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Cited by 40Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsGame Theory and Applications

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Understanding outcome bias

Brownback, Andy, Kuhn, Michael A.·2019·Games and Economic Behavior
DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.003
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Metadata

Authors
Brownback, A., & Kuhn, M. A.
Affiliations
  • University of Arkansas at Fayetteville (US)
  • University of Oregon (US)
Corresponding author
Kuhn, Michael A.
ORCID
Venue
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2019-09
Volume
117
Pages
342-360
ISSN
0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.003
OpenAlex
W2963134042
Cited by
40
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2
FWCI
5.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
outcome bias, principal-agent problem, performance evaluation (human resources), information control, belief elicitation, effort incentives, disappointment, distributional preferences

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