Moral Reasons Not to Posit Extended Cognitive Systems: a Reply to Farina and Lavazza
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“Cognitive extension does not solve per se complex moral problems inherent to human-AI interaction such as manipulation, given that there might be AI systems that extend cognition but undermine the agent's self and autonomy (Cassinadri 2022;Clowes 2020;Clowes et al., 2023;Hernández-Orallo and Vold 2019).”
From ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact (2024) · cites this paper as Cassinadri 2022
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“However, despite accepting the drug as an extending-cognition device (since its causal contribution is also a constitutive one in realizing specific sorts of cognitive processes and mental states),3 the dialogical intervention of the psychotherapist can at most be characterized in terms of cognitive distribution (Hutc…”
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“Clark and Chalmers (1998) proposed the hypotheses of extended mind and extended cognition (EXT), according to which, under specific coupling conditions between a cognitive agent and a cognitive artifact, the latter can actively and constitutively contribute to the realization of extended mental and…”
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Clark, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001 · Cited by 2,201 · cited 3×
“Therefore, in this case, the postulation of an agent-centered extended mental system (Clark, 2008) appears to be both misplaced and useless.”
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“The a posteriori PP instead individuates an ontologically committed cognitive isomorphism between internal and external resources in virtue of a specific level of analysis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Rupert, 2004).”
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“The only way to make the extended mind thesis necessary for better protection of some agents is by assuming a framework of moral status, such as the one proposed by McMahan (1996, 2002), which potentially exposes to marginalization of the cognitive 1 3 unextended and impaired ones.”
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Baylis, F. (2013) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-011-9137-1 · Cited by 202
Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?
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“Agency resources are not reducible to the internal capacities of an individual mental system capable of intentionally generating actions and reasonable choice, since it can be socially and technically scaffolded, mediated, and transformed (Goering et al., 2017; Goering et al., 2021).”
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Sprevak, M. (2010) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.10.010 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“…a mark of cognition that defines the necessary and/ or sufficient conditions for the external resources to be constitutive of a cognitive process, there is an empirical underdetermination and a metaphysical-explanatory stalemate between EXT and EMB (Barker, 2010; Sprevak, 2010; Clark, 2011: 460).”
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“In clinical settings, Mecacci and Haselager (2014) propose a similar approach to Farina and Lavazza’s, but potentially more fruitful.”
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“F&L consider the case of a necklace with a chemical sensor that makes an annoying sound when a person drinks alcohol in order to prevent her from drinking excessively (Farina & Lavazza, 2022: 12).”
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“Agency resources are not reducible to the internal capacities of an individual mental system capable of intentionally generating actions and reasonable choice, since it can be socially and technically scaffolded, mediated, and transformed (Goering et al., 2017; Goering et al., 2021).”
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Cited by
Cassinadri, G. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00701-7 · Cited by 54
Self-citationFasoli, M., Cassinadri, G., & Ienca, M. (2025) · Journal of Cognitive Enhancement · doi:10.1007/s41465-025-00331-7 · Cited by 32
“Third, technological cognitive extension is not neutral; it can induce cognitive, affective, motivational, and existential transformations, some of which may be detrimental or manipulative (Biber & Capasso, 2022; Cassinadri, 2022, 2025).”
Self-citationThe Right to Mental Integrity: Multidimensional, Multilayered and Extended
Cassinadri, G. (2025) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-025-09585-6 · Cited by 30
Self-citationCassinadri, G., & Ienca, M. (2024) · Journal of Medical Ethics · doi:10.1136/jme-2023-109830 · Cited by 26
Self-citationGenerative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things
Barandiaran, X. E., & Pérez-Verdugo, M. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-04961-4 · Cited by 19
“AI-based AI-based technologies, however, pose particular challenges, and ethical debates have questioned the suitability of adopting extended cognition frameworks for these contemporary technologies [Cassinadri, 2022, Farina and Lavazza, 2022].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Cassinadri, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Bologna (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Cassinadri, Guido
- ORCID
- Cassinadri, Guido
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2022-07-15
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W4285492680
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1
- FWCI
- 1.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
- Keywords
- extended cognition, embedded cognition, moral argument, moral reasons, progressiveness, inclusivity, external resources, normative evaluation
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