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Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
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Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
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Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
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Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 620-652
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122572986
- Cited by
- 666
- References
- 84
- FWCI
- 39.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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