The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 90 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Tax morale and conditional cooperation
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Integrity signals
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“However, contrary to the predictions made by standard game theory, behavioural experiments on the PGG have shown that most people contribute to the common pool, and only a few individuals free ride16,16,26,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [26]
Citations
Cites
Adams, J. S. (1965) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60108-2 · Cited by 10,818
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Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms
Hollander, E. P., & Homans, G. C. (1963) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1419191 · Cited by 4,708
Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences
SCHNEIDER, F. G., & Enste, D. H. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.1.77 · Cited by 3,034
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R. T., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. M., & McElreath, R. L. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.73 · Cited by 2,619
Rabin, M. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,463
The Handbook of Experimental Economics
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Not just for the money: an economic theory of personal motivation
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-1009 · Cited by 1,956
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Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Andreoni, 1998, Tax compliance, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 818
- Webley, 1988, Social comparison, attitudes and tax evasion in a shop simulation, Social Behaviour, 3, 219
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
Chaudhuri, A. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 · Cited by 1,445
The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance
Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., & Vlaev, I. (2017) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.003 · Cited by 764
Do Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and Morality
Alm, J. R., & Torgler, B. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0761-9 · Cited by 738
Self-citationTax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment
Castro, L., & Scartascini, C. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.002 · Cited by 285
Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers
Traxler, C. (2009) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.11.001 · Cited by 282
Metadata
- Authors
- Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- Torgler, Benno
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-03
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 136-159
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3023361769
- Cited by
- 671
- References
- 90
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 53 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 30 · 2015: 38 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 43 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 32.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.zora.uzh.ch
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Comparative Economics (publishedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Taxation and Legal Issues
- Keywords
- tax morale, tax compliance, conditional cooperation, tax evasion, institutional quality, audit probability, tax fines, homo economicus
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