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The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence

Open access
Giubilini, Alberto, Savulescu, Julian · 2018 · Philosophy & Technology
Cited by 135

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We describe a form of moral artificial intelligence that could be used to improve human moral decision-making. We call it the “artificial moral advisor” (AMA). The AMA would implement a quasi -relativistic version of the “ideal observer” famously described by Roderick Firth. We describe similarities and differences between the AMA and Firth’s ideal observer. Like Firth’s ideal observer, the AMA is disinterested, dispassionate, and consistent in its judgments. Unlike Firth’s observer, the AMA is non-absolutist, because it would take into account the human agent’s own principles and values. We argue that the AMA would respect and indeed enhance individuals’ moral autonomy, help individuals achieve wide and a narrow reflective equilibrium, make up for the limitations of human moral psychology in a way that takes conservatives’ objections to human bioenhancement seriously, and implement the positive functions of intuitions and emotions in human morality without their downsides, such as biases and prejudices.

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Metadata

Authors
Giubilini, A., & Savulescu, J.
Venue
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2017-12-08
Volume
31
Issue
2
Pages
169-188
ISSN
  • 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
  • 2210-5441
OpenAlex
W2773687970
Cited by
135
References
12
FWCI
25.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13347-017-0285-z
The paper
Giubilini, A., & Savulescu, J. (2018). The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0285-z

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