized as such until decades after death (Goldman, 2018).”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, A. I.
- Affiliations
- Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
- Corresponding author
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- ORCID
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2016-07-14
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-10
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W3191164836
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2016: 2
- FWCI
- 24.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Topoi (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Education, Healthcare and Sociology Research
- Keywords
- expertise, epistemic authority, expert disagreement, laypeople
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.