The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We describe a form of moral artificial intelligence that could be used to improve human moral decision-making. We call it the “artificial moral advisor” (AMA). The AMA would implement a quasi -relativistic version of the “ideal observer” famously described by Roderick Firth. We describe similarities and differences between the AMA and Firth’s ideal observer. Like Firth’s ideal observer, the AMA is disinterested, dispassionate, and consistent in its judgments. Unlike Firth’s observer, the AMA is non-absolutist, because it would take into account the human agent’s own principles and values. We argue that the AMA would respect and indeed enhance individuals’ moral autonomy, help individuals achieve wide and a narrow reflective equilibrium, make up for the limitations of human moral psychology in a way that takes conservatives’ objections to human bioenhancement seriously, and implement the positive functions of intuitions and emotions in human morality without their downsides, such as biases and prejudices.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341 · Cited by 6,544
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement
Rawls, J. (2001) · doi:10.2307/j.ctv31xf5v0 · Cited by 5,761
The unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699 · cited 1×
“Intuitive and emotive responses can also result from the automatization of rational reflection or of the application of consciously held moral goals (Fishbach et al. 2003; Bargh and Chartrand 1999).”
BackgroundMood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM).
Forgas, J. P. (1995) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.117.1.39 · Cited by 3,470
When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z · Cited by 2,385 · cited 3×
“According to recent theories in moral psychology, our sense of morality is based on a limited set of intuitive and emotive responses, where principles and reasons are, more often than not, mere post-hoc rationalizations (Cushman et al. 2003, Haidt and Graham 2007, Haidt 2012).”
BackgroundSlovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2008) · The Innate Mind, Volume 3 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0019 · Cited by 650
Self-regulation of prejudiced responses: Implications for progress in prejudice-reduction efforts
Monteith, M. J. (1993) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.3.469 · Cited by 556
Seo, D., Patrick, C. J., & Kennealy, P. J. (2008) · Aggression and Violent Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.avb.2008.06.003 · Cited by 520 · cited 1×
“We might in principle be opposed to violence, but our motivations are under many physiological influences (often out of our control) which make us aggressive, such as serotonin hypofunction (Seo et al. 2008) or low blood glucose (Bushman et al. 2014).”
Background
Cited by
The Ethics of Digital Well-Being: A Thematic Review
Burr, C., Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-020-00175-8 · Cited by 374
Artificial intelligence: Who is responsible for the diagnosis?
Neri, E., Coppola, F., Miele, V., Bibbolino, C., & Grassi, R. (2020) · La radiologia medica · doi:10.1007/s11547-020-01135-9 · Cited by 240
The Moral Psychology of Artificial Intelligence
Bonnefon, J.-F., Rahwan, I., & Shariff, A. (2024) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-030123-113559 · Cited by 151
Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning
Almeida, G. F. C. F., Nunes, J. L., Engelmann, N., Wiegmann, A., & Araújo, M. D. (2024) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2024.104145 · Cited by 70
Claudy, M. C., Aquino, K., & Graso, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.898027 · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Giubilini, A., & Savulescu, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2017-12-08
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 169-188
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W2773687970
- Cited by
- 135
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 25.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13347-017-0285-z
- The paper
- Giubilini, A., & Savulescu, J. (2018). The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0285-z
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.