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Cited by 180

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game

Piazza, Jared, Bering, Jesse M. · 2008 · Evolution and Human Behavior

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002

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Citations

Cites

Show all 5 references

Research works printed but not linked: 16

  1. Beneson, 2007, Children's altruistic behavior in the dictator game, Evolution and Human Behavior, 28, 168, 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.10.003 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Bering, J. M. (in press). Why hell is other people: Distinctively human psychological suffering. Review of General Psychology.
  3. Bering, 2004, The causal role of consciousness: A conceptual addendum to human evolutionary psychology, Journal of General Psychology, 8, 227, 10.1037/1089-2680.8.4.227 · DOI
  4. Bjorklund, 2000, Child development and evolutionary psychology, Child Development, 71, 1687, 10.1111/1467-8624.00258 · DOI · Paper page
  5. Bohnet, 1999, The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 38, 43, 10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00121-8 · DOI · Paper page
  6. Bolton, 1995, Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 95, 10.1006/game.1995.1026 · DOI · Paper page
  7. Dunbar, 2004, Gossip in evolutionary perspective, Review of General Psychology, 8, 100, 10.1037/1089-2680.8.2.100 · DOI · Paper page
  8. Eckel, 1998, Are women less selfish than men?: Evidence from dictator experiments, The Economic Journal, 108, 726, 10.1111/1468-0297.00311 · DOI · Paper page
  9. Fehr, 2004, Third-party punishment and social norms, Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63, 10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4 · DOI · Paper page
  10. Forsythe, 1994, Fairness in simple bargaining experiments, Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 347, 10.1006/game.1994.1021 · DOI · Paper page
  11. Harbaugh, 2000, Children's altruism in a public good and dictator experiments, Economic Inquiry, 38, 95, 10.1093/ei/38.1.95 · DOI · Paper page
  12. Hoffman, 1996, Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games, The American Economic Review, 86, 653
  13. Kahneman, 1986, Fairness and the assumptions of economics, Journal of Business, 59, 285, 10.1086/296367 · DOI · Paper page
  14. Kenrick, 1991, Proximate altruism and ultimate selfishness, Psychological Inquiry, 2, 135, 10.1207/s15327965pli0202_8 · DOI
  15. Rankin, 2006, Requests and social distance in dictator games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60, 27, 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.08.004 · DOI
  16. Wedekind, 2000, Cooperation through image scoring in humans, Science, 288, 850, 10.1126/science.288.5467.850 · DOI · Paper page

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Piazza, J., & Bering, J. M.
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-05
Volume
29
Issue
3
Pages
172-178
ISSN
1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2007051766
Cited by
180
References
5
FWCI
15.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002
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Piazza, J., & Bering, J. M. (2008). Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.