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Testing theories of fairness—Intentions matter
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Cited by
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 · Cited by 2,416
Self-citationInequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments
Engelmann, D., & Strobel, M. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002741 · Cited by 1,188
Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7384 · Cited by 1,081
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-01
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 287-303
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2134984114
- Cited by
- 711
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 104.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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