CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 60

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The evolutionary ecology of despotism

Summers, Kyle·2005·Evolution and Human Behavior
DOI 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.09.001
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.09.001

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • IDMs may take a despotic form in which certain individuals control access to locations by excluding others and lowering their suitability.

    “IDMs may also take on a despotic form in which certain individuals control access to locations by excluding others and lowering their 'suitability' (Summers 2005;Vehrencamp 1983aVehrencamp , 1983b)).”

    From The Ideal Distribution Model and Archaeological Settlement Patterning (2022) · cites this paper as Summers 2005

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 67

  1. Alexander, 1974, The evolution of social behavior, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 5, 325, 10.1146/annurev.es.05.110174.001545 · DOI
  2. Alexander, 1990, How did humans evolve? Reflections on the uniquely unique species, University of Michigan Museum of Zoology Special Publication, 1, 1
  3. Alexander, 1968, Review of on aggression by Konrad Lorenz and the territorial imperative by Robert Ardrey, Bioscience, 18, 245, 10.2307/1294259 · DOI
  4. Allen, 1997, Agriculture and the origins of the state in ancient Egypt, Explorations in Economic History, 34, 135, 10.1006/exeh.1997.0673 · DOI
  5. Arnold, 1995, Transportation innovation and social complexity among maritime hunter–gatherer societies, American Anthropologist, 97, 733, 10.1525/aa.1995.97.4.02a00150 · DOI · Paper page
  6. Beekman, 2003, Conflicts in social animals: who has power?, TREE, 18, 272
  7. Betzig, 1995, Medieval monogamy, Journal of Family History, 20, 181, 10.1177/036319909602000204 · DOI
  8. Bingham, 1999, Human uniqueness: a general theory, Quarterly Review of Biology, 74, 133, 10.1086/393069 · DOI
  9. Boehm, 1993, Egalitarian society and reverse dominance hierarchy, Current Anthropology, 34, 227, 10.1086/204166 · DOI · Paper page
  10. Boone, 1986, Parental investment and elite family structure in preindustrial states: a case study of late medieval–early modern Portuguese genealogies, American Anthropologist, 88, 859, 10.1525/aa.1986.88.4.02a00050 · DOI
  11. Boone, 1998, The evolution of magnanimity-When is it better to give than to receive?, Human Nature-an Interdisciplinary Biosocial Perspective, 9, 1
  12. Cant, 1998, A model for the evolution of reproductive skew without reproductive suppression, Animal Behaviour, 55, 163, 10.1006/anbe.1997.0589 · DOI
  13. Carneiro, 1970, A theory of the origin of the state, Science, 169, 733, 10.1126/science.169.3947.733 · DOI
  14. Cashdan, 1980, Egalitarianism among hunter–gatherers, American Anthropologist, 82, 116, 10.1525/aa.1980.82.1.02a00100 · DOI
  15. Casimir, 1995, Prestige, possessions, and progeny: cultural goals and reproductive success among the Bakkarwal, Human Nature, 6, 241, 10.1007/BF02734141 · DOI
  16. Chagnon, 1988, Life histories, blood revenge, and warfare in a tribal population, Science, 239, 985, 10.1126/science.239.4843.985 · DOI · Paper page
  17. Clutton-Brock, 1998, Reproductive skew, concessions, and limited control, TREE, 13, 288
  18. Clutton-Brock, 1995, Punishment in animal societies, Nature, 373, 209, 10.1038/373209a0 · DOI · Paper page
  19. Crespi, 2000, A skew model for the evolution of sociality via manipulation: why it is better to be feared than to be loved, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 821, 10.1098/rspb.2000.1077 · DOI
  20. Ember, 1978, Myths about hunter–gatherers, Ethnology, 17, 439, 10.2307/3773193 · DOI
  21. Ember, 1992, Peace between participatory polities: a cross-cultural test of the “democracies rarely fight each other” hypothesis, World Politics, 44, 573, 10.2307/2010488 · DOI
  22. Emlen, 1982, The evolution of helping: I. An ecological constraints model, American Naturalist, 119, 29, 10.1086/283888 · DOI
  23. Emlen, 1994, Benefits, constraints and the evolution of the family, TREE, 9, 282
  24. Emlen, S. T., & Reeve, H. K. (2002). Reproductive skew and conflict between reciprocal cooperators. Abstract: Proceedings of the 9th Bienniel Congress of the International Society for Behavioral Ecology, Montreal, Canada.
  25. Essock-Vitale, 1980, Predictions derived from the theories of kin selection and reciprocation assessed by anthropological data, Ethology and Sociobiology, 1, 233, 10.1016/0162-3095(80)90010-2 · DOI
  26. Frank, 1995, Mutual policing and the repression of competition in the evolution of cooperative groups, Nature, 377, 520, 10.1038/377520a0 · DOI
  27. Garcia San Juan, 1999, Expressions of inequality: settlement patterns, economy and social organization in the southwest Iberian Bronze Age (c.1700–1100 BC), Antiquity, 73, 337, 10.1017/S0003598X00088293 · DOI
  28. Gurven, 2000, “It's a wonderful life”: signaling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay, Evolution and Human Behavior, 21, 263, 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00032-5 · DOI · Paper page
  29. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour I, II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1–16, 17–52. · DOI · Paper page
  30. Hudson-Dyson, 1978, Human territoriality: an ecological reassessment, American Anthropologist, 80, 21, 10.1525/aa.1978.80.1.02a00020 · DOI · Paper page
  31. Hughes, 1986, Kin coalitions and social dominance, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 123, 55, 10.1016/S0022-5193(86)80235-1 · DOI
  32. Johnstone, 2000, Models of reproductive skew: a review and synthesis, Ethology, 106, 5, 10.1046/j.1439-0310.2000.00529.x · DOI
  33. Johnstone, 1999, Reproductive skew and indiscriminate infanticide, Animal Behaviour, 57, 243, 10.1006/anbe.1998.0952 · DOI
  34. Johnstone, 1999, Reproductive skew and the threat of eviction: a new perspective, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 266, 275, 10.1098/rspb.1999.0633 · DOI
  35. Johnstone, 1999, Reproductive skew in multimember groups, American Naturalist, 153, 315, 10.1086/303169 · DOI
  36. Jones, 2000, Group nepotism and human kinship, Current Anthropology, 41, 779, 10.1086/317406 · DOI
  37. Jones, 1992, The metallography and relative effectiveness of arrowheads and armor during the middle ages, Materials Characterization, 29, 111, 10.1016/1044-5803(92)90109-U · DOI
  38. Keller, 1994, Partitioning of reproduction in animal societies, TREE, 9, 98
  39. Knapp, 1993, Social complexity: incipience, emergence, and development on pre-historic Cyprus, Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, 292, 85, 10.2307/1357250 · DOI
  40. Kokko H. (2004). Are reproductive skew models evolutionarily stable? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 270, 265–270. · DOI
  41. Kokko, 2002, Delayed dispersal as a route to breeding: territorial inheritance, safe havens and ecological constraints, American Naturalist, 160, 468, 10.1086/342074 · DOI
  42. Kokko, 1999, Social queuing in animal societies: a dynamic model of reproductive skew, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 266, 571, 10.1098/rspb.1999.0674 · DOI
  43. Kokko, 2001, The evolution of cooperative breeding through group augmentation, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 187, 10.1098/rspb.2000.1349 · DOI
  44. Lehmann, 2002, Altruism, dispersal and phenotype-matching kin recognition, American Naturalist, 159, 451, 10.1086/339458 · DOI
  45. McEachron, 1982, A review of selected sociobiological principles: application to hominid evolution: II. The effects of intergroup conflict, Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5, 121, 10.1016/S0140-1750(82)91789-4 · DOI
  46. Nowak, 1998, Evolution of reciprocity by image scoring, Science, 393, 573
  47. Otterbein, 1965, An eye for an eye, a tooth for tooth: a cross-cultural study of feuding, American Anthropologist, 67, 1470, 10.1525/aa.1965.67.6.02a00070 · DOI
  48. Otterbein, 1968, Internal war: a cross-cultural study, American Anthropologist, 70, 277, 10.1525/aa.1968.70.2.02a00040 · DOI
  49. Petengill, 1979, The impact of military technology on European income distribution, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 10, 201, 10.2307/203334 · DOI
  50. Ragsdale, 1999, Reproductive skew theory extended: the effect of resource inheritance on social organization, Evolutionary Ecological Research, 1, 859
  51. Ratnieks, 1989, Worker policing in the honeybee, Nature, 342, 796, 10.1038/342796a0 · DOI
  52. Reeve, 1998, Reproductive sharing in animal societies: reproductive incentives or incomplete control by dominant breeders?, Behavioral Ecology, 9, 267, 10.1093/beheco/9.3.267 · DOI
  53. Reeve, 2003, From individual control to majority rule: extending transactional models of reproductive skew in animal societies, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 270, 1041, 10.1098/rspb.2002.2253 · DOI
  54. Schurr, 1995, Associations between agricultural intensification and social complexity—an example from the prehistoric Ohio Valley, Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 14, 315, 10.1006/jaar.1995.1016 · DOI
  55. Sigmund, 2001, Reward and punishment, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 98, 10757, 10.1073/pnas.161155698 · DOI · Paper page
  56. Silk, 1980, Adoption and kinship in Oceania, American Anthropologist, 82, 799, 10.1525/aa.1980.82.4.02a00050 · DOI
  57. Smith, 2000, Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: public generosity as costly signaling, Evolution and Human Behavior, 21, 245, 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00031-3 · DOI
  58. Spencer, 1896, vol. 2
  59. Strassmann, 1998, Ecological constraints on marriage in rural Ireland, Evolution and Human Behavior, 19, 33, 10.1016/S1090-5138(97)00103-7 · DOI
  60. Strate, 1985, The role of war in the evolution of political systems and the functional priority of defense, Humboldt Journal of Social Relatations, 12, 87
  61. Thoden van Velzen, 1960, Residence, power groups and intra-societal aggression, International Archives of Ethnography, 49, 169
  62. Trivers, 1971, The evolution of reciprocal altruism, Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35, 10.1086/406755 · DOI · Paper page
  63. Vehrencamp, 1983, A model for the evolution of despotic versus egalitarian societies, Animal Behaviour, 31, 667, 10.1016/S0003-3472(83)80222-X · DOI
  64. Webster, 1990, Labor control and emergent stratification in prehistoric Europe, Current Anthropology, 31, 337, 10.1086/203848 · DOI
  65. Wesson, 1999, Chiefly power and food storage in southeastern North America, World Archaeology, 31, 145, 10.1080/00438243.1999.9980436 · DOI
  66. Wrangham, 1999, Evolution of coalitionary killing, Yearbook of Physical Anthropology, 42, 1, 10.1002/(SICI)1096-8644(1999)110:29+<1::AID-AJPA2>3.0.CO;2-E · DOI
  67. Wright, H. & Johson, G. Population, exchange and state formation in southwestern Iran. American Anthropologist, 77, 267–289. · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Metadata

Authors
Summers, K.
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2005-01
Volume
26
Issue
1
Pages
106-135
ISSN
1090-5138
DOI
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.09.001
Cited by
60
References
1
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review