The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership
Open accessAbstract
It is proposed that knowledge of motor commands is used to distinguish self-generated sensation from externally generated sensation. In this paper, we show that the sense of self-agency, that is the sense that I am the one who is generating an action, largely depends on the degree of discrepancy resulting from comparison between the predicted and actual sensory feedback. In Experiment 1, the sense of self-agency was reduced when the presentation of the tone was unpredictable in terms of timing and its frequency, although in fact the tone was self-produced. In Experiment 2, the opposite case was found to occur. That is, participants experienced illusionary sense of self-agency when the externally generated sensations happened to match the prediction made by forward model. In Experiment 3, the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences, regardless of presence or absence of a discrepancy between the intended and actual consequences of actions. In all the experiments, a discrepancy between the predicted and actual feedback had no effects on sense of self-ownership, that is the sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience. These results may suggest that both senses of self are mutually independent.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Effects of noise letters upon the identification of a target letter in a nonsearch task
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974) · Perception & Psychophysics · doi:10.3758/bf03203267 · Cited by 7,230
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 1×
“Recently, Gallagher (2000) has proposed that self-consciousness can be divided into two important aspects: the “minimal self” and the “narrative self”.”
BackgroundThe cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0601 · Cited by 1,901
The mental representation of hand movements after parietal cortex damage
Sirigu, A., Duhamel, J.-R., Cohen, L., Pillon, B., Dubois, B., & Agid, Y. (1996) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.273.5281.1564 · Cited by 836
The cerebellum is involved in predicting the sensory consequences of action
Blakemore, S.-J., Frith, C. D., & Wolpert, D. M. (2001) · Neuroreport · doi:10.1097/00001756-200107030-00023 · Cited by 587
Experiences of alien control in schizophrenia reflect a disorder in the central monitoring of action
Frith, C. D., & Done, D. J. (1989) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s003329170001240x · Cited by 551
BLAKEMORE, S.-J., SMITH, J., STEEL, R., JOHNSTONE, E. C., & FRITH, C. D. (2000) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291799002676 · Cited by 497
Cited by
Joint action: bodies and minds moving together
SEBANZ, N., BEKKERING, H., & KNOBLICH, G. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.009 · Cited by 1,950
Toward a second-person neuroscience
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & Vogeley, K. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000660 · Cited by 1,510
What is embodiment? A psychometric approach
Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.004 · Cited by 956
The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework
Pacherie, E. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003 · Cited by 618
The “sense of agency” and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms
David, N., Newen, A., & Vogeley, K. (2008) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.004 · Cited by 506
Metadata
- Authors
- Sato, A., & Yasuda, A.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-01
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 241-255
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2064100285
- Cited by
- 520
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 3.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.04.003
- The paper
- Sato, A., & Yasuda, A. (2005). Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.04.003
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.