The DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 84 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
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Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
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Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage
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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply
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Self-citation
Cited by
Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
(2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3 · Cited by 2,472
Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/432166 · Cited by 2,385
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097524 · Cited by 2,366
Political foundations of the resource curse
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.008 · Cited by 1,706
Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.898 · Cited by 1,475
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.08.005 · Cited by 1,204
State Capacity, Conflict, and Development
(2010) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta8073 · Cited by 850
Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions
Roland, G. (2004) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/bf02686330 · Cited by 779
Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
ACEMOGLU, D., & ROBINSON, J. A. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062046 · Cited by 709
Self-citationBaland, J.-M., Moene, K. O., & Robinson, J. A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00007-0 · Cited by 593
Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule
Acemoglu, D., Verdier, T., & Robinson, J. A. (2004) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247604323067916 · Cited by 581
Self-citationWhy Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990219 · Cited by 546
DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF
Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2011) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01033.x · Cited by 497
A Political Theory of Populism *
Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs077 · Cited by 475
Self-citationDirect Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
OLKEN, B. A. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000079 · Cited by 463
When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations
Rodrik, D. (2014) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.28.1.189 · Cited by 432
A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt
Battaglini, M., & Coate, S. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.201 · Cited by 421
The effects of new public management on the quality of public services
Lapuente, V., & Van de Walle, S. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12502 · Cited by 387
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Mian, A. R., & Khwaja, A. I. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.631703 · Cited by 375
Duanmu, J.-L. (2014) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.2014.16 · Cited by 324
Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets
Anderson, K., Rausser, G., & Swinnen, J. (2013) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.51.2.423 · Cited by 298
Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?
Greif, A., & Kingston, C. (2011) · Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8_2 · Cited by 270
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silane, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9608 · Cited by 257
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 620-652
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122572986
- Cited by
- 666
- References
- 84
- FWCI
- 39.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.