The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 44 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment
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In the citing paper
“Conversely, if players know that their own score is passed on, they are much more likely to donate than otherwise 59,60 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [60]
Citations
Cites
Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences
McGinn, L. C. (1957) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/0016-0032(57)90766-4 · Cited by 7,284
Nielsen, R. P., & Axelrod, R. (1985) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/257983 · Cited by 6,517
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,399
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · Cited by 4,868
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
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Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Roth, 1991, Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo, American Economic Review, 81, 1068
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01008-6 · Cited by 1,246
Rand, D. G. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.004 · Cited by 699
The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment
Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05229 · Cited by 501
Metadata
- Authors
- Seinen, I., & Schram, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Schram, Arthur
- ORCID
- Schram, Arthur
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-04
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 581-602
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2008783805
- Cited by
- 350
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 26 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 18.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
- Keywords
- indirect reciprocity, group norms, social status, costly helping, reputation, cooperation, random pairing, third-party punishment, evolution of cooperation
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