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Tax morale and conditional cooperation
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“However, contrary to the predictions made by standard game theory, behavioural experiments on the PGG have shown that most people contribute to the common pool, and only a few individuals free ride16,16,26,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [26]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- Torgler, Benno
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-03
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 136-159
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3023361769
- Cited by
- 671
- References
- 90
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 53 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 30 · 2015: 38 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 43 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 32.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.zora.uzh.ch
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Comparative Economics (publishedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Taxation and Legal Issues
- Keywords
- tax morale, tax compliance, conditional cooperation, tax evasion, institutional quality, audit probability, tax fines, homo economicus
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