Consciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There are strong reasons to believe that our conscious inner life is structured, suggested both by introspection as well as scientific psychology. One of the most salient structural characteristics of conscious experiences is known as unity of consciousness. In this contribution, we wish to demonstrate how features of experience that pertain to the unity of consciousness could be made precise in terms of mathematical relations that hold between phenomenal objects. Based on phenomenological considerations, we first outline three such features. These are (i) environmental embedding, (ii) the mutual constraint between local and global representations, and (iii) a top-down process of object formation in consciousness. We then introduce a formal model based on the notion of phenomenal space, defined in terms of a set of quasi-elementary and extended entities. We describe the structure of phenomenal space by appealing to mereological and topological concepts, and we outline a projector-based calculus to account for the idea that the structure of phenomenal space is ultimately dynamical. Using the above concepts, one could approach the mind-matter problem by relating environmentally embedded agents to topologically well-defined objects that result from decompositions of phenomenal space. We conclude our discussion by putting it into the context of some recent conceptual questions that appear in cognitive science and consciousness studies. We opt for the possibility to regard the phenomenon of consciousness not in terms of a singular transition that happens between "brain" and "mind" but rather in terms of a series of transitions between structured layers of experience.
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Cites
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Cited by
Levin, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.768201 · Cited by 195
“More generally a key future aspect to address is whether these spaces have any objective reality, or whether the spaces that scientists see systems solving, as well as the spaces that the system itself constructs from its experience [150; 151], are equally valid and all virtual.”
BackgroundInfluentialFields, C., & Levin, M. (2022) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e24060819 · Cited by 121
Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification
Signorelli, C. M., Szczotka, J., & Prentner, R. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab021 · Cited by 91
“…IIT (Oizumi et al. 2016; Tsuchiya et al. 2016; Kleiner andTull 2020) andmathematized phenomenology (Yoshimi 2007; Ehresmann andGomez-Ramirez 2015; Prentner 2019; Signorelli et al. 2021b); other approaches are based on symmetry (Kleiner 2020), category theory (Northoff et al. 2019; Tsuchiya and…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Prentner, R.
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019-04
- Volume
- 70
- Pages
- 25-38
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2916021804
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 6.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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