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Optimal Labor Income Taxation

Piketty, Thomas, Saez, Emmanuel·2013·Handbook of Public Economics
DOI 10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00007-8
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Metadata

Authors
Piketty, T., & Saez, E.
Venue
Handbook of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier
Published
2013
Pages
391-474
ISSN
1573-4420 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00007-8
OpenAlex
W2890935901
Cited by
290
References
5
FWCI
80.35
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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