The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 44 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Conversely, if players know that their own score is passed on, they are much more likely to donate than otherwise 59,60 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [60]
Citations
Cites
Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences
Guitton, H., & Siegel, S. (1958) · Revue économique · doi:10.2307/3498751 · Cited by 35,279
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences
McGinn, L. C. (1957) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/0016-0032(57)90766-4 · Cited by 7,284
Nielsen, R. P., & Axelrod, R. (1985) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/257983 · Cited by 6,517
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,399
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · Cited by 4,868
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Rabin, M. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,614
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Ysander, B.-C., & Arrow, K. J. (1975) · Ekonomisk Tidskrift · doi:10.2307/3438925 · Cited by 2,600
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M. A., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2003) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,895
Alexander, R. D. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203700976 · Cited by 1,695
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and CooperationPreprint
Fehr, E. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.106228 · Cited by 1,629
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. M. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118338 · Cited by 1,482
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
Levine, D. K. (1998) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1006/redy.1998.0023 · Cited by 1,374
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171941 · Cited by 1,193
The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare.
Hamlin, A., & Sugden, R. (1987) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232937 · Cited by 1,187
Individual Strategy and Social Structure
Young, H. P. (1998) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691214252 · Cited by 1,128
How to identify trust and reciprocity
Cox, J. C. (2003) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00119-2 · Cited by 1,065
Cooperation Through Image Scoring in Humans
Wedekind, C., & Milinski, M. (2000) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.288.5467.850 · Cited by 877
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
Mezzetti, C., & Young, H. P. (1999) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061165 · Cited by 862
An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1992) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951567 · Cited by 746
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence
James Andreoni, A., & Miller, J. H. (1993) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234532 · Cited by 707
(1992) · Cited by 691
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.1998.0775 · Cited by 607
Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (1998) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00131-1 · Cited by 563
The Origins of Virtue. Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation
Ridley, M. (1998) · Cited by 558
When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets
Fehr, E., Kirchler, E. M., Weichbold, A., & Gächter, S. (1998) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209891 · Cited by 437
The evolution of indirect reciprocity
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1989) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/0378-8733(89)90003-8 · Cited by 398
Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R. S., & Ross, T. W. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0013 · Cited by 396
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement DevicePreprint
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 380
Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.008 · Cited by 305
Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy?
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Bakker, T. C. M., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2001.1809 · Cited by 288
Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach
Brandts, J., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2001) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00120-6 · Cited by 262
Self-citationReciprocity and the emergence of reputation
Pollock, G., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1992) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80765-9 · Cited by 142
Dufwenberg, M. A., Uri Gneezy, B., Güth, W., & van Damme, E. E. C. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.18452/3357 · Cited by 104
Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game
Engelmann, D., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.352540 · Cited by 64
Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring / The Dynamics of Indirect ReciprocityPreprint
Nowak, & Sigmund, K. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 61
Sorting out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations
Schram, A. J. H. C. (2000) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1005036003561 · Cited by 49
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Roth, 1991, Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo, American Economic Review, 81, 1068
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01008-6 · Cited by 1,246
Rand, D. G. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.004 · Cited by 699
The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment
Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05229 · Cited by 501
Metadata
- Authors
- Seinen, I., & Schram, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Schram, Arthur
- ORCID
- Schram, Arthur
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-04
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 581-602
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2008783805
- Cited by
- 350
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 26 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 18.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
- Keywords
- indirect reciprocity, group norms, social status, costly helping, reputation, cooperation, random pairing, third-party punishment, evolution of cooperation
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
